University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

3-12-2015

The Encultured Mind: From Cognitive Science to
Social Epistemology
David Alexander Eck
University of South Florida, mrdavideck@yahoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Eck, David Alexander, "The Encultured Mind: From Cognitive Science to Social Epistemology" (2015). Graduate Theses and
Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5472

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

The Encultured Mind: From Cognitive Science to Social Epistemology

by

David Eck

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Co-Major Professor: Alexander Levine, Ph.D.
Co-Major Professor: Stephen Turner, Ph.D.
Charles Guignon, Ph.D.
Joanne Waugh, Ph.D.
William Goodwin, Ph.D.
Date of Approval:
March 12, 2015

Keywords: enactivism, participatory sense-making, embodied knowledge, tacit knowledge,
testimonial knowledge
Copyright © 2015, David Eck

Dedication

To Lauren, whose understanding and support lie quietly between the lines of the many pages that
follow.

Acknowledgments

It is hard to imagine the existence of the following project—never mind its completion—without
the singular help of Alex Levine. His scholarship is as remarkable as it is unassuming, only
surpassed by his concern for others and readiness to help. I must express immense thanks for the
assistance of Stephen Turner, whose intellectual candor and acuity repeatedly spurred the
dissertation forward. I am also especially thankful to Charles Guignon—for his kindness and
philosophical subtlety; to Joanne Waugh—for her enlivening conversations, not least those
concerning Plato; and to William Goodwin—for his steadfast questioning, which has added
valuable perspectives to the project. My committee members have been invaluable mentors—in
philosophy and much else. All of the errors in the following—I assure you—are mine.
I would like to also thank the USF philosophy community as a whole, from the teachers
and staff to my fellow graduate students. A special thanks to Roger Ariew, whose philosophical
sensibilities and historical acumen have greatly improved my own. My fellow graduate students
have helped me at every turn, most of all Andrew Winters who shepherded me through the entire
writing process. I would like to also stress Brian Dunst’s contributions, whose own dissertation
dispelled the impasse that I found myself at. Nate Draluck and Jared Kinggard, both of whom are
veritable oracles, have been instrumental; “It’s just one big paper.” To name only some of the
many others who have supported me: Phil Scuderi, Steve Burgess, Megan Altman, Adam Buben,
Casey Rentmeester, Pete Olen, Michael Thompson, Michelle Merritt, Ali Elamin, David Cheely,
Christine Wieseler, Sarah Wieten, Dahlia Guzman, Anthony Fernandez, and Carter Hardy. Also,

I want to separately thank those who began graduate school with me and made the transition
worthwhile: Brian Mintey, Sacha Greer, Mark Castricone, Emre Keskin, and Greg McCreery. (I
hope you didn’t expect my acknowledgements to be brief—the following dissertation claims that
philosophers have systematically marginalized the social dimensions of knowledge.)
The philosophy department at Lehigh University set me up to succeed. Gordon Bearn
taught me more than could be put into words and much else that can. Rick Matthews turned his
classes into living Socratic dialogues or group therapy sessions, it was never clear which but it
was always transformative. Roslyn Weiss opened up to me the wonders of ancient philosophy.
Mark Bickhard taught me the productivity of error. I would be remiss to not also thank Hannah
Behrmann, Alex Ganim, John Pettegrew, Seth Moglen, Erin Seeba, Donna Wagner, Olga
Stewart, Fareed Awan, Molly Luft, Emily Wettstein, Joey, Jess, Pat, and Colin.
My insatiable curiosity, questioning disposition, and love of conversation is due in no
small part to a rich network of hometown friends. Thank you Cutter, Jesse, Eric, Dylan, Paul, JP
and many others. For food, wine, literature, and stonelaying, I am eternally indebted to the entire
Miele-Wood clan, especially Cutter, Erin, Gloria, Jim, Liz, Bob, Dante, and Marcia.
As with most good stories, mine begins with a singular family experience. My mother’s
love was only matched by her unflinching example of independence. My older brother Jake’s
forced impressment into helping with his newspaper route instilled in me the determination and
space for contemplation necessary to be a philosopher. Amber, Brandon, Adriana, and Rachel,
among other things, remind me of the adolescent injustices I inflicted upon them and the need to
compromise without compromising oneself. Thanks also go to Grandmérè, Erica, Ralph, the Lee
family; and to my father. Chad and Linda have been great friends. And a final thanks to Lauren,
who has buoyed me, Jon and Jackie, and the Wagner, Anderson, and Troup families.

Table of Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii
Chapter 1: The Testimony View ......................................................................................................1
1.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................1
1.1 Epistemology’s Litmus Test ..........................................................................................3
1.2 The Nature and Domain(s) of Testimony ....................................................................10
1.2.1 Elizabeth Fricker’s Partitioning of Testimony’s Domain .............................10
1.2.2 Jennifer Lackey on the Nature of Testimony ................................................13
1.2.3 John Greco’s “Friendly” Epistemic Environments .......................................18
1.3 The Transmission Thesis versus The Transmission View ...........................................22
1.4 Alvin Goldman’s Reliabilism ......................................................................................25
1.5 Goldman’s Epistemics Project: Some Major Issues ....................................................30
1.5.1 Epistemics: An Overview .............................................................................30
1.5.2 Epistemics and the Generality Problem ........................................................32
1.5.3 Epistemics’ Conception of Intelligence and the Basing Relation
Problem ............................................................................................................34
1.5.4 Epistemics’ Conception of Intelligence and the Pursuit of
Knowledge .......................................................................................................37
1.6 Truth-Oriented Social Epistemology ...........................................................................41
1.6.1 Testimony within Goldman’s Social Epistemics ..........................................42
1.6.2 Epistemic Paternalism and Epistemics’ Two Loci of Control ......................46
1.6.3 Concluding Thoughts on Truth-Oriented Social Epistemology and
Epistemics ........................................................................................................50
1.7 Kusch’s Communitarian Critique of the Testimony Literature ...................................54
Chapter 2: The Translation View...................................................................................................61
2.0 Introduction ..................................................................................................................61
2.1 Polanyi on Tacit Knowledge: Imitative Learning within Traditions ...........................63
2.2 Dreyfus and Searle: Tacit Knowledge as a Transferable Objective
Precondition .................................................................................................................71
2.3 Substitutes for the Normative ......................................................................................85
2.4 The Cognitive Basis for the Translation View: Connectionism and Mirror
Neurons .......................................................................................................................93
2.5 Social Theory: Individualist or Collectivist? .............................................................108
Chapter 3: Coordinated Interaction..............................................................................................112
i

3.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................112
3.1 From Autopoietic Machines to Sense-Making: The Enactivist Approach to
Cognition ...................................................................................................................114
3.2 Teleology, Adaptivity, and Other Forbidden Things .................................................126
3.3 An Enactivist Approach to the Social: Participatory Sense-Making .........................134
3.4 Extended Functionalism? ...........................................................................................146
3.5 Structural Normativity? .............................................................................................149
Chapter 4: Coordination in Epistemic Communities ...................................................................161
4.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................161
4.1 Relating Embodiment and Social Epistemology: Two Ways of Regulating
Error............................................................................................................................163
4.2 Kuhn as a Bridge to Contemporary Social Epistemology .........................................166
4.3 D’Agostino’s Federal Model of Enquiry ...................................................................172
4.4 Two Disembodied Social Epistemologies .................................................................182
4.5 Cogency and the Immanent Normativity of Epistemic Communities .......................191
Chapter 5: The Encultured Mind .................................................................................................199
5.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................199
5.1 The Extended Mind, Functionalism, and Their Vanishing Cognitive Subject ..........201
5.2 Uncovering the Adaptationist and Manipulationist Core of the Extended
Mind ...........................................................................................................................209
5.3 Socializing EM: Insights, Advances, and Some Intractable Difficulties ...................218
5.4 Hutto’s Radical Enactivism: Eliminating Basic Mental Content But At
What Cost? .................................................................................................................229
5.5 Enculturation via Cognitive Practices: Menary’s Erasure of Epistemic
Agency .......................................................................................................................235
5.6 The Encultured Mind: An Enactive Account of Complementarity ...........................241
Conclusion: Epistemic Enquiry, Encultured Enquirers, and their Future ....................................249
6.1 From the Problem of Justification to Enculturation: How Much Has
Changed? ...................................................................................................................249
6.2 The Information Age and Not-Just-Information Problems ........................................259
References ....................................................................................................................................265

ii

Abstract

The last quarter-century has witnessed monumental advances in studies of the social dimensions
of knowledge. In this dissertation, I chart a number of those advances and some remaining
difficulties, drawing upon work in social philosophy, cognitive science, epistemology, and the
philosophy of science. It has been common, within each field, to initially approach the social
dimensions of knowledge as simply another resource to be utilized or controlled: in the
philosophy of science, for instance, Kuhn (1977) focuses on how a diversity of individuals foster
scientific progress by balancing the tension between innovative and conservative research
impulses; in epistemology, Coady (1992) focuses on how other people, via their testimony, are a
ubiquitous and indispensable source of beliefs; in social epistemology, Fuller ([1988] 2002)
focuses on how to organize scientific research in order to most efficiently realize a set of political
values; and in cognitive science, there has been a widespread focus on how individuals’ predict
or explain others’ behavior (Churchland [1984] 2013). From this utility perspective, other
people—insofar as they are epistemically significant—appear as resources or tools to be
managed and exploited. I call this view—in which people’s epistemic significance are only of
instrumental value—manipulationism. The following dissertation is dedicated to identifying
manipulationism, tracing its manifestations in the aforementioned fields, and explaining how to
move beyond it.
That manipulationism was not cause for immediate alarm is attributable in large part to
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two factors: adaptationism and the distinction between knowledge and its practical application.
Regarding the former, most theorists who even deign to consider the evolutionary origins of
knowledge are stuck in the modern Darwinian synthesis, treating random variation and natural
selection as the sole consequential evolutionary processes. It is only but one more step from this
adaptationism to an egoism in which individuals’ epistemic aims are grounded in the drive to
survive. Regarding the second factor, distinguishing between knowledge and its application
suggests that the epistemic dimension of social interaction is isolable. From this perspective,
people might be more than just valuable tools, but not when considered strictly in terms of their
epistemic value. A large portion of the following dissertation concerns how the knowledge-andits-application distinction has been undermined, and the issues with manipulationism that arise
therefrom. The distinction’s shortcomings have been brought to the fore by the palpable failures
of attempts to treat other people as just instrumental epistemic resources. To assess these failures
and to chart a path beyond them, I consider three broad approaches to analyzing the epistemic
significance of social interaction: the testimony view, the translation view, and the
transformation view.
The testimony view is an outgrowth of analytic epistemology and the attendant justified
true belief account of knowledge. On the testimony view, other people are essentially efficient
belief transmitters. All of the transmitted beliefs could, in principle, be acquired by one’s own
senses, but owing to one’s physical finitude, it is necessary to rely on others’ firsthand
experiences. Ideally, as in the case of courtroom testimony, the other person reports their sensory
experience without covertly introducing any information absent from their original experience.
As a result, the central epistemic question, on this view, concerns the problem of justification:
can beliefs gained through testimony, under any circumstances, be considered knowledge despite
iv

the recipient apparently lacking proper justification. As an alternative to the testimony view, I
draw upon the translation and transformation views for understanding the epistemic significance
of social interaction, both of these views shifting the epistemic question away from the
traditional one of justification and towards the nature of embodied skills.
The translation view is tied to the notion of tacit knowledge, as first developed in the
philosophy of science. Becoming a scientist requires the direct tutelage of experienced
professionals, suggesting that being a scientist involves inarticulable skills (i.e., tacit knowledge).
Accordingly, the label “translation view” refers to the inherent need for agents to translate the
behavior and words of others into their own unique competencies. Social interaction is thus
important precisely because of the ineliminable differences between individuals, not because of
what they share. The definitive tenet of the translation view is that diversity amongst individuals
is pervasive, persistent, and profoundly shapes social interaction. While the emphasis on the
profound differences between individuals is salutary and serves as a crucial standard for social
theory, the translation view fails to overcome manipulationism. Other people, on this view, are
epistemically significant only insofar as they are a means for passing along tacit skills. To
overcome the manipulationist presupposition, I assemble a transformation view of cognition over
the course of Chs. 3 – 5.
One of the principal aims of the transformation view is to bridge the gap between
cognitive science and social epistemology. There has been a troubling lack of exchange between,
on the one hand, cognitive scientists who examine the thinking subject as an isolated individual
and, on the other, social epistemologists who limit themselves to population-level descriptions
and prescriptions. The key tenet of the transformation view, as the name suggests, is that
cognition—especially cognition within a social context—is a transformative process. To put the
v

same point polemically, the transformation view objects to the existence of an innate and
immutable cognitive core. I begin assembling the transformation view in Ch. 3, using the
enactivist movement within cognitive science, then shift to the population-level perspective of
neo-Kuhnian social epistemology in Ch. 4, and, finally, return to cognitive science in Ch. 5 in
order to assess the Extended Mind debate. Incorporating both first-personal and population-level
perspectives is essential to modeling enculturation without reifying one aspect of the dynamic
relationship between self and others.
The main impetus behind enactivism is to provide a naturalized account of cognition that
is non-exceptionalist and non-saltationist. Aligned with the so-called Extended Synthesis in
contemporary biology, enactivism challenges egoistic pictures of agency, in which the agent
chooses to interact with its environment in order to satisfy self-interested desires. The enactivist
subject, by contrast, is a self-maintenant network of processes that lacks a fixed boundary
between self and environment. By presenting an alternative to egoistic models of agency,
enactivism points the way to overcoming manipulationism. Yet enactivism’s implications for
social theory have only recently begun to be articulated with the concept of participatory sensemaking. Applied to two-person interactions, participatory sense-making shows how
epistemically productive social coordination does not presuppose individual cognitive
mechanisms. But extending participatory sense-making to larger-scale and longer-term social
contexts has proven difficult: most efforts have reified coordination patterns and consequently
obscured the role of idiosyncratic individuals. To provide a more compelling extension of
participatory sense-making, I draw upon accounts of epistemic communities found in neoKuhnian social epistemology.
Social epistemology’s rich accounts of epistemic communities identify a number of
vi

coordination mechanisms. One mechanism that I discuss in Ch. 4 is cogent argumentation, a
coordination mechanism that exemplifies the further insights made possible by linking social
epistemology to embodied and enactive accounts of cognition. According to the concept of
cogency, argumentation is a context-specific process that involves an indefinite range of possible
factors. When viewed in terms of embodied cognition, the immanent nature of argumentation
reflects the fundamental nature of knowledge rather than being merely a practical exigency. My
synthesis of social epistemology and enactivism, however, runs contrary to most theorists who
have tackled the problem of how to relate the predominantly individualist methodology of
cognitive science to population-level accounts of epistemic communities. I review a sample of
such competing theories in Ch. 5, two of which are also enactivist.
One indication of the general progress made in the last quarter-century in cognitive
science has been a noticeable shift in polemical targets. The trenchant attacks leveled against
cognitivism by the so-called “four E” cognitive theories (i.e., embodied, embedded, extended,
and enactive approaches) have ceded way in large part to 4E theories critiquing each other. In Ch.
5, I argue that many 4E theories have failed to overcome manipulationism. Using the extended
approach as an exemplar, I trace manipulationism to unsatisfactory accounts of first-personal
agency. On the extended account, the cognitive subject quite literally disappears, lost in a jumble
of multiply realizable processes. In this context, the manipulationist presupposition is necessary
in order to glue the processes into something resembling an individual agent—that is, the drive to
survive is the multiply realizable end upon which all epistemic goals derive. The disappearing
cognitive subject issue also manifests itself in retrospective enactivist accounts.
Some varieties of enactivism model the epistemic agent in strictly retrospective terms.
This strictly retrospective orientation is a product of modeling enculturation as a process wherein
vii

an individual agent internalizes objective communal norms. Although the model falls under the
transformation view—since it treats socialization as a transformative process—it does so at the
cost of erasing any meaningful notion of first-personal agency. Positing a shared set of objective
communal norms obscures the idiosyncratic differences between agents, differences that—as
suggested by the translation view—play a productive epistemic role.
In contrast to retrospective interpretations of enactivism, I present a future-oriented
epistemic agent. With the shift in temporal orientation, the agent’s history—including its
evolutionary, ontogenetic, and social aspects—no longer appears as a determinate causal chain
but rather as an open-ended constraint. Participating in joint epistemic ventures, the encultured
agent enacts her history in the continuous process of creating a new one. In what follows, neither
agent nor community possess analytic priority; agent and community are rather, I suggest, in a
mutually transformative relationship.
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Chapter 1: The Testimony View

1.0

Introduction

Imagine a world in which most of the knowledge you possess originates from the verbal reports
of other people. These reports are usually based on the first-hand observations of the reporter,
him- or herself, and the reporter’s primary intention is to inform you of his or her observations.
Now imagine another world descended from the first. In this second world, most of your
knowledge still depends on others’ reports, only now others’ reports also come in the form of
encoded symbols inscribed on relatively stable physical media. As in the first world, the primary
intention of reporters is an informative one. The use of physical media in conjunction with verbal
reports facilitates longer chains of reports: people often report to you another person’s
observations, the third person having inscribed his or her first-hand observation on a physical
medium.
Finally, imagine a third world that is like the second, except that encoded inscriptions on
physical media are vastly more common. Other people still verbally report their own first-hand
observations as well as the first-hand observations of a third person. But it is routine, perhaps
even more common, for acquaintances to report the observations of people whom they have
never met, who often are themselves reporting another persons observations, some of whom
lived hundreds or even thousands of years ago. Furthermore, a large portion—perhaps the
majority, or even vast majority—of one’s knowledge originates from physical inscriptions rather
than verbal reports. According to the epistemological concept of testimony, this imagined third

1

world represents the epistemically significant aspects of social interaction in the present-day
world, while the first two worlds outline its epistemically salient precursors. Given this general
picture of epistemic interaction, testimony theorists see their chief epistemological task as
explaining in what sense and to what extent (if any) are our testimonial beliefs justified.
In the present chapter, I argue that the concept of testimony and the social epistemology
founded upon it are fundamentally asocial. The concept of testimony leads to a clinical, perhaps
even pathological approach to the epistemic significance of social interaction. Central to my
claim is what I describe as testimony’s “transmission view,” which underlies the various
approaches to testimony that I examine. The transmission view treats social interaction as
essentially nothing more than the transfer of discrete units of information. In characterizing the
transmission view, I identify two troubling effects it has on social epistemology. First, social
interaction—and, by extension, other people as well—are understood in strictly instrumental or
manipulationist terms. Second, epistemic agency appears to be inherently passive. In the
following, I focus on identifying and tracing the transmission view within the testimony
literature, while in subsequent chapters I will offer alternative models of social interaction.
The chapter contains two major parts. In the first half (§1.1-1.3), I examine the testimony
literature in general. This general account begins with C.A.J. Coady’s seminal 1992 work
Testimony: A Philosophic Study and traces some of the major outlines of the literature that his
work has inspired. I give extensive attention to Jonathan Adler’s “core case” approach to
testimony because I think it epitomizes the asocial tendencies endemic to the literature. To show
the pervasiveness of this asocial tendency I examine three different critical strands that attempt to
address the issue, though all ultimately fail to do so. In the second half of the chapter (§1.4-1.6),
I turn to Alvin Goldman’s epistemics project. On the basis of reliabilism, Goldman avoids many
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of the issues that dominate and unduly limit the larger testimony literature. The epistemics
project focuses on ways of more efficiently acquiring true beliefs, shifting away from the issue of
justification. This shift is helpful in drawing more attention to the transmission dynamics of
testimony.
In the final section, I discuss Martin Kusch’s communitarian epistemology. Kusch offers
one of the most fundamental critiques of the testimony literature, arguing that it has been
dominated by the “individualist testimony view.” My critique of testimony’s transmission view
shares much in common with and is partially indebted to Kusch’s diagnosis. But unlike Kusch, I
find the concept of testimony fundamentally flawed. Kusch’s attempt to redirect the testimony
literature is understandable given its role in establishing social epistemology as a vital field of
study. In subsequent chapters, however, I argue that social epistemology needs to abandon the
concept of testimony.

1.1

Epistemology’s Litmus Test

The testimony literature, more than any other discussion, is responsible for showing that the
epistemic significance of social interaction is more than an afterthought. Frederick Schmitt, in
the introduction to Socializing Epistemology, considers testimony the “most fundamental test of
epistemological individualism” (Schmitt 1994). Even though Schmitt does not think there has
been a decisive argument against “weak individualism,” social epistemology appears as a vast,
ripe, and largely unexplored domain. Grappling with testimony, he thinks, is one of the keys to
unlocking the domain. Yet the testimony literature has been subject to a notably narrow dialectic
since its contemporary inception with C.A.J. Coady’s Testimony: A Philosophic Study.
The fundamental nature of testimony has been largely taken for granted. Coady (1992),
for example, focuses not on characterizing the nature of testimony but rather arguing for how to
3

conceptualize testimony’s justificatory grounds. Adopting Coady’s focus and terminology, the
resulting testimony literature has been dominated by the reductionist – antireductionist/fundamentalist debate. Reductionists hold that testimonial beliefs ought to be
justified by appeal to non-testimonial sources, while anti-reductionists argue that testimony is
itself a fundamental source that provides at least prima facie warrant.
In the spirit of the reductionist – anti-reductionist debate, Alvin Goldman (2010) casually
remarks that the “problem of testimony is a problem about justification.” And Jonathan Adler’s
(2010) entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the topic of testimony is not about
testimony per se but instead the “The Epistemological Problems of Testimony,” with the
problem of justification chief among them. Testimony itself (i.e., the act of testifying) appears to
be as theoretically uninteresting as social epistemology previously had been. This rhetorical
trajectory, however, is not simply a function of Coady’s work but, more importantly, reflects the
underlying notion of testimony at work.
Testimony is understood to be ubiquitous. Its ubiquity marks testimony’s general
significance in that it shows our unavoidable dependence on it. In arguing against the
reductionist position, for example, Coady (1992) is at pains to establish our dependence on
testimony by describing its variety and pervasiveness: from the mundane, such as knowing our
date of birth, to more far reaching and complicated matters, such as knowing about historical
events and serving as a prerequisite for scientific collaboration. While testimony’s ubiquity
establishes our dependence, it also implies that the essential act of testifying is relatively trivial.
The common element to all of the examples is the generic notion of passing along information,
what Elizabeth Fricker (2006) terms as a “telling” in the broadest sense. The only theoretically
interesting aspect of the act of testifying itself consists in clearly distinguishing such “tellings”
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from other non-epistemic communications. Axel Gelfert (2006) offers a very different
motivation for the epistemic significance of testimony but is committed to same underlying
notion of testifying as a mundane act of telling.
Gelfert uses the unlikely figure of Immanuel Kant to argue for the epistemic significance
of testimony. Kant’s argument differs markedly from the contemporary literature because in it
our dependence on testimony follows from ethical considerations rather than empirical ones.
Gelfert interprets Kant’s lectures on logic as presenting our trust in others’ testimony—so long as
the testimony concerns empirical as opposed to moral matters—as a presumptive imperfect duty.
The duty follows from the thought that if we want to be believed by others, then we have a duty
in turn to believe others (Gelfert 2006). Despite its distinctive ethical dimensions, Kant’s
argument, like the contemporary literature on testimony, is primarily concerned with establishing
our reliance on testimony rather than examining the act of testifying itself.
Having established people’s dependence on testimony, the subsequent question is what
implications this has for our understanding of knowledge. Both reductionists and antireductionists agree that people rely on testimony, but disagree over what epistemic status to
accord to testimonial beliefs. More specifically, if knowledge involves some element of
justification, then how are testimonial beliefs justified. Reductionists attempt to reduce
testimonial beliefs to individual cognitive resources, as opposed to fundamentalists like Coady
who think that such a task is hopeless and thus infer that there must be an additional social
source of justification. It is worth returning to Schmitt’s remark, noted above, that testimony is
the fundamental test of epistemological individualism. The test is specifically over the question
of whether knowledge can be justified solely on the basis of individual cognitive capacities.
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Adler labels testimony’s justificatory question as the “Vulnerability Problem.” He poses
the problem as follows: “Given that speakers of a language sometimes assert falsehoods and fail
to be sincere, under what conditions, if any, is someone's word alone sufficient to justify the
beliefs a hearer acquires from those assertions?” (Adler 2010). Dishonesty alone makes people
epistemically vulnerable if they do not and, in many if not most everyday situations, cannot
verify a speaker’s claims. Additional factors, such as the possibility of honest errors, only further
highlight the vulnerability of endorsing testimonial beliefs. The Vulnerability Problem—the very
idea that individuals are epistemically vulnerable due to their reliance on other people—is what
makes testimony the fundamental test of epistemological individualism. For the Vulnerability
Problem to be a genuine test of epistemological individualism, however, the Problem must be
more than a marginal worry.
In order to show that the Vulnerability Problem is a widespread concern, Adler (2010)
appeals to three general features of our “conversational practice.” The first corresponds to the
main fundamentalist point from above, namely that we are profoundly dependent on testimony.
This is the point of showing that reliance on testimony is necessary in mundane matters as well
as in rigorous epistemic endeavors, such as scientific research. Adler’s second feature is people’s
tendency to accept “ordinary informative testimony.” The idea here is that at least with respect to
everyday topics—such as the time of day, the weather forecast, the name of a nation’s president,
and so on—people usually accept answers to such questions without a second thought. The final
feature of our conversational practice is closely related to the first but deserves more extensive
treatment.
The third feature of our conversational practice concerns people’s ability to test their trust
in a speaker. Within the constraints of normal testimonial exchange, it is infeasible for hearers to
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“seriously” check or confirm a speaker’s reliability or sincerity. The reliability issue results in
part from our far-reaching dependence on testimony, as established in the first feature. Coady’s
critique of Hume as the representative of reductionism carefully unpacks this point: the scope of
testimonial beliefs dwarfs any particular individual’s first-hand experiences. Thus, the
individual’s experiential base is far too narrow to support an inferential induction to the
reliability of speakers in general (Coady 1992). And, if it is impossible to infer the reliability of
speakers in general, practical constraints will prevent people from inferring the reliability of all
or even many particular speakers. Thus, these three features of ordinary conversational practice
show that the Vulnerability Problem pervades much of what we consider ourselves as knowing.
It’s worth questioning, however, whether it is misleading to treat all of the various
instances of testimony in terms of a single general “conversational practice.” The danger is to
abstract away from epistemically significant aspects of social interaction. This danger is even
more evident when Adler attempts to more clearly delineate the Vulnerability Problem by
identifying a “class of core cases.”
Adler’s class of core cases is defined by six conditions (2010). First, a piece of testimony
can only be a single sentence, eliminating the possibility of the statement being supported by
cohering with other assertions. Second, there can only be one speaker, eliminating the possibility
of support via corroboration with other speakers. Third, the social context must be one in which
the norm of truthfulness holds and the purpose is to inform, ensuring that there is a strictly
epistemic dimension to the exchange. Fourth, the testimony must sustain the corresponding
belief in the hearer, ensuring that the testimony is doing the work and not some separate source.
Fifth, the speaker should not be recognized as an expert, since expertise could provide an
additional source of support. And, finally, the hearer must have no special knowledge of the
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speaker, ensuring that such personal knowledge does not provide independent support for the
testimony. The six conditions aim to distill the essential element of testimony as one person
passing along a belief to another with the receiver accepting the belief as such. But the
usefulness of this theoretical idealization, even more than the “conversational practice”
idealization, is unclear.
The core of testimonial acts, according to Adler’s idealization, is one statement passing in
one direction. The worry, at this point, is that the class of core cases seems to have lost touch
with the reality of testimony. Given the latter condition, the core of testimony is not even an
exchange but rather a one-directional transmission. It is worth doubting whether all six
conditions could ever be simultaneously fulfilled. One of the basic issues is that people do not
stay strangers for long, which directly problematizes the sixth condition of the core case
idealization and, more generally, the aim of isolating the transmission and reception of a discrete
belief from any other epistemic considerations.
By making the class of core cases the definitive core of testimony, our understanding of
what is meant to be a pervasive part of our everyday lives is based on a questionable idealization.
I think Adler’s approach is symptomatic of what Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo
(2007), when discussing classical approaches in the philosophy of mind, pejoratively refer to as
the “Rear Window Approach.”1 I will return to this thought in Ch. 3 when discussing the concept
of participatory sense-making, but, for the moment, I only want to gain more perspective on the
underlying notion of testimony and the literature that it has inspired.
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It should be noted that the “Rear Window” criticism does not imply that testimony cannot be put to
valuable uses. Perhaps its most valuable application has been in Virtue Epistemology, by thinkers such as
Miranda Fricker, John Greco, and Ernest Sosa.
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Testimony, as a topic of philosophic inquiry, has offered an uneven perspective on the
social dimensions of epistemology. On the one hand, the contemporary literature initiated by
Coady (1992) has thoroughly established our epistemic reliance on other people, a reliance that
had been obscured by traditional individualist epistemology. In this respect, the topic of
testimony has been a major corrective to traditional epistemology.
But, on the other hand, particular acts of testifying appear to be relatively trivial and, for
the most part, theoretically uninteresting. This tendency is common to diverse approaches to
testimony, from Coady’s original treatment to reductionist responses as well as other approaches
such as Gelfert (2006). The major theoretical question has been what implications testimony has
on our concept of justification, as evidenced by the dominance of the reductionist – antireductionist debate. Justification seems to both sides to be the sticking point: the ubiquity of
testimonial beliefs makes it impractical if not entirely infeasible to verify them. Given this
situation, it is unclear in what sense testimonial beliefs could be adequately justified in order to
be considered knowledge. And dismissing testimonial beliefs as less than knowledge appears to
discount far too much of what people know; in contrast to Quine’s ontological preferences, not
everyone likes desert landscapes. One potential casualty of this debate, I have suggested, has
been an adequate treatment of testimony as it occurs in our everyday lives.
Given the size of the testimony literature, it should be no surprise that these issues have
been at least alluded to. Not everyone, for example, has been satisfied with the reductionist –
anti-reductionist debate. And the basis for identifying a class of core cases—which presupposes
that there is some homogenous essence common to all instances of testimony—has also been
called into question. These critical strands shed some light on the basic concept of testimony per
se, which as previously mentioned tends to be taken for granted in the general literature. In the
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next section, I examine three critical strands within the testimony literature and claim that they
are insufficient for adequately addressing the present concerns.

1.2
1.2.1

The Nature and Domain(s)2 of Testimony
Elizabeth Fricker’s Partitioning of Testimony’s Domain

Adler’s explication of the Vulnerability Problem implies that testimony consists of one unified
domain. For if testimony does not consist of one unified or homogenous domain, then the use of
core cases to explain and address the Vulnerability Problem would be inappropriate. Testimony’s
domain has been an ongoing (though mostly marginal) concern of the contemporary testimony
literature, beginning with Elizabeth Fricker’s (1995) extensive critical review of Coady (1992).
Fricker’s most general criticism of Coady is for treating testimony as “one unitary
category” (1995). In place of one category, Fricker makes two crosscutting distinctions. The
domain of testimony is partitioned based on, first, “kinds of tellings” and, second, the “phases in
the career of a recipient of testimony.” Different “kinds” of tellings refers to differences in
subject matter, while the “phases” of a receiver’s career simply refers to the recipient’s maturity
level. Both of these are very coarse-grained concepts, as Fricker is only interested in two subcategories within each. With respect to maturity level, there are two stages—a developmental
phase defined by simple trust in other people and a mature phase. Likewise with kinds of tellings,
Fricker is not interested in particular subject matters but rather whether a given subject matter
lends itself to competency. As a result, Fricker is only interested in two types of subject matter—

2

In keeping with the testimony literature, I use “domain” in the non-technical sense of scope or range. There
are times at which a technical sense of domain seems to be implied in the literature (e.g., claims regarding a
finite number of types of testimony), but there has not been a rigorous treatment of such implications.
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those that should and should not be expected to support competent testimony. Coady’s unified
domain is thus crisscrossed by four sub-categories.
By partitioning testimony’s domain, Fricker attempts to reconcile the fact that, on the one
hand, some testimonial beliefs seem to be appropriately accepted on trust alone with the belief,
on the other hand, that some testimonial beliefs ought to have justificatory support in order to be
deemed knowledge. The second distinction regarding maturity level has the most obvious
implications for this question. In the developmental phase, cognitive subjects abide by the
Presumptive Right Principle (PR) in which they are entitled to believe what they are told as such.
Among the purported benefits of the PR principle within the developmental stage is enabling the
acquisition of language. Thus, the developmental stage’s PR principle is not merely a temporary
dispensation but also serves some positive epistemic ends. The first distinction from above helps
to explain how the PR principle may appear as though it still holds in the mature phase when it
actually does not.
Even for mature cognitive subjects, there are some subject matters that do not deserve
close scrutiny. Topics that readily support a speaker’s competency—such as the speaker’s name,
where she lives, anything that is readily accessible to her perceptual capacities, and so on—ought
to be trusted more than complex or contentious matters, such as political issues. In cases of
simple subject matters, mature cognitive subjects often rightfully accept the testimony without
any attempt to independently verify it. Even though the exchange thus looks similar to the PR
principle, Fricker claims that mature subjects monitor the speaker for problem signs. This is
already implied by the need to discriminate between which subject matters support competent
testimony, but even with regard to these subject matters it is also necessary to monitor the
speaker’s sincerity. Monitoring is meant to be a background mental activity that only switches
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into conscious scrutiny when a problematic sign appears. Hence, a mature subject’s quick
acceptance of a testimonial belief may appear compliant with the PR principle when, in fact, it is
more epistemically robust having passed unconscious monitoring for sincerity and competence.
Fricker’s interest in partitioning the domain of testimony relates back to the reductionist –
anti-reductionist debate initiated by Coady. One result of the partition is distinguishing between
two possible versions of reductionism—local and global. Coady (1992) seems to only recognize
the possibility of global reductionism, which entails establishing the reliability of testimony in
general. Fricker, by contrast, endorses local reductionism: monitoring testimony for signs of
dishonesty and incompetence only justifies particular testimonial acts. Fricker’s primary interest
in addressing the justificatory question explains the limitations of her partition. The fourcategory partition of testimony’s domain, while an improvement on Coady’s monolithic
understanding, is too coarse-grained to address the concerns raised in the previous section,
namely whether the testimony literature abstracts out epistemically significant aspects of social
interaction. This is evident when comparing Fricker’s partition with Adler’s core case approach.
Despite their differences, Fricker’s account is compatible with the spirit of Adler’s core
case approach to the Vulnerability Problem. Reconciling the two only requires indexing Adler’s
core cases to one of Fricker’s four partitions, namely the domain of mature cognitive subjects
who are dealing with a subject matter that lends itself to competency. Fricker, after all, is most
interested in this domain anyway, as it is within this domain that background monitoring of
testimony occurs. Adler’s fifth condition on core cases—that the speaker not be seen as an
expert—even hints at Fricker’s subject matter requirement. Hence, although differing on the
details of how to conceptualize testimony’s domain, both Adler and Fricker are invested in
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identifying the general factors that justify particular testimonial beliefs. And, for both Adler and
Fricker, this justification depends on largely unconscious background activities and beliefs.
1.2.2

Jennifer Lackey on the Nature of Testimony

Jennifer Lackey poses a different challenge for Adler’s core case approach by more closely
examining the nature of testimony itself. In a pair of articles, Lackey argues for a dualism within
the epistemology of testimony as opposed to treating it as one homogeneous whole. Dualism in
this context refers to synthesizing elements from both reductionism and anti-reductionism into a
hybrid theory. Constructing the hybrid theory of testimony is what leads Lackey to reassess the
nature of testimony itself.
Examining the fundamental nature of testimony per se is unusual in the testimony
literature. Most discussion of its nature is limited to distinguishing testimony from other nonepistemic aspects of social interaction. Lackey (2006b) is led to more closely examining the
topic because she thinks that the reductionist – anti-reductionist debate collapses two distinct
aspects of testimony. These two aspects—hearer testimony and speaker testimony—are hinted at
and alluded to in others’ attempts to define nature of testimony.
Lackey considers three definitions of testimony in support of her argument for dualism.
First, Coady’s (1992) definition of testimony is extremely restrictive: the speaker must intend to
communicate a piece of information and the recipient must be interested in the information. The
definition discounts a great deal of what seem to be instances of testimony. Lackey refers to this
as the Narrow View of Testimony, which Peter Graham improves upon by dropping Coady’s
listener requirement while keeping the speaker’s intention requirement. For if someone intends
to inform another person, then this is an act of testifying regardless of whether the audience cares
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to be informed. Lackey labels Graham’s modification the Moderate View of Testimony.3 Finally,
Elizabeth Fricker dispenses with speaker intentions entirely, arguing that any expression of
thought constitutes an instance of testimony. Fricker’s definition—which Lackey labels the
Broad View of Testimony—has the benefit of accounting for instances in which a listener may
make use of a speaker’s thoughts despite the speaker lacking any intention to inform.
While highlighting Coady and Graham’s overly narrow construal of testimony, Fricker’s
Broad View is subject to its own problem. Fricker’s Broad View cannot properly exclude
instances in which no one—neither the speaker nor listener—takes an expressed thought to be
epistemically significant. Relevant examples include conversational fillers and words of
encouragement: if neither the speaker nor the recipient finds an expression epistemically
significant, then Lackey believes that it does not count it as testimony.
All three definitions contribute to Lackey’s concept of dualism. Coady’s definition even
includes both speaker and hearer testimony but treats each as a necessary rather than sufficient
condition for testimony, while Graham and Fricker each focus on only one of the halves.
Lackey’s dualism forms the basis for her intervention in the reductionist – anti-reductionist
debate, as explicated in Lackey (2006a).
As evidenced from the title “It Takes Two to Tango,” Lackey (2006a) thinks that the
testimony literature has failed to appreciate the epistemic importance of there being multiple
parties to a social interaction. For Lackey there are two distinct and intrinsically important roles
in a testimonial exchange—the speaker and hearer—regardless of how many individuals are
actually involved. The reductionist and anti-reductionist camps gravitate towards opposing
aspects of testimony. Reductionism requires that the hearer find positive reasons for a testimonial
3

Although Graham’s account is “moderate” in the sense of how many acts are counted as testimonial, his
larger Information-theoretical framework has dramatic implications. As I discuss later, this framework is
perhaps the starkest exemplar of testimony’s “Transmission View.”
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belief, the positive reasons reducing the beliefs to non-testimonial epistemic grounds. By
exclusively focusing on the hearer’s need to provide positive reasons, the reductionist neglects
speaker testimony. Conversely, anti-reductionism emphasizes the role of defeaters or what
Lackey terms “negative reasons”: a testimonial belief is justified so long as there are no negative
reasons, such as indications of dishonesty or incompetence. Negative reasons shift the focus
from the hearer to the speaker: the presence or absence of defeaters tells us nothing substantive
about the hearer and instead indicates the reliability of the speaker. Lackey’s dualism claims that
both positive and negative reasons are necessary for justification.
Given the scrutiny that the reductionist project has received, dualism’s positive reason
requirement is the most contentious issue. Lackey thus brackets the issue of how to identify a
reliable speaker in order to defend the need for the hearer to provide some positive justificatory
reasons. The argumentative strategy, here, is two-pronged. First, the positive reasons requirement
does not entail reducing testimonial beliefs to non-testimonial sources. Second, recognizing
defeaters/negative reasons as a separate standard alleviates some of the burden on the positive
reasons requirement.
The two-pronged strategy means that positive reasons are necessary though insufficient
for justifying a testimonial belief. This position is not open to reductionists since their positive
reasons are meant to accomplish a reduction and so would necessarily imply justification. On
Lackey’s view, the positive reason requirement alone does not imply that a person is rationally
justified in his or her belief, only that he or she is “not irrational” in holding the belief. The
counterexample to anti-reductionism—the alien diary example—is meant to show the need for
this sort of positive reason. In the example, a person sees an alien drop something in the woods.
Upon retrieving the item, it bears all the markings of a diary written in the English language;
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there are no defeaters that suggest that the statements cannot be read as a diary. Yet Lackey
thinks that it would be epistemically unjustified to endorse the testimonial beliefs that appear
within the apparent diary. It is not rational to accept the beliefs given the potential differences
between alien and humans; hence, the hearer in this case lacks positive reasons despite there
being no defeaters. For Lackey, the basic issue with the alien diary is that we do not know
whether the alien culture includes a testimonial practice analogous to our own.
Before considering the lessons that Lackey draws from the alien diary example, it is
necessary to first flag some basic concerns with the example. Most immediate, it beggars the
imagination that someone would be able to identify an alien without knowing anything else
about it. More generally, the example is another highly questionable idealization and, as with
Adler’s class of core testimony cases, it lacks any clear connection to the lives of actual
epistemic agents. As a result, the alien diary scenario does not support any substantial
conclusions regarding the nature of testimony. Even the less far-fetched version of this example
in which an amnesiac person has lost all her beliefs about people’s testimonial practices is
similarly flawed. Contrary to Lackey’s presentation, Martin Kusch (2012) points out that these
sorts of atypical cases do not actually support obvious and stable intuitions regarding
justification, or anything else for that matter.4 The dubiousness of Lackey’s examples calls into
question her notion of positive reasons, which in turn questions whether her account ultimately
differs from reductionism. This concern becomes even more prominent given Lackey’s
discussion of particular positive reasons.

4

Another deeply troubling feature of the positive reason examples is the implication that all individuals
possess determinate beliefs about a testimonial practice that all of humanity participates in. I think this
implication is an artifact of a retrospective reconstruction on the part of theorists rather than actual beliefs held
(whether consciously or unconsciously) by all human epistemic agents. In this respect, Lackey’s examples
typify the “Rear Window Approach” that De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) criticize.
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On the basis of the alien diary example, Lackey recognizes three classes of positive
reasons. The three classes are not meant as an exhaustive list but rather only to clarify the
concept of positive reasons. Context is the first class: without knowing anything about the alien’s
culture, it is impossible to properly contextualize the putative diary. Context is simply meant to
indicate whether a critical epistemic attitude is appropriate. The National Geographic Magazine,
for example, deserves a less critical attitude than the National Enquirer. The second class
discriminates between types of reports: some reports (e.g., mundane perceptual observations) are
more trustworthy than others (e.g., a reported UFO sighting). The third class is the individuation
of epistemically reliable speakers, although individuation does not consist of evaluating speakers
in terms of their personal histories. Instead, individuation means typing a particular speaker in
terms of epistemically salient factors: for example, an accountant is a reliable source of
information about taxes, campaigning politicians are unreliable sources concerning their
opponents’ qualifications, and so on.
Lackey’s examples of positive reasons closely resembles Fricker’s reductionist position.
Most obvious, the second class closely resembles Fricker’s subject matter requirement. More
generally, whether it is a matter of context, kinds of reports, or “individuating” reliable speakers,
the positive reason requirement serves the same function as Fricker’s unconscious monitoring
test. Failing Fricker’s monitoring test and Lackey’s positive reasons standard have the same
result, namely conscious deliberation and thereby an attempt at independent verification.
Lackey’s framework does improve upon Fricker’s: there are more fine-grained considerations
than Fricker’s four categories, and Lackey is not committed to the questionable psychological
claim regarding unconscious monitoring. But Lackey offers only a modest improvement—
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mostly a conceptual clarification—that fails to address the larger issue of obscuring the social
reality of testimony. This is especially notable since Lackey touches directly on the issue.
The conflation of hearer and speaker testimonies is symptomatic of the over-abstraction
pervasive within the testimony literature. Lackey has to remind her interlocutors that there are
two distinct parties involved in a testimonial exchange (i.e., “it takes two to tango”). Yet even
Lackey’s dualism downplays the importance of social engagement. The speaker and hearer both
need to make a substantive contribution to the testimonial exchange, but the other person appears
as a general type or cluster of types rather than a unique individual. Our epistemic interest in the
other person is, strictly speaking, instrumental and clinical (i.e., manipulationist): we identify the
epistemically relevant types that apply to the other person in order to judge their trustworthiness
and competence. Social engagement is epistemically interesting in only two respects: how it
affects the efficiency of transmission and how it affects our ability/opportunities to detect signs
of dishonesty or incompetence. Hence, despite raising concerns about collapsing the speaker and
hearer aspects of testimony, Lackey’s dualism still marginalizes the social reality of epistemic
interaction, especially the importance of engagement.
1.2.3

John Greco’s “Friendly” Epistemic Environments

John Greco (2012) poses a direct challenge for Adler’s core case approach. He argues that not all
cases of testimonial knowledge are epistemically homogenous. Unlike Fricker and Lackey,
Greco is not content with status-independent criteria for identifying trustworthiness and
competence. Thus, Greco’s proposal is more than a partitioning of testimony’s domain, as with
Fricker, and also more than a generic division of labor, as with Lackey’s distinction between
speaker and hearer testimonies. The initial impulse for Greco’s proposal stems from trying to
account for testimonial exchanges involving children.
18

On the one hand, it seems obvious that children gain knowledge from testimonial
exchanges with their parents but, on the other hand, children appear to fail any listener
requirements. For example, a parent may have passed along the belief that the earth is a sphere,
which the child now knows; but the parent could have just as easily told the child that the earth is
flat, which the child would then believe despite its being false. Given the apparent gullibility of
children, it is unclear how the former case can still be counted as a case of testimonial knowledge.
This issue, which was initially broached by Sanford Goldberg, arises in a number of other
situations.
Greco provides two additional situations that also involve “epistemic caretakers.”
Students similarly accept their teacher’s testimony and patients their doctor’s testimony. In all
three cases, the recipients—children/students/patients—appear to fail any possible hearer
reliability requirement since they would just as easily believe the opposite of what the
parent/teacher/doctor testified to. Despite seemingly blind acceptance, Greco thinks that these
are still cases of testimonial knowledge. The acceptance is justified because as epistemic
caretakers, the testifiers are sources of testimonial knowledge in a way that people more
generally are not.
Epistemic caretakers inhabit special social roles. Greco does not detail how exactly these
roles originate and are recognized or maintained but, instead, appeals to the sense that social
contexts or “environments” can have relevant epistemic differences. Epistemic caretakers
correspond to “friendly” social environments in that the caretaker is justifiably expected to
provide reliable testimony. In these friendly social environments, the hearer reliability
requirements are lower; in fact, the only mistake that a hearer can make in such a situation would
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seem to be one of inattention or misperception. Barring such errors, the caretaker will transmit
testimonial knowledge to his or her recipient.
Greco’s social environment proposal calls into question the fundamental nature of
testimony. In comparison, Lackey reassesses the fundamental nature of testimony but only finds
the need to clarify a generic division of labor between speaker and hearer: speaker and hearer are
determined by the activity of the individuals involved, not by a social status. By taking the social
environment into consideration, Greco’s proposal offers a more complex perspective on
testimonial exchanges.
Greco’s proposal also reconceptualizes testimony’s domain. Unlike Fricker, Greco does
not attempt to partition the entirety of testimony’s domain but, instead, circumscribes cases that
involve the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This departs from the prevailing view in
which all cases of testimonial knowledge involve transmission. The issue with the prevailing
view is that there are cases in which a recipient may end up more informed than the speaker. To
illustrate why knowledge transmission is only one type of testimonial exchange, Greco presents
an identical twin example.
In the example, a reporter misidentifies an identical twin. The speaker S calls the receiver
R and notifies R that Jim has entered the building, but Jim happens to standing in front of R.
Consequently, R knows that Jim’s identical twin is in the building despite S’s misidentification
and possible continued ignorance. In such a case—which even if relatively uncommon is far
from extraordinary—it would be inaccurate to say that knowledge was transmitted from the
speaker S to the receiver R. Yet the testimony did result in testimonial knowledge since R’s
knowledge of the whereabouts of Jim’s twin depends on S’s testimony. On this issue, Greco’s
critical ambitions are much more modest.
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Even though not all cases of testimonial knowledge involve transmission, Greco thinks
that the transmission cases are what make testimony epistemically important. He has in mind
especially the caretaker examples, which are one type of transmission. Parents, teachers, and the
like help to explain the inexhaustibility of testimonial knowledge: within such friendly
environments, people can very efficiently gain knowledge because of the relaxation of hearer
requirements.
Although factoring in social environments is an important departure from the prevailing
testimony literature, Greco’s proposal is still socially impoverished. As with Lackey, there is
little concern for the particular details of how individuals engage each other. Social environments
are only epistemically relevant insofar as they affect justificatory standards. And like Fricker’s
partitions as well as Lackey’s defeaters and positive reasons, all of the various social
environments only provide two epistemically salient outcomes: either the social environment is
friendly and so lax hearer requirements are justified, or the social environment is not and so lax
hearer requirements are unjustified. Thus, while Greco is right that social environments directly
factor into judgments of testimonial knowledge, his focus on the question of justification leads to
an overly abstract treatment of social environments.5
The shortcomings of Greco’s proposal are only amplified by the fact that he glosses over
the details of the origination, recognition, and maintenance of social roles. It is also unclear
whether some of the caretaker examples stand up to closer scrutiny. The doctor-patient
relationship, for example, is not simply a “friendly” environment, as evidenced by issues such as

5

Greco’s work in Virtue Epistemology, including its intersection with testimonial knowledge, does not
stick as closely to the issue of justification. Furthermore, Greco (2007) argues that it is possible for
multiple individuals to deserve credit for cooperative epistemic achievements. While the discussion of
credit is an improvement on justification, especially with its closer association to practical activity, the
discussion’s main aim is to solve the Gettier problem.
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prescription kickbacks and insurance company mandates. Given the many well-publicized issues
with doctors and their fallibility, it is unjustifiable to accept one doctor’s prognosis, at least when
it concerns a serious medical condition. Evaluating an actual epistemic interaction—such as that
between a particular doctor and patient—thus requires a much more sophisticated account of
social environment than offered by Greco.
An alternative lesson to draw from my doctor-patient example would be to
reconceptualize the epistemic agent’s responsibilities. Alvin Goldman’s proposal for reliabilism
provides such an alternative, shifting the agent’s responsibility from directly verifying a
particular belief (e.g., a doctor’s prognosis) to evaluating the broader belief-forming processes
that are the causal underpinning of the belief (e.g., the doctor being part of an HMO). Goldman
(2010) recognizes two basic ways of extending traditional individualist epistemology: either
focus on the goal of acquiring true beliefs or focus on the goal of having justified beliefs. In
terms of the present example, focusing on the goal of acquiring true as opposed to justified
beliefs implies worrying about the general causal processes that underlie one’s beliefs (e.g., does
the doctor’s affiliation make him an unreliable source of information) rather than directly
justifying the particular belief in question. While Goldman recognizes the need to have an
account of justification, he does not think it should drive our enquiries in social epistemology.
Importantly, Goldman’s focus on the goal of acquiring true beliefs draws attention to the
transmission view that underlies the concept of testimony.

1.3

The Transmission Thesis versus The Transmission View

Before turning to Alvin Goldman, it is worth examining the scant critical attention that has been
given to the topic of transmission within the testimony literature. Much of the critical discussion
is due to Jennifer Lackey’s efforts, who in a series of articles (1999, 2003, 2006c, 2008)
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questions what she refers to as the Transmission of Epistemic Properties (TEP) thesis.6 Lackey’s
approach here closely resembles her diagnosis and proposed solution concerning the nature of
testimony noted above. I think that in both cases Lackey alludes to a fundamental issue with the
testimony literature but only offers a modest conceptual revision to address it. Therefore, in the
next section I contrast Lackey’s critique of the “transmission thesis” (i.e., TEP) with the broader
“transmission view” that Lackey and her interlocutors are committed to.
In the introduction to The Epistemology of Testimony, Lackey summarizes her work on
the transmission thesis (TEP). The main reason why the topic of transmission receives little
critical attention within the testimony literature is that both non-reductionists and reductionists
alike are committed to TEP. The guiding idea behind TEP is that a speaker transfers a belief and
the belief’s epistemic properties to a recipient in a testimonial exchange. Lackey breaks TEP
down into two aspects—a necessity and a sufficiency thesis—using the metaphor of a bucket
brigade to explain each.
Lackey’s critique of TEP’s necessity thesis (TEP-N) leads her to conclude that testimony
can generate knowledge as opposed to merely transmitting it. Because this is Lackey’s most
dramatic conclusion, I am going to restrict my attention to TEP-N. The necessity thesis entails
that a speaker S must have a justified belief in her testimony in order for the recipient R to have a
justified testimonial belief. The bucket brigade analogy is meant to express this intuition as
follows: a person S cannot pass along a full bucket of water to another person R, unless S had a
full bucket to begin with. In the analogy, the full bucket symbolizes justified belief/knowledge,

6

Peter Graham (2000a, 2000b) also criticizes the TEP thesis, although using a different label. Graham’s
critique is offered from an Information-theoretic point of view, claiming that information rather than
knowledge is transmitted via testimony. The Information-theoretic view exemplifies the Transmission View
that I discuss in the next section and, in that respect, the fundamentally asocial character of testimony. I later
discuss Graham’s view, but I use Lackey’s critique here because it complements her dualist account of
testimony and thus is part of one of the most important attempts to capture the social element of testimony.

23

the passing along of water symbolizes the act of testifying, and R’s resulting bucket of water
represents the status of the recipient’s testimonial belief (i.e., if full, then R possesses justified
belief/knowledge). According to the metaphor, it is impossible for R to end up with a full bucket
of water if its contents depend solely on S’s contribution and S did not have a full bucket to
begin with.7
A counterexample to TEP-N consists of a testimonial exchange in which the testifier
lacks knowledge but the recipient gains knowledge based on the testimony.8 There are two
general ways for this to occur: the speaker S may fail either the condition of belief or
justification while the recipient R satisfies both (Lackey 1999). In either scenario, S would not
possess knowledge regarding her testimonial belief p even though it is possible for R to satisfy
both conditions and thus to know p. I will focus on the latter possibility—in which the speaker
fails to satisfy the justification condition—since Greco’s twin example exhibits such a scenario.
As noted above, in Greco’s identical twin example, a receiver R gains knowledge despite
the speaker S’s false testimony. It is not necessary for S to have knowledge in order for his or her
testimony to support testimonial knowledge in R. All that is needed is for S’s testimony to have a
non-accidental/truth-conducive relationship to a corresponding fact: in Greco’s example, S’s
testimony need only be the product of a reliable perceptual capacity that recognizes a person who
appears identical to Jim; given this condition, R knows it is Jim’s identical twin. There are many
other possible examples of testimonial exchanges in which the recipient gains knowledge despite
the reporter’s lack of it. One virtue of the identical twin example is that it is clear that knowledge

7

Since Lackey is attacking TEP-N and the Bucket Brigade analogy is meant to represent TEP-N, it
should be no surprise that the analogy is deeply flawed. Issues with analogy include: assuming that (1)
everyone has the same sized bucket, (2) a person cannot receive buckets from more than one source, and
(3) a person can only pass along a full bucket. Lackey’s own alternative modestly challenges (3), though
does not clearly address the first and second assumptions.
8
Greco’s identical twin example, which closely resembles the following, is partly indebted to Lackey.
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generation cases are far from rare. Thus, it appears as though Lackey has identified a major
lacuna within the testimony literature. But Greco’s understanding of these cases suggests that the
implications of Lackey’s critique are much more modest.
Lackey’s generation examples are not what make testimony the so-called litmus test for
epistemology. In the given generation cases, the hearer already possesses knowledge directly
relevant to the testimonial belief, as opposed to Coady’s ubiquity examples in which the hearer is
profoundly dependent on the speaker’s testimony (e.g., knowledge of our date of birth). Hence,
even though the transmission cases are not the only type of testimonial exchange, Greco (2012)
concludes that they represent perhaps the most important class of cases for testimony. Lackey’s
critique thus only offers a conceptual clarification of testimonial exchanges, showing that there
are at least two basic types of exchange. But the critique of the transmission thesis raises more
fundamental questions regarding the premises of the testimony literature—which Lackey does
not discuss—bringing us to the transmission view.

1.4

Alvin Goldman’s Reliabilism

Lackey and her interlocutors are committed to the transmission view of social interaction. The
transmission view consists of two basic claims:
(1) the transfer of discrete units of information exhausts the epistemically significant
aspects of social interaction,
(2) the transfer of discrete units of information is isolable from all other aspects of social
interaction.
In terms of the bucket brigade metaphor, the transmission view corresponds to the notion that
epistemic interaction is founded on the use of a common currency, which in the metaphor is
water. The epistemic equivalent of the metaphorical water is propositional beliefs or just bare
information. The nature of the currency—whether beliefs or bare information—depends on the
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particular account of testimony, but essential to the all of the accounts is that epistemic agents
share and circulate the same currency.
In Lackey’s generation cases, assertions of belief are the fundamental currency. The
transmission of an assertion is the precondition for the recipient to satisfy additional conditions
(e.g., justifying the belief via a defeater-defeater) that then “generates” knowledge. Lackey
thinks that all cases of testimony, regardless of how the requirements for knowledge are satisfied,
are founded on the transmission of an assertion. Thus, Lackey’s distinction between the
transmission and generation cases is more concerned with how knowledge is justified than with
what exactly is exchanged and, in this respect, still reflects the testimony literature’s myopic
focus on justification. As noted earlier, Peter Graham’s Information-theoretic framework
exemplifies the transmission view underlying the testimony literature.
Graham (2000a, 2000b, 2000c) applies Fred Dretske’s Information-theoretic account of
perceptual knowledge to the concept of testimony. Graham’s central move is to challenge the
same two knowledge transmission theses as Lackey, only he models testimony in terms of
“conveying information.” Conveying information results from “a law-like correlation or
counterfactual dependence between a signal … and another event, condition, or state of affairs”
(Graham 2000b). In the context of testimony, the informational “signal” corresponds to the
reporter while the resulting “condition” is the recipient’s cognitive state of knowledge. Graham
thus sees the foundation of testimony—at least in cases of perceptual knowledge—as a reporter
acting as a truth-conducting signal for the recipient; the informational signal is the shared
currency. This exemplifies testimony’s transmission view by implying that the reporter is
nothing more than an informational conduit, qualitatively no different from the signals produced
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by all physical entities. In this respect, the Information-theoretic view not only exemplifies but
represents the logical culmination of modeling epistemic interaction on testimony.
Yet Graham does not fully reduce testimony to the information-theoretic framework. I
have already alluded to one of his qualifications, namely he limits his application to cases of
perceptual knowledge. A second and more important restriction is that the conveyance of
information is a necessary though not sufficient condition for knowledge. More specifically,
Graham (2000b) thinks that justified belief is still an “important” component of knowledge. The
Information-theoretic framework is thus only meant to be a part of the epistemology of
testimony, namely the part that describes the underlying dynamics of at least some cases of
testimony.9 In the present section, I detail an account closely related to the Graham-Dretske
Information-theoretic view, namely Alvin Goldman’s reliabilism.
Goldman’s reliabilism, like the Information-theoretic model, suggests that more attention
in social epistemology should be given to the aspect of transmission and less to the conscious
justification of knowledge. The Information-theoretic view is reliabilist in its emphasis on truthconduciveness, though Goldman is not committed to the concept of an informational signal.
While Goldman’s account is thus not as stark an exemplar of the transmission view, Goldman
offers a more comprehensive framework for testimony that is helpful for spelling out the
implications of testimony’s transmission view.
Goldman’s reliabilism is aligned with his “epistemics” project.10 The general aim of
epistemics is to correct traditional epistemology’s disregard for humans’ actual cognitive abilities

9

Graham’s ultimately qualified conclusion is a microcosm of a deep ambivalence within the testimony
literature that, on the one hand, aims to explain the intrinsic epistemic importance of social activity but, on the
other hand, is pervaded by conceptions of naturalism that erode the intrinsic significance of any social activity.
10
Goldman (1993) relates reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology; in short, reliable processes are intellectually
virtuous ones. The connection offers reliabilism more terms for epistemic evaluation without changing its
fundamental commitments, the fundamental commitments being my present focus.
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(Goldman 1978). By correcting this lacuna, epistemics can provide practical recommendations
for acquiring knowledge. Epistemics is thus not meant to be a complete epistemology, but only
to cover the normative dimensions of traditional epistemology, prescribing ways to more
efficiently acquire truths. Reliabilism serves as a jumping off point from traditional epistemology
to Goldman’s epistemics project, introducing a gap between the goals of acquiring true beliefs
and of justifying one’s beliefs. By recognizing the former—acquiring true beliefs—as the
primary epistemic goal, epistemics entails a reprioritization of how to pursue knowledge.
In the following three sections dedicated to Alvin Goldman, I first discuss reliabilism and
then his epistemics project as a whole. In the third and final section, I examine the social
epistemology that follows from these commitments and relate Goldman’s social epistemology
back to the larger testimony literature.
Reliabilism’s departure from traditional epistemology begins with its commitment to a
causal theory of knowledge. Whether a given belief counts as knowledge depends in part on the
chain of causes that led to its formation. The most salient segments of the causal chain—the parts
that deserve epistemic appraisal—are belief-forming processes. Each belief forming process
operates on a set of inputs and then generates a doxastic belief state as its output. Beliefdependent processes take doxastic inputs, while belief-independent processes only accept nondoxastic inputs. The latter kind of belief forming process (i.e., perceptual processes) serves as a
foundation for belief-dependent ones. The concept of a belief forming process is essential to the
appeal of reliabilism for it supports the picture of epistemic evaluation as the typing of specific
cases.
As types, belief-forming processes are judged in terms of their token outputs. Perceptual
and reasoning processes serve an important rhetorical purpose for reliabilism in that they are the
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clearest examples of there being well-defined belief process types. Perceptual processes, in
particular, suggest the core meaning of reliability: percepts most often accurately correspond to
physical reality, as evidenced by the comparatively isolated occurrences of illusions or other
misperceptions. The guiding idea is that for most people perceptual errors appear against a vastly
larger backdrop of accurate perceptions. The accurate output tokens far outweigh the erroneous
ones, making perception a reliable process. So unless there are specific reasons to doubt one’s
senses—such as unfavorable or extreme conditions, a medical diagnosis, the presence of a
magician, and so on—then one is epistemically justified in accepting the outputs of perceptual
processes. Thus, in addition to its previously noted role as a foundation for belief-dependent
processes, perception also represents the core notion of a reliable though imperfect beliefforming process. The notion of a reliable though imperfect belief-forming process, in turn,
suggests the appropriate responsibilities of an epistemic agent.
For reliabilism, the primary responsibility of the epistemic agent consists in being aware
of what causal processes underlie a given belief. In contrast to the classic picture of directly
justifying particular beliefs, performing one’s epistemic responsibility is not necessarily
sufficient for justification because reliabilism sets a broader task for the agent. In the
epistemically praiseworthy cases, the belief-forming processes are truth-promoting. While
perception and reasoning tend to promote true propositions (and so are truth-linked), there are
other belief forming processes (e.g., wishful thinking and hasty generalization) that tend to
promote falsehoods (Goldman 2011). The task of the epistemic agent is only to identify the
causal process responsible for his or her belief: if from perception, then the belief is acceptable,
whereas if from wishful thinking, then not.
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The task of identifying the types of processes underlying a given belief is meant to be less
burdensome than the classic picture of justification. In the case of perceptual processes, this is
obvious since epistemic subjects only have to consciously scrutinize the grounds for perceptual
beliefs in unusual circumstances. Even if an epistemic subject does not understand the causal
mechanisms that underlie vision, hearing, and the like, the subject is justified in accepting the
beliefs produced by these processes. Goldman’s reliabilism generalizes this intuition: subjects
also often lack knowledge about the inner workings of other belief-forming processes but are still
capable of evaluating their resultant reliability. Yet despite the intent and intuition behind
reliabilism, it is unclear just how modest this epistemic task actually is. In the next section, I
examine this and other issues as they relate to Goldman’s epistemics project.

1.5

Goldman’s Epistemics: Some Major Issues

The biggest appeal of Goldman’s epistemics is meant to be a dramatically more accurate and
thereby practically useful account of epistemic agents and their epistemic pursuits. In this section,
I offer a general overview of epistemics and then examine some of the major obstacles that it
faces. One common theme among the various issues that I discuss is tempering epistemics’
initial appeal of greater accuracy and usefulness.
1.5.1

Epistemics: An Overview

The name epistemics signifies Goldman’s emphasis on inter-disciplinarity. Epistemics entails
using the insights of empirical science, especially psychology, to inform our epistemic pursuits.
This dovetails with the causal theory of knowledge discussed in the previous section and is
opposed to the picture of epistemology as the self-contained conceptual analysis of epistemic
terms (Goldman 1986). Given epistemics’ goal to improve how people acquire knowledge, it is
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clear that detailed information about the mental processes of cognitive subjects is important: any
regulative enterprise should be concerned with the weaknesses of a system in order to address if
not obviate them. The range of systems that fall under the domain of epistemics ranges from
individual cognitive subjects to institutionally organized epistemic ventures.
There are two main branches of epistemics: the individual and social branches. Within
the individual branch, there is, in turn, a distinction between primary and secondary individual
epistemics (Goldman 1978). Primary epistemics consists in identifying the native cognitive
processes of individual subjects. Most intellectual advances are not the product of native
processes alone. Instead, learning methods, heuristics, algorithms as well as the employment of
machines often play integral roles; acquired intellectual skills and capacities form the domain of
secondary epistemics. Despite the lesser importance of primary epistemics, Goldman still thinks
it is necessary for understanding how subjects make use of secondary acquired skills and tools.11
The importance of the social branch of epistemics is closely related to and follows from
secondary epistemics. Once the epistemic importance of acquired skills and tools is granted, then
other people will necessarily be epistemically important as well. Other people play an obvious
and vital role in the skills and tools that any given individual acquires in his or her lifetime. But
properly understanding social epistemics requires ultimately rooting all social processes in
individual belief-forming processes. Hence, epistemics has three essential levels in which the
secondary level is a direct extension of the primary/native one, while the third (social) level is a
direct extension of the first two.
In the rest of §1.5, I examine some of the major obstacles epistemics faces. The biggest
issue is the so-called generality problem, which appears at multiple levels of epistemics. Another
11

Andy Clark’s Extended Mind hypothesis develops this idea to its fullest potential. And John Sutton
forcefully criticizes it, both of which I discuss in Ch. 5.
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issue is Goldman’s conception of intelligence and its attendant picture of problem solving, which
separates the intellectual and practical dimensions of intelligence. Each of these issues relates to
the transmission view underlying the testimony literature, and both question epistemics’
usefulness as a framework for guiding the pursuit of knowledge. Since the generality problem
directly follows from discussion of justification in §1.4, I begin there.
1.5.2

Epistemics and The Generality Problem

The generality problem refers to the problem of properly typing the formation of a given belief.
Any given belief is meant to result from a token causal process, that is, a concrete process
occurring at a particular time and place. But it is unclear how to type a particular causal process,
since it can be typed in multiple narrower or broader ways (Goldman 1979). Without a unique
way of typing causal processes, there is no determinate reliability value for a token process. At
the extreme, if the causal process is typed so narrowly as to only include one instance, then a bad
belief-forming process may appear perfectly reliable if the particular belief happens to be true.
The reverse could hold with respect to a good belief-formation process.
There have been a number of proposed solutions for the generality problem, but
Goldman’s favorite response is telling. Among Goldman’s own proposals are considering only
content-neutral causal processes and restricting the extent of belief forming processes to
individual organisms’ nervous systems. With respect to the latter proposal, Goldman
acknowledges that he has been unable to stick to the restriction in his own explications
(Goldman 2011).12 As for the content-neutral restriction, it blocks the most extremely narrow
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Even if Goldman were able to restrict his explications to an individual nervous system, there would still be
the possibility of multiple causal processes operant within an organism’s nervous system.
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cases of typing but still fails to pick out a unique belief forming process.13 Goldman (2011)
concedes that his own and others’ proposals have been inadequate but claims that reliabilism is
in no worse shape than any other epistemology.
The generality problem is one manifestation of the basing relation problem. In the case of
reliabilism, a belief is grounded on the basis of a belief formation type. Other epistemologies
posit different basing relationships: an evidentialist epistemology, for example, will ground a
particular belief on available evidence. The subsequent issue for evidentialism is determining the
unique set of evidence that a particular belief should be judged in terms of. Parallel to the typing
of causal processes, it is unclear how narrowly or broadly to delimit the evidential base.
Goldman’s claim is that every epistemology’s account of justification involves some kind of
basing relation; and, furthermore, as with reliabilism and evidentialism, there is no clear way to
identify a unique way of basing particular beliefs. Thus, Goldman’s ultimate answer to the
generality problem is that every epistemology is equally subject to the underlying basing relation
problem.
Goldman’s diagnosis of the generality problem reflects, I think, the pervasiveness of
testimony’s transmission view. The basing relation problem is partly an artifact of grounding
epistemic interaction in the exchange of a common currency, such as propositional beliefs. If
epistemic interaction is grounded in some common currency, then the tokens of that currency are
the fundamental unit of evaluation. Evaluation consists in judging discrete entities as tokens of a
currency. And it is the discreteness of the tokens that creates the basing relation problem. In Ch.
2, I examine a model of epistemic interaction that does not ground epistemic interaction in the
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Enactivism, as I discuss later, and practically-oriented epistemologies more generally problematize the very
notion of a content-neutral epistemic process.
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exchange of discrete tokens. This model and others suggest that the basing relation problem is
not endemic to every epistemology and is thus a serious cause for concern.
In sum, the basing relation problem is related to a generic picture of epistemic evaluation
that is assumed in many epistemologies. Thus far, I have related this picture of epistemic
evaluation to testimony’s transmission view, but in the next section—while examining
Goldman’s conception of intelligence and problem solving—I link this picture to an
understanding of how knowledge relates to practical action.
1.5.3

Epistemics’ Conception of Intelligence and The Basing Relation Problem

The second major problem that I want to discuss in this section concerns Goldman’s need for a
conception of intelligence. From the outset of his epistemics project, Goldman (1978) recognizes
that the goal of acquiring true beliefs is by itself insufficient as a general epistemic standard. The
acquisition of truths must be balanced with other considerations, such as error avoidance. The
subsequent account of intelligence and problem solving suggests how knowledge relates to
practical action. I begin with Ch. 6 of Epistemology and Cognition, in which Goldman
introduces his notion of intelligence in an attempt to better describe what the acquisition of
knowledge entails.
Intelligence incorporates two main elements, power and speed (Goldman 1986). Power
largely corresponds to the ability to acquire true beliefs, which Goldman thinks consists
primarily in fostering reliable belief-forming processes. Speed, by contrast, is fundamentally in
tension with reliability. Heuristic problem solving—essential for solving many if not all
problems—necessarily sacrifices at least some reliability. Given this tension, one of the main
tasks that Goldman envisions for epistemics is evaluating how best to balance the values of
power and speed.
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Yet intelligence is much more complicated than the preceding picture of two dueling
values suggests. In addition to efficiently acquiring truths while still avoiding errors, it is
necessary to take into consideration other factors, such as how difficult it is to gain a truth as
well as how significant a truth is. Without these additional considerations, intelligence could be
mistaken for the stockpiling of trivial true beliefs or the solving of elaborate though meaningless
esoteric problems. The issue of determining the relative significances of different truths
highlights how Goldman envisions the relationship between the practical and intellectual
dimensions of problem solving.
Goldman narrowly construes the issue, considering it in terms of an intellectual puzzle
that is distinct from any practical matters. Practical matters supply epistemic goals: “cognitive
mechanisms” try to acquire true beliefs on “pretargeted questions,” pretargeted questions
referring to any questions relevant to “practical tasks at hand” (Goldman 1986; original italics).
Epistemic questions are “pretargeted” in the sense that the resulting cognitive activity is wholly
isolable from the practical task at hand. Cognitive activity is distinct from practical activities
because the latter only play a subsidiary role in knowledge acquisition.
Practical activities serve epistemic purposes but do not directly contribute to intellectual
activity. In addition to supplying target questions, practical activities are only meant to retrieve
information from the environment, test possible solutions, and, ideally, realize solutions. This
division reflects a distinction between mental and physical operations, which in turn relates back
to Goldman’s privileging of native cognitive processes. Mental operations, as native cognitive
processes, are thought to control problem solving activities (e.g., recognizing the need for more
information and so initiating more retrieval).
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Goldman’s narrow construal of problem solving implies that knowledge exists
independent of its practical implications and uses. After a subject acquires a piece of knowledge,
it can then inform his or her subsequent action.14 Whether the knowledge actually informs the
agent’s actions depends upon non-epistemic aspects of the agent. This generic picture of how
knowledge relates to practical action underlies the transmission view within the testimony
literature. Dividing knowledge from practical action implies that knowledge must be grounded in
a discrete entity: knowledge is something that can be absent one moment but present the next or
something that can be drawn upon or ignored. Tracing the transmission view back to this generic
picture of how knowledge relates to its practical uses explains why it is an under-theorized,
implicitly presupposed part of the testimony literature. In sum, one of the origins of the basing
relation problem is a seemingly obvious but ultimately flawed picture of how knowledge relates
to action.
Having used Goldman’s account of intelligence to trace the basing relation problem back
to another pervasive assumption in epistemology, I now turn to two other aspects of his account.
In §1.5.4, I focus on the issue of whether epistemics is founded on an inadequate description of
our epistemic pursuits. In particular, its account of intelligence seems to make discoveries an
epistemological mystery. To the extent that Goldman can address this concern, it requires
appealing to his social epistemology, which I examine in §1.6.
1.5.4

Epistemics’ Conception of Intelligence and the Pursuit of Knowledge

As discussed in the previous section, Goldman construes problem solving narrowly.
Epistemically significant problems are self-contained intellectual puzzles, isolable from their
practical implications and uses. Elaborating on this picture, Goldman emphasizes the
14

Both the translation and transformation views challenge the strict division between knowledge acquisition
and use.
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purposiveness of problem solving, using the game of billiards as a metaphor. In the game of
billiards, a pocketed ball only counts if the player “called” the shot. Analogously, an intelligent
person finds the solution to the problem that he or she had sought (Goldman 1986). Goldman
recognizes that when attempting to solve a particular problem, it is possible to serendipitously
discover other truths. Lumping such discoveries under the generic label of “incidental beliefs,”
Goldman minimizes their importance by indexing them to separate problems that deserve their
own “called” shot. One issue raised by this picture—particularly with respect to large-scale
epistemic ventures—is whether this is an adequate characterization of how knowledge is
acquired.
Goldman minimizes the importance of serendipitous discoveries on principle. This can be
explained using the overview of epistemics given above. Serendipitous discoveries cannot be a
direct product of an individual’s “native cognitive proclivities.” As for the acquired learning
methods and tools of secondary epistemics, Goldman (1978) thinks that these must be
understood in terms of how they are employed by native processes. Thus, secondary epistemics
is similarly ill-suited to consider the epistemic significance of serendipity. The general approach
of individual epistemics is to seek the essential lawful regularities—which are founded on a
native cognitive core—that underlie the messy details of a particular instance of cognition.15
Lawful cognitive regularities—whether manifested in terms of a native capacity, an acquired
skill or tool, or some higher-level sociological pattern of behavior—are the only kind of
descriptions that Goldman considers epistemically significant. The strictly purposive nature of
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John Sutton challenges the premise of Goldman’s focus by critiquing the notion of a substantial immutable
cognitive core. I discuss this issue in Ch. 5.
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problem solving reflects this descriptive focus on lawful regularities. I think that this picture of
purposive intelligence obscures important dimensions of cognitive agency.16
With respect to the topic of discovery, the immediate concern is whether this picture of
intelligence makes discovering knowledge an epistemological mystery. Goldman does not think
his emphasis on purposiveness is an impediment to discovery because individuals are members
of larger communities. Even if the picture of intelligence suggests that individuals are easily
locked into a particular puzzle, it is not a vicious problem so long as another individual’s insight
can break the deadlock. But for this to be an essential element in the pursuit of knowledge, there
needs to be a mechanism that supports constructive epistemic relationships between individuals.
Goldman’s product epistemology—which bridges the individual and social branches of
epistemics—explains how individuals can help each other even when dealing with extremely
complex and specialized problems.
Product epistemology marks a shift from “belief epistemology.” The shift consists of
identifying and examining specialized forms of communication within particular communities. A
community’s form of communication is based on intellectual products, by which Goldman
means the technical aspects of communication (i.e., the preferred medium(s) of communication)
as well as the mode of discourse (e.g., assertive debate). For example, twentieth century
scientific communities employed an assertive mode of discourse (as opposed to something like
the literary community’s use of a depictive mode) whose preferred medium was peer-reviewed
journal articles (as opposed to mediums like novels). A community’s specialized form of
communication is a mechanism for more effectively and efficiently circulating beliefs. The
different mediums and modes of discourse represent different problem-solving heuristics, whose
16

My most substantial critique of the picture of lawful regularities is my discussion of nonrepresentational
embodied directedness in Chs. 3 – 5.
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suitability depends on the aims of the intellectual venture. For science, the efficient acquisition of
knowledge would be hindered by novels’ depictive mode while, conversely, novels’ goal of
personifying characters would be hindered by the assertive mode. The concept of an intellectual
product plays a key role, for Goldman, in explaining how individual epistemic agents retain their
individuality while contributing to a larger community.
Goldman thinks that social epistemology is simply an extension of individual
epistemology. The constraints of creating an intellectual product ensure that an individual’s
epistemic abilities are channeled into a form that has a greater chance of being useful to another
individual working on the same or similar problem. As the name “product” suggests, the
specialized form of communication is an instrumental resource that individuals draw upon to
augment their own capacities. While product epistemology thus offers some insight into how
individuals can qua individuals effectively collaborate, the proposal’s appeal is tempered by the
re-emergence of the typing problem.
Product epistemology is a more fine-grained version of belief epistemology, but it is
unclear how fine-grained it should be. Goldman (1986) himself acknowledges, for example, that
despite sharing the generic mode and medium, there are important stylistic differences within
scientific sub-communities. Analogous to the issue of typing a uniquely important belief-forming
process, it is subsequently unclear how broadly or narrowly to delineate the uniquely important
level of community. In contrast to the case of belief-formation, product epistemology seems to
call for as fine-grained a delineation as possible, since its chief task is to explain how individuals
collaborate. But the typing cannot be so fine-grained as to lose its relevance to larger scientific
communities.

39

The typing of intellectual products draws attention to institutional hierarchies. Typing
intellectual products is a less pressing issue than typing belief-forming processes more generally
for an epistemic agent engaged in a particular problem. While the latter is a central epistemic
responsibility, the former only entails broad constraints on how an agent channels her cognitive
abilities. Sticking with the example of a twentieth century scientist: the issues of communicative
mode and medium (e.g., how to write journal articles, striking the right argumentative tone, and
so on) are not necessarily pressing concerns for the practicing scientist. Yet such matters are
abiding concerns that are open to change. Such broad concerns and changes are the purview of
an epistemic community’s authorities rather than a single agent. In the case of science: journal
editors, grant committees, and the like are in positions to judge and enact reforms concerning
their community’s intellectual products and other broad ranging matters. The issue of typing
intellectual products thus points to the importance of social epistemology for Goldman’s
epistemics, since the issue is not as intractable when it is considered from the perspective of
authoritative third-person intervention.
In this section, I have further examined Goldman’s account of intelligence as well as his
concept of a product epistemology. My main concern has been to question whether they
adequately characterize the pursuit of knowledge. Purposive intelligence was problematic on this
score because it seemed to make discoveries an epistemological mystery; but the issue was partly
ameliorated by situating the individual epistemic agent within a larger community. This response
raised the question of how individuals could collaborate on highly complex problems, a concern
partly addressed by Goldman’s product epistemology. Product epistemology, in turn, reiterated
the issue of typing belief-forming processes. When considered in terms of product epistemology,
the typing issue actually appears less intractable since it highlights the importance of social
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hierarchies and third-person regulation within epistemic institutions. In order to more fully
evaluate these proposals, I turn to Goldman’s social epistemology.

1.6

Truth-Oriented Social Epistemology

Taking an avowedly conservative stance, Goldman argues social epistemology is an extension of
individual epistemology. The epistemic significance of social interaction is explicable entirely in
terms of social interaction’s causal influence on an individual’s beliefs. In this respect, there is
no qualitative difference between social interaction and other external causal influences—all that
epistemically matters is how an external force influences an individual’s stock of beliefs. An
epistemically praiseworthy force promotes true beliefs, and, in situations where true beliefs are
valued over false beliefs or no belief at all, Goldman (1999) refers to the beliefs as possessing
“veritistic value” or “V-value.” Hence, Goldman’s approach to social epistemology is to examine
ways in which individuals promote true beliefs in other individuals, increasing the V-value
within a community.
Social epistemology is its own domain of enquiry because there are distinctive social
influences on beliefs. Product epistemology is one example of a social process that influences
individuals’ beliefs by enabling specialized communication. Social processes exert an immense
influence on individuals’ beliefs simply because people are more finely tuned channels of
information than other external causal influences. Most importantly, for Goldman, people share
the medium of language, which enables testimonial practices.
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1.6.1

Testimony within Goldman’s Social Epistemics

Goldman endorses much of the generic picture of what testimony is. Testimony consists in the
circulation of beliefs via language.17 Goldman defines the domain of testimony as factual
discourse (i.e., simple observational reports). As such, testimony is the “most elementary and
universal social path to knowledge” (Goldman 1999). As the sharing of observational reports via
language, testimony is the most basic kind of intellectual product. Later product epistemologies
represent specialized forms of testimony, both in terms of developing terminologies (i.e.,
specialized languages) and mechanisms for sharing the reports. Goldman’s approach to
testimony, like any other product epistemology, is to identify its most significant causal
mechanisms in the hopes of improving its effect on a community’s V-value.18
Goldman recognizes four stages of testimony-related activities. They are as follows: “(1)
discovery, (2) production and transmission of messages, (3) message reception, and (4) message
acceptance” (Goldman 1999). With respect to (1), Goldman endorses Philip Kitcher’s picture of
the cognitive division of labor (Goldman and Shaked 1991): the self-interested egoism of
individual agents ensures optimal specialization and distribution of risk within a larger epistemic
community (Kitcher 1990). Most directly related to discovery: systems of credit reward—best
exemplified in the practice of science—entice some individuals to explore radically alternative
solutions. Kitcher, like Goldman, thus considers social epistemology an extension of individual
epistemology.

17

Lackey (2006b) argues that some bodily gestures should count as testimonial acts. But this is only a minor
revision of the general identification of testimony with language acts, since Lackey considers such bodily
gestures as corresponding to propositional beliefs.
18
Miranda Fricker—whose work on epistemic injustice represents perhaps the most noteworthy ethical
application of the concept of testimony—lauds Goldman’s idea of the veritistic assessment of communities. I
do not extensively discuss M. Fricker (1998) because it limits itself to applying the concept of testimony rather
than scrutinizing it.
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The second stage of the testimony model corresponds to reporter practices. Goldman
gives his most extensive general account of reporting practices in the subsequent chapter on
argumentation. In keeping with his narrow construal of intelligence and problem solving,
Goldman sharply delineates argumentation from practical decision-making. In strictly epistemic
terms, argumentation refers to how a reporter best ‘advertises’ the truth of a conclusion
(Goldman 1999). In the simplest case—monological argumentation—the reporter-audience
interaction is one-directional, analogous to an isolated observational report.19 Dialogical
argumentation builds off this account—identifying the basic ways in which a recipient can
challenge the “advertised” truth. Apart from this model of argumentation, the only other aspect
of reporting practices that interests Goldman concerns what types of beliefs are most valuable for
reporting. Given the general goal of increasing veritistic value within a community, the most
valuable beliefs to report are ones that hold a low “degree of belief.”
While testimony’s first two stages receive only brief attention, the third stage of message
reception garners none. In a footnote, Goldman (1999) assumes that testimonial audiences
“properly understand” received messages, reducing message reception to the psychology of
language comprehension.20 Goldman’s treatment of the third stage draws attention to the
decisive cleavage between reporter transmission and message reception, as implied by
recognizing monological argumentation as the basic form of reporting.21 The receiver’s role is
strictly as a passive decoder of the transmitted report. Although Goldman’s cursory treatment of
19

In his account of argumentation, Goldman considers the issue of enthymemes, the acceptable use of which
he claims are regulated by “folk rules.” In discussing coordinated interaction in Ch. 3, I argue that factoring in
the pragmatic context of action is a more direct and satisfactory account of this issue.
20
In terms of Goldman’s four stages, it is possible to explain M. Fricker’s (2007) concept of testimonial
injustice as occurring at the third stage: that is, due to prejudice a person is denied the capacity of being a
knower, which prevents his or her testimony from even being evaluated. This reading, of course, suggests
that Goldman’s treatment of the third stage is far too cursory.
21
Goldman’s foundation of monological argumentation corresponds to Adler’s description of testimony’s core
cases as being only one-directional.
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message reception appears to be a harmless assumption from the perspective of the testimony
literature, Stephen Turner’s weak empathy model emphatically denies its truth. Turner argues
that the lack of proper reception and understanding is one of the defining features of epistemic
interaction.22 I examine this point in Ch. 2 but, for the moment, only use it to further highlight
the premises of testimony’s transmission view.
The fourth stage of testimonial activity—message acceptance—is importantly different
from the question of epistemic justification. As discussed in §1.4, Goldman uses reliabilism to
differentiate between the goals of acquiring true beliefs and acquiring justified beliefs. This sets
the stage for Goldman’s most distinctive contribution to the testimony literature, namely his
proposal for applying Bayesian inference procedures to testimonial practices. When applied to
testimonial reports, Bayesian inference is presented as a universal framework for increasing Vvalue by regulating when a message ought to be accepted.23 The basic proposal is as follows:
given a testimonial report T, if T possesses an objective likelihood magnitude X corresponding
to a true answer for a question Q, and if a receiver R possesses X, then employing Bayes’
Theorem is objectively likely to improve R’s stock of true beliefs regarding Q. Bayesianism does
not, however, necessarily justify the belief since R may not be able to justify certain likelihood
magnitudes (e.g., perhaps R adopted a likelihood value from elsewhere, relying on another
agent’s assignment). Apart from the issue of justification, there are number of concerns with the
Bayesian proposal.
I will touch on two concerns with the Bayesian proposal before linking it to epistemic
paternalism. Both concerns relate to Goldman’s “crucial assumptions” concerning the proposal,
22

The importance of “shallow consensus” for collaborative enquiry, in which understanding between
individuals may be extremely tenuous—as discussed by Fred D’Agostino (2010)—offers another perspective
on the doubtfulness of Goldman’s assumption.
23
The inspiration for Goldman’s proposal stems from Richard Friedman’s application of Bayes’ Theorem to
evaluating witness testimony within the legal context.
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namely that a given piece of testimony has an objective likelihood value and that the receiver
possesses that value. Needless to say, Bayes’ Theorem itself offers no special insight on how an
epistemic agent ought to acquire the likelihood values. That Goldman does not consider this a
pressing issue relates back to the former point regarding objective likelihood values: the
Bayesian proposal depends on there being fairly obvious measures of truth. Acquiring
likelihoods values would ideally be as simple as having an extensive chart of previous results.
But there are good reasons to doubt whether this is an adequate account or even plausible.
Goldman himself acknowledges that Bayes’ Theorem may not be the most effective
inference practice for particular problems. His argument is only meant to establish that Bayesian
inference is likely to have a positive effect for all epistemic practices. While this may be an
epistemological curiosity, it does not immediately follow that it should actually be applied to
epistemic practices since a given practice may already employ a more effective inference
practice. This is an especially telling issue given the second concern, namely the difficulty of
actually employing Bayes’ Theorem. Largely based on the difficulty of its application, the use of
Bayesian inference has been rejected in the British legal system (Kusch 2002a). In discussing the
court’s rejection, Martin Kusch (2002a, 81) concludes that evaluating the credibility and
plausibility of evidence and witnesses—necessary for establishing accurate likelihood values in
the legal context—are “not the sorts of things that are best thought of in discrete quantities.” In
such cases where relevant factors cannot be expressed in terms of discrete quantities, it is
impossible to properly perform a Bayesian calculation. But, setting aside these cases, it should be
granted that the difficulty of Bayesian inference is mitigated when considered from the
perspective of an epistemic authority, especially an authority who is attempting to evaluate the
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efficacy of a large-scale and long-term epistemic enterprise. This brings me to the element of
epistemic paternalism within Goldman’s social epistemology.
1.6.2

Epistemic Paternalism and Epistemics’ Two Loci of Control

The most charitable way of reading Goldman’s Bayesian proposal is from the perspective of
authoritative regulation. To discuss the importance of epistemic authorities for Goldman, I will
examine the notion of epistemic paternalism, which is one form of authority. Discussing the
authoritative role within epistemic paternalism is also helpful for understanding the normative
role that Goldman envisions for social epistemics. In the present section, I focus on epistemic
paternalism and its attendant picture of epistemic agency, while in the next and final section on
Goldman’s social epistemology, I link epistemic paternalism back to Bayesianism.
Epistemic paternalism entails that not all relevant and available information should
always be heard. Epistemic paternalism is defined as “whenever a ‘communication controller’
interposes their own judgment rather than allowing the audience to exercise theirs” (Goldman
1991). The specific type of authority being exercised in epistemic paternalism is communication
control, the authority filtering out any information that would have a veritistically negative effect.
A wide variety of domains exhibit this dynamic, such as legal and education systems. If the
significance of a piece of information is easily over- or under-estimated by its audience, then the
authority may filter it out so that the audience’s judgment is not likely misled. In the case of the
legal system, for example, hearsay and the accused’s criminal history in addition to the
previously mentioned case of Bayesian inference are all excluded for fear of being overestimated by juries.24 In the former two cases—hearsay and the accused’s criminal history—the
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One of the considerations that blocked the use of Bayesian inference in juror deliberation was the claim that
jurors are likely to under-estimate or effectively forget the subjective judgments that underlie a set of
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information is withheld despite being directly relevant. Yet Goldman considers the withholding
as justified on epistemic grounds: blocking relevant information is epistemically justified if it
improves the chances of acquiring the sought-after truth, such as the guilt or innocence of an
accused.
The authoritative, paternalistic filtering of information represents one of two loci of
cognitive control that Goldman recognizes. In a footnote from the 1978 Epistemics essay,
Goldman states that epistemics covers both “the self-regulation of cognitive processes” as well
as the “third-person control of cognitive traits” (520; original emphasis). Goldman’s goal is to
expand traditional epistemology’s purview beyond the individual; in the passage, the specific
concern is with how tool-use and education shape cognitive subjects. Goldman implicitly
commits himself to the view that first- and third-person regulation are the only two loci of
cognitive regulation. Either the epistemic subject imposes a change on herself, or a third-person
(as a specially tuned external force) imposes the change on the subject. While this is an
improvement on traditional epistemology’s exclusive focus on self-regulation, I think there is at
the very least one other loci of cognitive intervention, namely second-person participation. But
the importance of second-person participation to epistemology does not appear as a possibility to
Goldman. In Chs. 2 – 3, I use Turner’s weak empathy model and the enactivist concept of
participatory sense-making to argue that second-person interaction is of distinct if not primary
epistemic importance. But for present purposes, I mention the possibility of second-person
participation in order to highlight another under-theorized element of the testimony view’s
transmission picture, namely the implicit passivity of epistemic subjects.

likelihood values. In such a scenario, the conclusions based on Bayesian inference would be over-estimated
due to an exaggerated appearance of objective certainty (Kusch 2002a).
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One way to examine the passivity of epistemic subjects is by considering the parallels
between first- and third-person regulation. Goldman (1978) notes that people do not have direct
control over doxastic attitudes and that the most important “command variable” (i.e., cognitive
element that an individual does control) is attention. This consideration relates to the importance
of secondary epistemics, especially how practicing certain skills can be used to mold cognitive
traits. And once the importance of secondary epistemics is granted, it follows that third-person
interventions importantly influence individuals’ cognitive traits via secondary epistemics as well.
Whatever can be counted as a “command variable” for an individual is susceptible to thirdperson control, beginning with attention.25 Given the profound influence of social circumstances
and external forces more generally on an individual’s attention, the very notion of a “command
variable” is at best a difference of degree rather than kind from the non-voluntaristic doxastic
attitude.26 The essence of cognitive control thus suggested is that of filtering, and it is in this
sense that Goldman’s cognitive subject is essentially passive.
The essence of epistemic agency consists in parsing perceptual inputs as opposed to a
world-directed behavior. The epistemic agent does not control the causally determinate nature of
perceptual input but does exercise some control over what input she is exposed to as well as what
aspects of the input are taken as salient. A person, for example, may not be able to control the
effect of advertising but can exercise some control as to what advertising they are exposed to
(e.g., by avoiding TV). This is the basic sense in which filtering is the essence of epistemic
agency. And the ultimate result of epistemically skilled filtering is increasing one’s stock of true
beliefs. The molding of cognitive traits can be understood as types of filters: such habituated
25

The potency of advertising makes this a ubiquitous and non-trivial point.
I argue in Ch. 2 that the lack of a qualitative difference between Goldman’s command variables and nonvoluntaristic cognitive states stems from grounding knowledge in causal determination. I further explicate and
clarify this aspect of Goldman’s view of the cognitive subject by comparing his simulationist model of the
mind to Turner’s weak empathy model.
26
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traits influence what a cognitive subject exposes herself to, what she recognizes as salient, and
also forms heuristics for processing the salient input. Likewise, other people—strictly in terms of
their epistemic significance—are nothing more than particularly effective filters.
Goldman recognizes social epistemics as a distinct domain because other people often act
as specialized filters, filtering information in ways analogous to an individual’s own acquired
secondary cognitive skills. Other people essentially predigest and condense perceptual input.
What another person shares reflects in part what they thought of as salient in addition to being
the product of their own acquired epistemic skills: for these two reasons, the testimony of
another person has at least the potential and often the actuality of providing true beliefs more
efficiently than if an individual had to undergo the corresponding first-hand experiences herself.
Epistemic paternalism, in turn, is one special type of social filter; in the case of epistemic
paternalism, “pre-digestion” involves intentionally withholding relevant but likely misleading
information. As with other kinds of social filters as well as an individual’s own acquired
secondary cognitive skills, the benefit of epistemic paternalism derives from filtering input in
order to lighten the burden on an individual’s cognitive processes.
In the present section, I examined epistemic paternalism in order to explore the nature of
epistemic agency. Epistemic paternalism provides a helpful perspective on the issue by drawing
attention to the second locus of cognitive control, namely third-person regulation. After
comparing third-person regulation with self-regulation, I concluded that for Goldman there is no
qualitative difference in the nature of control for each locus because individual “command
variables” are susceptible to third-person regulation. The comparison also highlighted the passive
nature of epistemic agency: the essence of epistemic agency—whether performed by an
individual or by another person for an individual—consists in filtering informational inputs in
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order to more efficiently stockpile true beliefs. As noted at the beginning of the section, the
authoritative role depicted in cases of epistemic paternalism is the most charitable way of
considering Goldman’s Bayesian proposal. I expand on this idea in the next section, while
presenting a summary overview of Goldman’s truth-oriented social epistemology.
1.6.3

Concluding Thoughts on Truth-Oriented Social Epistemology and Epistemics

Alvin Goldman’s truth-oriented social epistemology includes one of the most comprehensive
frameworks for testimony. Beginning with §1.4, I examined how reliabilism enables Goldman to
avoid many of the justificatory issues that limit the testimony literature. Epistemics, in both its
individual and social branches, is instead directed towards prescribing ways to improve the
efficiency of knowledge acquisition.
In §1.5, I discussed the epistemics project as a whole and some of its major issues. The
individual branch of epistemics is the most important branch, since all matters concerning
knowledge ultimately terminate in an individual’s belief-forming processes. Even though social
epistemics is merely an extension of individual epistemics, the third major issue that I
discussed—namely, accounting for the nature of discoveries—indicates the need for social
epistemics. Along these lines, the concept of product epistemology explains how individuals can
collaborate on problems such as those found in science.
Language is, in effect, the most basic kind of product epistemology. More than anything,
social epistemology is a distinct domain of enquiry because the medium of language makes
people particularly influential on each other’s stock of beliefs. It is upon this broad framework
that Goldman approaches the topic of testimony, rooting testimony in the use of language for
transmitting observational reports.
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As discussed in §1.6.1, Goldman adopts most of the basic tenets of the testimony
literature. His most noteworthy contribution consists in his proposal to universally apply Bayes’
Theorem to testimonial practices. Bayesian inference is shown to likely increase the amount of
true beliefs within a community despite not necessarily providing epistemic justification for
those beliefs. The increase in veritistic value (i.e., “V-value”) can be verified by a third-person
authority who monitors beliefs within the community.
The specific type of regulatory control that I focused on in §1.6.2 was epistemic
paternalism. I used this specific type of third-person intervention to highlight the essentially
passive nature of agency in Goldman’s epistemics and the testimony literature more generally.
Whether first-personal or third-personal, epistemic agency consists in filtering informational
inputs in order to stockpile true beliefs. Epistemic agency is essentially passive because it is
limited to how an agent receives information. From a strictly epistemic viewpoint, Goldman sees
a cleavage between a source of information (whether a person or other external force) and the
informational receiver. This cleavage manifested itself in Goldman’s testimony account in the
claim that monological argumentation is the basic and isolable form of testimony reporting.
The cleavage between testimonial reporter and receiver creates a motivation problem. An
individual must make an effort to report information to another person, and it is not always clear
why individuals expend such effort to share information. Goldman recognizes and briefly
canvasses possible solutions to the motivation problem in the 1999 chapter on testimony. The
general solution that Goldman seeks is an evolutionary selective pressure that favors
communication, which is most plausible when thought of in terms of examples such as animals
warning each other of threats. Over the long-term, individuals would mutually benefit from such
communication. But Goldman recognizes that such an explanation is not entirely satisfactory,
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since many animals communicate when there is no clear instrumental benefit and even when
there is a negative cost—the example that Goldman notes is of chickens who share when they
find a food source. While instrumental benefits are obviously a motivating factor in epistemic
interaction, I think the attempt to make it the fundamental motivating factor results from the
mistaken picture of there being a cleavage between reporter and receiver.27
The very idea of a fundamental motivation to communicate is only plausible given the
larger picture of a default cleavage between testimonial reporter and receiver. Seeking a
fundamental motivation to be social is an example of what Martin Kusch (2002b)—with regard
to the testimony literature as a whole—diagnoses as the dilution of social life. Like other
contributors to the testimony literature, Goldman considers the details of actual interaction to be
of only secondary/derivative importance to testimony.
The details of social interaction are epistemically significant only insofar as they relate to
the transmission of beliefs. Interaction is strictly an instrumental means for gaining information
more efficiently than would be required for first-hand experience. So even though Goldman
rightfully deprioritizes the question of justification—allowing him to focus on ways to more
efficiently transmit true beliefs—he still myopically focuses on message acceptance. The
question of whether to accept a belief still crowds out the interactive dynamics between two
agents. Goldman’s “aim realism” offers another, broader perspective on Goldman’s distinctive
form of social myopia.
Goldman’s truth-oriented social epistemology is an expression of his commitment to aim
realism. As presented in Goldman (1986), aim realism rests on a fitting correspondence theory of
27

Another troubling feature of Goldman’s discussion is the implicit equivocation of evolution with natural
selection. The adaptationist focus on the survival of the fittest brings with it the presumption that social
relationships should be explained strictly in terms of instrumental benefits. In Chs. 3 – 5, using the
transformation view, I argue that naturalism does not warrant such a reduction of social relations. Regarding
adaptationism, see Gould and Lewontin (1979).
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truth.28 Language, as formulated by epistemic agents, provides the conditions of truth but
physical reality still determines whether language fits.29 Thus, an agent may focus solely on
reformulating terminology (e.g., attempting to solve a theoretical puzzle), but what gives
ultimate significance to such exercises is the possibility of providing a better fit to reality. Truthoriented social epistemology refers to the same dynamic but explicitly at the level of a
community. Analogous to esoteric theoretical puzzles with no direct connection to factual truths,
certain measures may be instituted in a community even though they may seem to be unrelated
or even a hindrance to truth. Epistemic paternalism is a good example in this respect because
there is a clear sense in which truth appears to be hindered. But Goldman thinks that the ultimate
effects are veritistically positive: a community will ultimately possess a greater amount of true
beliefs. Hence, Goldman’s social epistemology is truth-oriented in the sense that it concerns
itself with issues that do not immediately relate to truths but which promote the acquisition of
truths in the long-term; it orients a community to acquiring truths.
By concerning itself with the means of acquiring truths, truth-oriented social
epistemology gives a more comprehensive treatment of testimony. But, as I have argued,
Goldman’s treatment is still myopic due to neglecting the interactive dynamics between
individuals. In §1.5, this issue appears in the form of delineating between the practical and
intellectual dimensions of problem solving, while in §1.6.2, I traced the problem back to the
essentially passive understanding of epistemic agency. The only means that Goldman concerns
himself with—whether from a first- or third-person perspective—is how to filter informational
inputs. Both Turner’s weak empathy model and enactivism’s participatory sense-making offer
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This conception of truth is the metaphysical underpinning of reliabilism, explaining why it is not merely a
heuristic for traditional justification.
29
Martin Kusch (2002a) argues that Goldman’s fitting conception of truth correspondence is either vacuous or
contradictory.
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active conceptions of epistemic agency. But before examining these fundamentally different
approaches to epistemic interaction in the subsequent chapters, I first want to discuss Martin
Kusch’s internal critique of the testimony literature. Kusch’s critique serves as a helpful
transition because it anticipates the more pragmatically oriented accounts, yet still retains the
testimony literature’s focus on language as the primary medium of social interaction.

1.7

Kusch’s Communitarian Critique of the Testimony Literature

In his call for a communitarian epistemology, Martin Kusch (2002a, 2002b, 2009, 2013) offers
perhaps the most thorough and fundamental internal critique of the testimony literature. Kusch
largely limits himself to one of the basic premises of the testimony literature—namely that
language is the fundamental medium of epistemically significant social interaction—but offers a
dramatically different characterization of that medium. Rather than thinking of language as
solely or even primarily a medium for transmission, Kusch emphasizes the performative nature
of linguistic acts. Kusch’s communitarian epistemology thus provides a useful contrast to the
transmission view underlying the testimony literature.
Knowledge by Agreement represents Kusch’s most extensive attempt to redirect the
testimony literature towards communitarian epistemology. Kusch critiques what he refers to as
the “individualist testimony view,” which corresponds to what I have labeled as testimony’s
“transmission view.” Kusch (2002a) summarizes the individualist testimony view in terms of
four aspects: (1) testimony is taken to be a merely derivative as opposed to generative source of
knowledge, (2) testimony is meant to consist in the transmission of complete items of knowledge,
(3) items of knowledge are delivered solely by perception, memory, and inference, and (4) the
“testifier” and “recipient” need possess only minimal social knowledge of each other. The first
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aspect concerning the transmission versus generation of knowledge is the most important, as
discussed in §1.3.
In §1.3, I evaluated Lackey’s argument that testimonial exchanges generate rather than
simply transmit knowledge. But Lackey still bases testimonial exchanges on the transmission of
preformed beliefs. Given Kusch’s four aspects taxonomy, we can explain Lackey’s position in
terms of adopting all of the four aspects except the first one. By contrast, for Kusch, the
testimonial generation of knowledge refers primarily to the performative nature of linguistic acts
(e.g., certifying two people as married). The other three aspects help to further illustrate the
performative nature of testimony.
The second and third aspects of the individualist testimony view are closely interrelated.
Testimony is thought to only consist of transmitting complete items of knowledge (the second
aspect) because items of knowledge are supposed to be formed only by an individual’s on-board
cognitive resources, namely perception, memory, and inference (the third aspect). The
individualist testimony view thus endorses a four sources view of knowledge, in which testimony
is the fourth and strictly derivative source that encapsulates all social sources of knowledge.30
The fourth aspect of the individualist testimony view offers another perspective on the issues
with the four sources picture.
The testimony literature generally disregards the significance of social identities and
statuses. The fourth aspect of the individualist testimony view is the claim that testifier and
recipient need only possess minimal social knowledge of each other.31 This aspect is most clear
for theorists who focus on the question of justification in idealized terms. But even John Greco’s
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Turner’s weak empathy model challenges this four sources of knowledge picture and thus the first three
aspects of the individualist testimony view.
31
The transformation view, especially as represented by Sutton’s encultured mind, challenges all four aspects
of the individualist testimony view.
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account of testimony is lacking despite arguing that some social environments are epistemically
relevant. As discussed in §1.2.3, Greco’s argument is salutary because it alludes to the
importance of social roles but remains impoverished. Greco only considers paternalistic
relationships—such as doctor-patient and mother-child relationships—because these situations
have a dramatic impact on standards of justification. Kusch, by contrast, thinks of epistemic
communities in more general and complex terms, claiming that testifier and recipient are usually
part of the same community and, furthermore, that the shared membership matters to the
testimonial exchange. More specifically, the shared membership influences the normative
expectations for both testifier and recipient.32 Paternalistic relationships are just one example of
how community membership can influence normative expectations; Greco thus only indirectly
alludes to the multifaceted epistemic significance of community membership. Before considering
more of Kusch’s communitarian alternative to the individualist testimony view, it’s worth first
noting his diagnosis of the intuition that underlies and guides the individualist view.
In “The Limits of Testimony,” Ch. 1 of Knowledge by Agreement, Kusch argues that the
original legal meaning of testimony still guides the literature. Kusch thinks that the legal sense of
testimony serves as an intuition pump that “lurks behind” philosophical theories of testimony,
despite attempts to broaden its meaning. In the legal context, an eyewitness ought to pass along
knowledge founded on perception and memory, not hearsay. The witness’s testimony should not
involve any generative element because it would corrupt the testimony.
The legal meaning of testimony nicely encapsulates the four aspects of the individualist
view. Testimony in the philosophical sense, as in the courtroom sense, should only transmit
knowledge. What is transmitted should be a belief formed by the epistemic agent’s/witness’s on32

Fred D’Agostino (2010) is especially insightful on this point, describing how shared epistemic values within
communities facilitate collaboration in the midst of widespread disagreement. This situation corresponds to the
previously noted notion of “shallow consensus.”
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board cognitive resources (the third aspect), which in turn implies the second aspect of having
formed a complete belief prior to transmission. Finally, the reason why testifier and recipient
need only possess minimal social knowledge of each other is because the physical reality
responsible for the first-hand perceptual experience is the defining and isolable element on which
the testimonial exchange rests. Similar to how the details of social interaction are treated, social
roles and epistemic communities are of only incidental importance. Social statuses may only be
useful as a means for determining whether a piece of testimony is credible/uncorrupted or an
indication that standards of justification should be relaxed.
Having summarized the individualist testimony view, Kusch points out cases that do not
fit the picture. One immediate misfit is the previously mentioned example of certifying two
people as married, which is an instance of collective stipulation. Testimony in this case creates
the status of marriage as opposed to reporting a fact of nature. Collective stipulation is an
obvious example of a linguistic act that is essentially performative. Another example that Kusch
gives is of a judge pronouncing an accused person as guilty—the judge’s official capacity
entitles him to make the pronouncement and for it to be of consequence. In other words, by
recognizing a person as serving the role of judge, the corresponding community endorses his
pronouncement and in that sense collectively stipulates that the accused person is guilty. But the
performative nature of language goes beyond such obvious examples of collective stipulation.
Three of the primary sources for Kusch’s characterization of language are the late
Wittgenstein (1958, 1969), Barry Barnes’s (1983) account of language in relation to the
philosophy of science, and Edward Craig’s (1999) conceptual genealogy of knowledge. Most
pertinent for social epistemology is Kusch’s use of Craig, since Craig claims that the very
concept of knowledge originated as a social status marker. More specifically, Craig claims that
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the concept of knowledge originated due to the need to mark certain people as good informants.
That is to say, the concept of knowledge (and thus the very foundation of epistemology) is rooted
in an act of collective stipulation. Hence, Kusch thinks that knowledge is itself a social kind as
opposed to a natural or artificial kind.
Kusch (1998, 2002b) presents the tripartite division of natural, artificial, and social kinds.
The tripartite division modifies Barnes’s previous dichotomy between natural and social kinds.
Elephants and roses are examples of natural kinds—they are organisms with their own particular
reproductive histories. Artificial kinds, in turn, correspond to material artifacts: the two examples
that Kusch offers are typewriters and tables. The idea is that both typewriters and tables, as
material objects, were invented by people but would continue to exist even if humans suddenly
disappeared. Social kinds are also invented by humans but their existence depends on people’s
continued recognition. Money is a social kind because its value derives solely from its being
collectively recognized as valuable. If people suddenly disappeared, then money would as well,
leaving behind token traces in the form of metal discs and such. More specifically, social kinds
like money as well as marriage depend on the existence of language, because language enables
collective stipulation (Kusch 2002b). Relating this division back to Craig: knowledge is simply
another form of collective stipulation, stipulating people who inhabit the social role of being
informative. Without people and the medium of language for stipulating social roles, knowledge
would not exist. Although thought provoking and a valuable contrast to the testimony literature, I
think Craig’s conceptual genealogy and Kusch’s use of it are both problematic.
Craig’s conceptual genealogy of knowledge is problematic for reasons similar to
Goldman’s approach to testimony’s motivation problem. In both cases, the authors explain a
social phenomenon in terms of one type of driving force. For Goldman, the motivation to
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communicate is reducible to evolutionary selection pressures; while for Craig, the origin of
knowledge is reducible to the function of marking good informants. It does not help Goldman
that he acknowledges the need for multiple selection pressures because the underlying
presupposition—common to Craig—is that a social phenomenon is reducible to the instrumental
benefits derived from it. Craig’s reduction is less objectionable given that it is concerned with a
single concept as opposed to all forms of epistemically significant social interaction. I think
Craig makes a convincing case that marking good informants played a formative role in the
genesis of the concept of knowledge. But what is objectionable is claiming that this is the sole
original purpose behind the concept of knowledge.33 The plausibility this type of one-factor
explanation derives in large part from an exclusive focus on instrumental benefits.
Kusch’s use of Craig raises a different issue. More specifically at issue is Kusch’s
tripartite distinction between natural, artificial, and social kinds, which Kusch uses to situate
Craig’s concept of knowledge. The distinction between artificial and social kinds betrays an
overinflated role for language in social epistemology. Kusch thinks that social kinds, unlike
artificial ones, depend on the medium of language for their existence. Social kinds are by
implication ethereal, separable from material reality and only visible to language users. The
tenuousness of this distinction is evident from Kusch’s own examples: a typewriter is thought to
be an artificial but not social kind, since a particular hulk of metal that could be used as a
typewriter would still exist even if all language users disappeared. But without language users
the hulk of metal would cease to be a typewriter for the same reason that the metal discs that
were coins would cease to be money: the typewriter would become just a hulk of metal. The
significance of language is not distinct from the material reality that it is a part of, which is why
33

Kusch (2013) alludes to this issue when he suggests that it would have also been important for testifiers to
be able to mark good listeners/recipients.
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it is misleading to distinguish between artificial and social kinds. John Sutton’s (2010) discussion
of the encultured mind goes so far as to suggest that there’s not even a clear-cut distinction
between natural and social kinds. But before challenging this latter distinction, I will use
Turner’s weak empathy model in Ch. 2 to challenge the view of language operant within the
artificial-social distinction.
Despite the two problematic issues, I am largely sympathetic to Kusch’s communitarian
epistemology. Furthermore, as I will show in the following chapters, there are important
affinities with the translation and transformation views. Most importantly, Kusch’s emphasis on
collective stipulation anticipates their pragmatic-orientation. It is this emphasis on the practical
dimensions of knowledge that leads to more careful treatments of the interactive dynamics
between individuals. Social interaction is more than a means for transmitting or receiving
preformed packets of information.
In this chapter, I have traced some of the major themes and trajectory of the testimony
literature. The literature has made it forcefully clear that the social dimensions of knowledge are
more than a theoretical afterthought. Yet in describing testimony’s “transmission view,” I have
argued that the testimony view has not fully overcome the myopic individualism of traditional
epistemology. By introducing Turner’s weak empathy model as a representative of what I call
the “translation view,” I challenge the presupposition that epistemically significant social
interaction must be founded on the exchange of discrete representations or beliefs. In Ch. 5, as
part of the transformation view, I challenge the exclusive focus on the instrumental benefits of
epistemic interaction—that is, I challenge manipulationism.
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Chapter 2: The Translation View

2.0

Introduction

Acknowledging the reality of tacit knowledge raises an immediate concern for the testimony
view. If, as Polanyi (1966b) states, “we can know more than we can tell,” then, according to
testimony’s transmission view, it appears to be impossible to pass along such knowledge to
another person. But this by itself does not pose a problem for the testimony view, since the view
need not imply that all of an individual’s knowledge can be passed along. Accordingly, there are
conceptions of tacit knowledge that are compatible with testimony’s transmission picture of
social epistemology; in the next section, I discuss one such account by Searle.34
Yet other theorists, including Polanyi, think that the implications of tacit knowledge
require radically transforming our understanding of explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge, on this
general approach, broadens what is considered epistemically significant. Embodied skills, in
particular, take on a greater prominence: Polanyi (1958), for example, examines the epistemic
importance of bicycle riding and swimming; in addition to bicycle riding, Dreyfus (1986, 1991,
2005) examines piloting an airplane; Turner (2011) examines driving a car. For all three thinkers,
examining the epistemic nature of embodied activities shows how understanding (as explicit
knowledge) shades into various skills, skills that are inexplicable in terms of conscious rules or
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For another account of tacit knowledge that is compatible with the testimony view, see Stanley and
Williamson (2001), who acknowledge tacit knowledge but drain it of epistemic significance. Additionally,
Gascoigne and Thornton (2013) use this account to argue that McDowellian normativist theories, which I
discuss in Ch. 3, are compatible with the tacit.
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propositions. And it is this emphasis on embodied skills that ultimately conflicts with the
testimony view.
In the present chapter, I draw upon the tacit knowledge literature as a corrective to the
testimony view. Analogous to how Schmitt (1994) saw the concept of testimony as a litmus test
that establishes the need for socializing epistemology, tacit knowledge shows the need for more
detailed analyses of how epistemic agents interact. In terms of the previously discussed cluster of
presuppositions and symptomatic tendencies of the testimony view from Ch. 1, tacit knowledge
challenges the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the abstract focus on the question of justification,
basing epistemic interaction on the exchange of discrete tokens,
viewing epistemic agents primarily as passive informational receivers, and
dividing the epistemic and practical dimensions of problem solving.

The concept of tacit knowledge shows how these four issues are closely interrelated. Towards
this end, in contrast to approaches that are compatible with testimony’s transmission view, my
understanding of tacit knowledge is heavily indebted to Polanyi and Turner. Turner’s (2012a,
2012b) account, in particular, serves as the representative of the translation view, which I offer as
an alternative to testimony’s model of epistemic interaction.
The present chapter consists of three major parts. In the first (§2.1-2.2), I survey the tacit
knowledge literature, beginning with Polanyi’s project followed by the two more recent accounts
of Dreyfus and Searle. In §2.3-2.4, I examine how Turner uses the issues raised by tacit
knowledge to present his weak empathy model of social interaction and criticize what he refers
to as “collectivist” social theories. Finally, in the third part (§2.5), I compare Turner’s critique of
collectivist theories to Kusch’s critique of the “individualist testimony view.” At first glance,
Turner and Kusch’s critiques appear to be diametrically opposed to each other, since the latter
sees individualism as the primary obstacle to improving social epistemology while the former
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sees collectivist notions as the primary issue. I argue that these should instead be understood as
complementary critiques that offer two perspectives on one deeply troubled picture. In short, I
argue that the individualism of the testimony view creates spurious rifts between epistemic
agents that then must be sutured over by vacuous collectivist notions. This discussion sets the
stage for the enactivist concept of participatory sense-making in Ch. 3.

2.1

Polanyi on Tacit Knowledge: Imitative Learning within Traditions

Tacit knowledge, as a term of art, originated with the ambitious efforts of Michael Polanyi. First
and foremost, Polanyi (1958, 1959, 1964) sought to challenge the positivist picture of science, in
which knowledge is detached and impersonal. Polanyi believed this picture of science obscured
the psychological processes that underpin knowledge. Most importantly, the basic fact of the
tacit—that “we can know more than we can tell” (Polanyi 1966b, 4)—appears paradoxical.
Polanyi argues that this basic fact shapes all of scientific practice, beginning with becoming a
scientist in the first place. The ramifications of this fact ultimately reshape all forms of
knowledge, as indicated by Polanyi’s (1966a, 7) bold claim that “all knowledge is either tacit or
rooted in tacit knowledge.”
In the present section, I examine the transformative implications of Polanyi’s project. My
focus is on the implications that Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge has for social
epistemology, implications that he only partially develops himself. In the next section, I argue
that Dreyfus and Searle both undermine its potential in two closely related though different ways.
Because it is the most direct point of contact with social epistemology—the point at which
Polanyi most carefully examines how the tacit shapes social interaction—I begin my exposition
of Polanyi with his notion of tradition.
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The practice of science depends on and is maintained by the tradition of science (Polanyi
1964). Polanyi (1964, 44) famously compared the relationship between great scientists to
apostolic succession within the Christian church in which new bishops are ordained by a “laying
on of hands.” The comparison emphasizes the need for sustained interaction with distinguished
scientists in order to become a distinguished scientist oneself. In modern physics, for example,
the Nobel laureate J.J. Thomson mentored Ernest Rutherford who in turn mentored four
additional Nobel laureates. The string of tremendous successes—a recurrent pattern in other
disciplines as well—suggests that something more than the sharing of explicit observations and
theories was responsible for the lineage of great thinkers, since the observations and theories
were readily available to researchers elsewhere. In short, the example suggests that learning
through imitation is essential to sustaining the tradition of science as well as traditions more
generally.
Imitation indicates in what sense tacit knowledge can be taught and deliberately acquired.
Turner (2012a, 2012b, 2014) seizes on this aspect of Polanyi’s account, using imitative learning
as the framework for modeling the cognitive basis of social interaction. As I discuss in §2.3, this
is in tension though not necessarily at odds with Polanyi’s broader emphasis on tradition. For
both Turner and Polanyi, imitation enables novices to acquire an indefinite range of skills; in the
case of science, some of what a master “imparts” to his or her apprentices include “the way he
chooses problems, selects a technique, reacts to new clues and to unforeseen difficulties,
discusses other scientists’ work…” (Polanyi 1964, 43). For Polanyi, unlike Turner, acquiring the
indefinite range of skills amounts to becoming part of the tradition of science.
In keeping with his rhetorical style, Polanyi’s use of the term tradition is somewhat
nebulous but does have some clear implications. The term underpins Polanyi’s response to one

64

possible misreading of his picture of the scientist, which he describes as follows: “the scientist
may appear as a mere truth-finding machine steered by intuitive sensibility” (Polanyi 1964,
38).35 Polanyi thinks that intuitive sensibility alone would be insufficient for handling the
responsibilities of the practicing scientist. In opposition to this picture, Polanyi describes the
scientist as a “detective, policeman, judge, and jury all rolled into one” (38). In terms of this
metaphor, the mistaken picture implies that the scientist is only a detective, who collects
evidence and tests his or her hunches on nature who is the ultimate judge of the hunches’ truth.
But since nature does not play such a determinate role, the freedoms and thereby responsibilities
of the scientist are much greater than that of a mere detective. The tradition of science is essential
as a resource for guiding individuals, fostering moral ideals including the ideal of objectivity.
In challenging the detached and impersonal picture of knowledge, Polanyi is at pains to
offer an alternative account of objectivity. In multiple places, he defines objectivity in terms of a
scientist possessing “universal intent” (1958, 341; 1959, 27; 1964, 73; 1966b, 69). Objectivity is
thus a product of an individual scientist’s attempt to discover a truth of nature, despite humans’
inherent “infirmity” (1958, 342). Our inherently limited physical constitution ensures that
science is an endless inquiry, with further discoveries always awaiting. Tradition is important in
this regard, since it consists of the range of values and ideals that new generations of scientists
must commit themselves to in order to further the growth of science. These values hold the
project of science together—as much as it needs to be held together—not nature as a materially
determinate judge of truth.

35

The misreading is notable in part because it is essentially a blend of Alvin Goldman’s view of the scientist
with Hubert Dreyfus’s concept of expertise. As noted in §1.6, Goldman views epistemic subjects as essentially
nothing more than truth acquirers. While Dreyfus, as I discuss below, focuses on intuitive sensibility to the
point of only giving extremely cursory attention to anything resembling a tradition.

65

The intentional-based account of objectivity serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it
accentuates the abiding importance of making new discoveries in science. Rather than
identifying objectivity with substantive facts, the ceaseless striving for more knowledge is the
defining feature. The other purpose is more contentious: for Polanyi, humans’ physical
infirmities illustrate the need for religion: “[we undertake the hopeless task of attaining the
universal] because we hope to be visited by powers for which we cannot account in terms of our
specifiable capacities. This hope is a clue to God…” (1958, 342). Quite literally, Polanyi (1964,
15 & 45) thinks that being a scientist requires faith in its methods, mentors, and in the tradition
as a whole; this view is stressed in repeated appeals to the Christian dictum “fides quaerens
intellectum.”36 Given the associations, it should be no surprise that many subsequent theorists
have downplayed if not completely jettisoned the importance of tradition in regards to tacit
knowledge. This approach, best exemplified by Turner (as discussed in §2.3), offers a fair even if
truncated reading of Polanyi, since Polanyi thought empirical considerations motivated the view.
The strongest empirical motivation relates to a common regress argument concerning explicit
knowledge, which other theorists have drawn different lessons from.
The regress argument is simple. If it existed on its own, explicit knowledge—beginning
with simple descriptive statements—would lead to an infinite regress of explicit rules. Polanyi’s
argument is partly indebted to Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) distinction between “knowing that” and
“knowing how.” Explicit knowledge, which corresponds to “knowing that,” implies skillful
know how as its precondition. At the most basic level, a cognitive subject must supplement the
inherent imprecision of language in order to recognize a statement (whether oral or written) as
possessing a meaning. Hence, teaching in general presupposes the “pupil’s intelligent cooperation” (Polanyi 1966b, 5). Accordingly, the claim that all knowledge is “either tacit or
36

Polanyi translates the Latin as “to believe in order to know” and “faith in search of understanding.”
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rooted in the tacit” can be paraphrased as all knowledge either consists of know how or is rooted
in know how. Unlike Ryle who limits his argument to a conceptual analysis of terms such as
“mind” and “knowledge,” Polanyi relates his version of the regress argument to the biological
nature of humans and numerous psychology experiments.37
The biological underpinning of the cognitive subject that Polanyi (1958) identifies
resembles that found in Goldman’s epistemics and even Andy Clark’s more recent Extended
Mind hypothesis. In all three cases, individual organisms possess a suite of innate drives and
cognitive capacities. Goldman and especially Clark think that natural selection favors organisms
capable of augmenting their native capacities with acquired skills and tools. While Polanyi (1958,
35) criticizes attempts to explain the origin of personhood and other complex organisms by
appeal to natural selection, he still endorses a similar position regarding the immutability of
innate characteristics. He writes, “Our thoughts are limited by our innate capabilities. Our senses
and emotions can be enhanced by education, but these ramifications remain dependent on their
native roots” (339). In this generic picture, the link between innate and acquired capacities is
one-directional; innate capacities are the immutable foundation for and executor of acquired
capacities.38 It is in this sense that acquired traits are thought to be, strictly speaking, extensions
of innate capacities.39 Polanyi’s general discussion of biology is geared towards clarifying the
relationship between innate capacities and tacit knowledge.

37

N. R. Hanson’s (1958, 1967) conceptual analysis of scientific discovery bridges the linguistic focus of Ryle
with Polanyi’s abiding concern with scientific discovery. Polanyi (1964, 12) notes that Hanson’s views
concerning the theory-ladenness of scientific facts as overlapping his own views.
38
My own critique of adaptationism, which I detail in Ch. 5, focuses on the issue of whether innate capacities
are immutable. I argue that innate capacities are, in fact, plastic and thus are shaped by developmental factors,
such as socialization.
39
While Polanyi endorses an immutable cognitive core, he is not committed to Clark’s functionalist
framework and is opposed to Goldman’s emphasis on belief-forming mechanisms.
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Polanyi (1958) thinks sensory organs are an organism’s most important innate cognitive
capacity and are inseparable from the organism’s innate drives. Perception prefigures all
knowledge, while satisfying biological drives prefigures all practical skills (104). Perception and
drives thus form a reciprocal relationship: perception guides drives, while the satisfaction of
drives, in turn, implicitly confirms the veracity of one’s percepts (104). Within the 1958 book,
Polanyi thinks of tacit knowledge as interiorizing bits of the universe and offers this biological
sketch as an attempt to shed light on the process of interiorization. But by (1966b), though he
retains the biological sketch, Polanyi discards the notion of interiorization in favor of viewing the
individual as expanding outward towards reality (35).40 The defining feature of this expansion is
an exponential increase of tacit knowledge, which corresponds to stratifying reality into two
cognitive levels. Polanyi describes these two levels in terms of a from-to structure of tacit
knowing.
In “The Logic of Tacit Inference” (1966a) and The Tacit Dimension (1966b), Polanyi
distills tacit knowledge into a from-to structure. This structure is exhibited in various psychology
experiments, including one in which human subjects were administered electric shocks after
hearing certain nonsense syllables. Subjects were unable to recall the syllables that preceded the
shocks yet knew when to brace themselves (Eriksen and Kuethe 1956). Polanyi describes the
subjects as attending from the subsidiary particulars (i.e., nonsense syllables) to the focal term
(i.e., the electric shock). The focal term corresponds to the meaningful object of conscious
attention, while subsidiary particulars are perceived unconsciously only in relation to the focal
term. The general trajectory of cognition is for the focal term to become increasingly distal, as
acquired tools and skills enable individuals to integrate increasingly large domains of particulars
40

Dreyfus’s (1972) criticism of Polanyi, as I discuss in §2.2, doesn’t acknowledge that Polanyi moves away
from the (1958) interiorization picture.
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(Polanyi 1966b, 29). Yet in contrast to the case of acquired tools and skills, which even after
mastery can be made explicit, the subsidiary particulars in the shock experiment are entirely
tacit—known only via attending to the shock. The hands-on education of a new scientist, while
perhaps less painful, exhibits the same from-to structure found in the electric shock experiment
and the related outward trajectory of cognitive integration.
While attending to the stated goals of a given research project, the new scientist must also
“pick up on” the expert scientist’s intuitive skills. These intuitive skills are subsidiary particulars
from which the apprentice attempts to contribute to the project’s stated aims, which are the focal
terms. If the apprentice focused on learning these intuitive skills, then he or she would not
understand their proper significance and also would be unable to focus on the explicit objectives.
Hence, pace the testimony view, social interaction is all the more important because of what we
cannot tell, rather than being just a means for transmitting what we can tell. Furthermore, by
showing how a subsidiary particular can be inarticulable yet still, in a determinate manner,
contribute to a conscious cognitive achievement, the electric shock experiment suggests that
emphasizing the role of imitative learning does not necessarily require the broad and perhaps
mystifying notion of tradition.
There is, however, an important difference between the electric shock experiment and the
education of a scientist. The subsidiary particulars in the latter consist of an indefinite range of
various skills and perhaps values rather than a discrete entity, as in the case of a particular
nonsense syllable. Hence, in the electric shock experiment, presuming the same nonsense
syllables are used for each subject, everyone will be unconsciously aware of the same tacit
particular. But in the case of science, there is only a family resemblance between the intuitions of
teacher and student, each possessing a somewhat similar though unique skill set.
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An individual scientist’s unique set of intuitive skills is an example of what Polanyi refers
to as a tacit or personal coefficient. Coefficients are personal precisely because they differ
amongst individuals, a result of each individual’s unique physical constitution and experiential
history. Yet these inherent differences are not at odds with the goal of objectivity: Polanyi (1958,
17) describes the personal coefficient as bridging the disjunction between subjectivity and
objectivity. The tacit coefficient thus expresses the notion of compensating for personal
differences. Individuals “transcend” personal differences by striving to meet universal standards,
which relates back to the definition of objectivity as universal intent. Objectivity is defined in
terms of intention because it is impossible to compensate for all personal differences.41
Imitative learning suggests the extent to which compensation for personal difference is
possible. In striving to imitate another person, it is common to discover salient differences.
Sometimes these differences can be overcome, sometimes not, but many differences correspond
to actual differences in how a competency is realized. Competencies are thus multiply realizable
functional skills in which personal coefficients refer to differences in how a competency is
realized.
In sum, imitative learning is a heavily interactive process that imparts tacit knowledge,
but the tacit knowledge is realized uniquely on an individual-by-individual basis. There is thus
no determinate body of tacit knowledge that corresponds to science or any other epistemic
practice but rather a loose-knit, vaguely bounded range of skills (and perhaps values) that
individual scientists have become proficient at. That is to say, there is only a family resemblance
between the tacit knowledge of different individual scientists. For Polanyi, this inherent diversity
indicates the importance of traditions, which consist in part of moral values that he thinks are

41

I return to Polanyi’s concept of objectivity in §2.3 in order to contrast it with Turner’s own.
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necessary for maintaining a body of tacit knowledge. In the case of science, relevant values
include faith (in the history and methods of science), objectivity (the intention to meet universal
standards despite one’s inherent physical infirmities), honesty, and so on.
In the following sections, I consider three theorists who are all in some respect
dissatisfied with this general picture. Dreyfus and Searle both deny the epistemic significance of
diversity, which enables them to each give a more ontologically determinate account of tacit
knowledge. More specifically, Dreyfus and Searle, though in importantly different ways, treat
tacit knowledge as a form of objective knowledge, which can be transferred between subjects.
By contrast, Turner, whom I discuss in §2.3-2.4, retains Polanyi’s emphasis on diversity while
challenging Polanyi’s notion of tradition and the notion of transferrable objective tacit
knowledge.

2.2

Dreyfus and Searle: Tacit Knowledge as a Transferrable Objective Precondition

Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle make odd bedfellows. The former’s primary interest is in
clarifying the nature of performative skills and arguing that such skills cannot be reduced to rule
following. Searle, by contrast, models mental consciousness on the rules of language but
ultimately supplements this picture with his Background hypothesis, which grounds the mental
in pre-intentional know how. Despite arriving at the same issue via different routes, both Dreyfus
and Searle’s treatment of non-conceptual or pre-conceptual know how serve as points of contact
and comparison to Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge. In the ensuing section, I argue that
despite their differences, Dreyfus and Searle offer similar pictures of the social significance of
tacit knowledge. More specifically, Dreyfus and Searle both minimize the differences in tacit
knowledge between individuals, which, in turn, dilutes the importance of social interaction.
Since Dreyfus’s project shares a greater affinity with Polanyi’s, I begin there.
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Dreyfus’s focus on performative skills stems in large part from a reaction against midtwentieth century artificial intelligence. Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI), as
Haugeland (1985) would call it, sought to create a human-like intelligence based strictly on the
computation of explicit instructions. In examining how people perform various bodily skills,
Dreyfus argues that know how is an essential aspect of human intelligence, an intelligence that
cannot be reduced to rule following. With a few rhetorical broad strokes, Dreyfus traces the
prejudice against know how through the canon of Western philosophy back to Plato. But, more
pointedly, the symptom even appears in Polanyi.
Dreyfus (1972) scrutinizes Polanyi’s (1958) bicycle riding example. In an extensive
footnote (236-37), Dreyfus seizes on Polanyi’s appeal to “hidden rules” and “principles.” In the
example, Polanyi cites a principle from physics to explain how cyclists maintain their balance.
Given the principle’s highly technical details, it is safe to presume that most cyclists do not
explicitly know and will never explicitly know of it, which is Polanyi’s point. Emphasizing the
technical details suggests tacit knowledge’s complexity and ubiquity. For Dreyfus, however, the
appeal to hidden rules signals a conflation between explanation and understanding, in which
explanation refers to capturing the essential first-personal features of a performance and
understanding refers to a third-personal formal description. While the physical principle is
helpful for understanding bicycle riding, Dreyfus thinks that it is incongruous with explaining a
cyclist’s performance.
Dreyfus’s point is somewhat unfair but highlights a limitation of Polanyi’s framework.
Polanyi, like Dreyfus, thinks that explicit rule-following is inadequate for modeling cognition
and has the conceptual resources to support the point. Polanyi’s direct response to Dreyfus’s
criticism is to clarify the ontological status of the hidden rules: as subsidiary particulars, the rules
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are not merely unconscious but also functionally bear on explicit knowledge. This corresponds to
the previously discussed from-to structure of consciousness. The from-to structure signifies that
humans, unlike computing machines, have levels of consciousness. I think Dreyfus’s dismissal is
unfair, since Polanyi’s position is not reducible to GOFAI rule-following, but the criticism does
draw attention to Polanyi’s need for novel epistemic terms. Polanyi’s talk of “rules,” “principles,”
and “premises” stretches their normal meanings beyond recognition. Tacit knowledge deserves
and ultimately requires a more original epistemic framework.42 Dreyfus develops one such
framework, in which rules are only a propaedeutic to a different kind of knowledge.
Over the course of two decades and in collaboration with his brother Stuart, Hubert
Dreyfus (1965, 1972, 1980, 1986) distilled his interest in performative skills into a universal
model of expertise. Apart from some minor extensions and novel applications, Dreyfus’s (1986)
five-stage model of expertise represents the mature framework. In the model, rules are initially
important, especially in the first stage in which a novice’s actions are dictated by rule following.
But the significance of rules subsides and eventually is transcended, the crucial moment coming
after the proficiency stage. At this moment, the person’s skill no longer relies on calculative
rationality but strictly on intuition and thereby can no longer be explained in terms of rulefollowing. Dreyfus thinks that the role of intuition is evident from the felt experience of
mastering a skill.
The five-stage model is meant to reveal the underlying phenomenological structure of
skills. Dreyfus (1972, 145) characterizes his use of phenomenology as follows: “It
[phenomenological description] can give us understanding if it is able to find the general
characteristics of such behavior. … Such an account can even be called an explanation if it goes
42

J. J. Gibson (1986, 22) recognizes the far-reaching consequences of Polanyi’s concept, labeling
environmental affordances as tacit knowledge.

73

further and tries to find the fundamental features of human activity which serve as the necessary
and sufficient conditions for all forms of behavior.” At the very least, phenomenology is
understood to reveal the general characteristics of expert performance—namely, acting on
intuition rather than rules. But the more ambitious claim, the one Dreyfus commits to, is that the
five-stage model reveals the fundamental features of all human skills. Expertise is thus closely
related to intelligent bodily coping, which is inherent to any bodily performance.
Intelligent bodily coping is non-conceptual or pre-conceptual, yet on this view is still an
objective form of knowledge. Dreyfus’s (2001b) introduction to Samuel Todes’s Body and
World is helpful in this regard. Todes’s project was to identify the perceptual categories of
judgment, which are distinct from and the precondition for Kant’s conceptual categories (Todes
219). Subjects are material beings with needs; the success conditions of perceptual judgments
consist in the satisfaction of those bodily needs (Todes 58). The satisfaction of bodily needs
provide an objective standard apart from any conceptual judgments, thus relating to what
Dreyfus labels “practical objective knowledge” (xxvi). While not invested in the specifics of
Todes’s table of categories, Dreyfus heartily endorses the notion of practical objective
knowledge, since it articulates a material basis for his phenomenological account of expertise.
Given his unusual use of the term “expertise,” the most charitable way of reading it is as
a synonym for intelligent bodily coping. Accordingly, Dreyfus counts many activities as forms
of expertise—such as bicycle riding, walking, and talking—that are not normally counted as such,
though they are instances of bodily coping. Furthermore, he discounts some activities that are
normally thought of as forms of expertise—most importantly, coaching and teaching—that he
thinks are inexplicable in terms of bodily coping. Evan Selinger and Robert Crease (2006) link
Dreyfus’s usage to his defense of expertise against non-expert demands. Dreyfus (1986, 196)
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defends experts against what he sees as an unwarranted and destructive pressure to rationalize
their skills. A non-expert’s demand for justification, the argument goes, forces the expert to
distill her skills into explicable rules, essentially forcing her to regress back to the stage of
proficiency. In contrast to this rationalizing pressure, Dreyfus thinks that expertise should be
justified in terms of its form.
Dreyfus’s defense of experts involves simultaneously stressing their similarities and
differences with non-experts. Selinger and Crease (2006, 231-32) express this argument in terms
of a Similarity Claim (SC) and Difference Claim (DC). As “experts” in walking, talking, and
such, every person can recognize the phenomenal structure of mastering a skill. This is the sense
in which all forms of expertise are similar. But if a person has not mastered a particular skill—
such as being a doctor, a ballistics expert, and so on—the outsider cannot properly evaluate the
skills of that expert; only a fellow expert (i.e., an insider) can make such an evaluation. This is
the sense in which there are barriers between different kinds of expertise. In order for expertise
to be justified in terms of its form, Selinger and Crease note that SC must trump DC; that is, nonexperts should accept an expert’s judgment based on the shared phenomenal structure of mastery
in spite of the barrier. Selinger and Crease’s point is that this account is far too socially
impoverished to explain how expertise is actually acknowledged with respect to particular
individuals, especially in situations where expertise is contested.
There are numerous unacceptable social consequences of Dreyfus’s insulation of experts.
Most immediate is the naïve presumption that experts have shed all of their personal prejudices
with regard to their skills.43 Another consequence is diminishing the importance of coaching and
43

Dreyfus could concede that this is false while maintaining that risking the influence of experts’ personal
prejudices is a worthwhile tradeoff given the alternative of undermining expertise. But this response would be
inconsistent with the notion of objective practical knowledge that informs Dreyfus’s handling of social
questions (that is, his almost complete neglect of them).
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teaching. Selinger and Crease (2006, 226) note that while coaching is often understood as a form
of expertise, Dreyfus characterizes it as a “dispensing of rules in a standardized way.” This
picture of coaching is consistent with the five-stage model—in which all forms of expertise
begin with rule following—but is at odds with the complex reality of coaching. Dreyfus (2001a,
171-72) himself hints at this issue in discussing the importance of apprenticeship for “passing
along a style.” But his cursory discussion pales in comparison to Polanyi’s original treatment.
Imitative learning, as discussed in terms of the master-apprentice relationship,
exemplifies the differences between Polanyi and Dreyfus. “Passing along a style,” for Dreyfus,
consists essentially in cloning the master. In the (2001a) passage, Dreyfus notes the danger of
becoming merely a virtuoso, a musician who has copied her master’s style. The only way to
escape this danger, Dreyfus suggests, is to study with multiple masters, which thereby creates a
clashing of each master’s styles that “destabilizes and confuses” the apprentice (172). In other
words, the default result of imitative learning is identity between master and student. Dreyfus
and Polanyi thus reach opposite conclusions about whether diversity or identity come cheaply
through imitative learning: for Dreyfus, it takes extra effort to ensure there are qualitative
differences between master and apprentice, while for Polanyi, the moral dimension of traditions
are necessary merely to foster a family resemblance between master and apprentice. This result
is surprising given that Polanyi was charged with clinging to a rule-based account, but it is
Dreyfus’s model that diminishes the diversity across individuals. The notion of practical
objective knowledge implies that expert intuitions are so determinate that they are effectively
rules, only rules by a different name.
Having diluted the differences between people, social interaction appears, for Dreyfus, as
at best an opportunity for copying a piece of objective practical knowledge. But more often
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social interaction is expensive if not an outright imposition, as in the case of expecting experts to
articulate and thereby justify their judgments. Hence, while identifying know how with a
distinctive form of objectivity prevents it from being reduced to rationality, it eliminates what
was socially distinctive about tacit knowledge. In terms of the implications that know how has
for social interaction, John Searle reaches what is effectively the same position but from a very
different direction.
Unlike Dreyfus, Searle (1990, 1995) directly addresses and gives extensive attention to
the question of the social. The question follows from Searle’s (1969, 1983) larger project of
using the methods of the natural sciences to explain ordinary human behavior. From this very
different starting point, Searle adduces some additional considerations not seen in Dreyfus, such
as a sketch of the evolutionary origins of know how and a proposal for a new type of explanation
in the social sciences. As a project in fundamental ontology, Searle articulates some important
assumptions underlying Dreyfus’s account that also relate to the testimony view.
There are two scientific theories that any educated citizen of the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries must accept, at least according to Searle (1995, 6). The two theories in question
are the evolutionary theory of biology and the atomic theory of matter. From this vantage point,
the question of the social appears primarily as an ontological one. That is, the complexity of
social life outstrips bare physical descriptions, so it is unclear how they fit within our
fundamental understanding of the universe. Searle (1969) first touched on this issue by
distinguishing between brute and institutional facts but felt he could not satisfactorily account for
it until The Construction of Social Reality (1995).
The difference between brute and institutional facts hinges on constitutive rules.
Constitutive rules create the possibility for certain types of action, such as rules that establish the
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existence of money or how a sport is played. As such, constitutive rules are the defining feature
of all social institutions. With regard to sports, taking baseball as an example, the rules
concerning what counts as an out, what a safe hit, what a run, and so on are constitutive in that
the game of baseball would not exist without them. Regulative rules, by contrast, such as what
type of clothing the players must wear, whether umpire calls can be appealed, and so on can be
changed without directly affecting the game itself. Searle (1995) links the notion of constitutive
rules to three additional elements that were not present in his early work on speech acts. Two of
the elements are the concept of assigning functions and that of collective intentionality, both of
which constitutive rules presuppose. The assignment of functions—in which humans and some
other animals impose a function on a physical object—illustrates the point nicely. Whether
referring to a natural or invented object, Searle argues that all functions are observer relative,
presupposing an observer’s prior set of values that are reflected in the assigned function.
Searle presents his account as an articulation of people’s ordinary notion of functions.
The common cold, for example, is not supposed to have a function because it would conflict with
the values of observers. In this regard, Searle dismisses the relevance of Ruth Millikan’s (1984,
1989) account of proper function on the grounds that hers is a technical concept that conflicts
with our ordinary notion and depends on the truth of the causal historical narrative suggested by
Darwinian evolution. This is a curious position given that it is the same chapter in which Searle
says that every educated person today must accept evolutionary theory and, worse yet, Searle
even helps himself to Darwinian evolution on the very same point, using evolution to dismiss
teleological conceptions of function. With respect to the issue of whether common colds have
functions, Searle’s point is unhelpfully circular: colds do not have functions if they are observer
relative. But without this stipulation, Millikan’s account has an answer readily available: colds
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do not, in fact, have a function but rather are an incidental side-effect of the proper functioning
of the viruses that cause them in their hosts. Although sneezing—since it helps spread the viruses
to new hosts—would arguably count as part of the viruses’ proper functioning.44 In short, I do
not think that Millikan’s account of proper function and Searle’s characterization of our ordinary
functions—if there is even anything substantive to be said about such a thing—are mutually
exclusive. But it is important for Searle that they are mutually exclusive, so that he can claim
fundamental priority for the latter. That Searle risks such a tenuous line of reasoning indicates its
importance to his larger project.
The observer relative model of functions establishes the basic intuition of an ontological
hierarchy. If all functions trace back to an observer’s imposition on a physical object, then
functions presuppose not only an observer but, more fundamentally, the material reality that the
observer assigns the function to. This ultimately underpins the claim that social reality is
derivative upon material reality. Social reality also presupposes collective intentionality, the
other element noted above, but in a less obvious way.
Collective intentionality lacks the patina of concreteness found in the assignment of
functions. Searle’s (1990) argument for we-intentions appeals to two pieces of evidence. First,
the intuition that group undertakings—such as an orchestra or football team—are more than the
aggregate coincidence of multiple individuals’ performances. The second piece of evidence
concerns the analysis of the statement form “We intend x.” This statement, Searle argues, cannot
be substituted for any set of “I intend x, and you believe…” statements. From these two pieces
of evidence, despite them not referring to anything directly related to biology, Searle infers that
we-intentions are a biological primitive. As a result, the biological character of we-intentions
44

While I am not endorsing Millikan’s account of proper functions, I think my sketch is helpful for
problematizing the intuition behind the observer relative account of functions. I give a more detailed analysis
of Millikan’s account in Ch. 5 with regard to functionalist theories of mind.
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appears to be somewhat mysterious, we-intentions acting as an explanatory stopping point about
which nothing more can be said.45 Instead, the explanatory task of we-intentions, in conjunction
with assignment functions, is to demystify the ontological status of constitutive rules and the
social institutions of which they are a part. But completing this account requires an additional
fourth element, which permeates the other three.
The Background hypothesis, the aforementioned fourth element, is the chief innovation
of Searle’s account. Searle (1983) proposes the Background hypothesis as part of a
comprehensive account of intentionality. Intentional states, which are any mental state
possessing representational content, presuppose know how. Like Dreyfus, the necessary role of
know how is established by an infinite regress argument, which, in turn, relates back to Polanyi
and Ryle. Searle (1983, 150) draws the same lesson as Dreyfus, namely that rules become
progressively irrelevant as a person masters a skill.46 Searle’s innovation is formulating this
picture of know how in terms of a third type of causal explanation, the first two types being brute
physical causation and mental causation. This perspective further articulates the problematic
noted at the end of my discussion of Dreyfus, which Searle expresses in terms of the following
paradox. Explanations of human behavior, especially in relation to social institutions, face a
dilemma: explaining the complexity of behavior, such as the actions of a baseball player or user
of money, appears to warrant an appeal to rules, but appealing to rules threatens to undercut the
creativity and spontaneity of the behavior. One example that Searle uses is how to explain the
actions of a professional baseball player who runs to first base after hitting the ball: explaining
the action by appealing to rules such as what counts as a safe hit, how to score runs, and so on
45

One of the main selling points of participatory sense-making, as presented in Ch. 3, is that much more can
be said about the biological character of the dynamics that we-intentions are meant to capture.
46
Searle even reiterates Dreyfus’s charge that Polanyi’s model fails because it implies rules become
interiorized. But, as I stated earlier, I believe that Polanyi’s picture of a functional relationship between levels
of the mind is more akin to Andy Clark’s Extended Mind hypothesis.

80

fails to correspond to the first-personal performance. Yet if these rules did not exist, the person’s
behavior would be different or at least mean something very different. Handling this tension
requires maintaining the difference between rule-governed and rule-described behavior. With
regard to the Background hypothesis, the issue manifests itself in terms of representing
something that is itself nonrepresentational (namely, the preconceptual Background).
It is to address this challenge that Searle proposes his new type of causal explanation. The
explanatory form is based on an analogy with the principle of natural selection, in particular its
diachronic character. By introducing this diachronic element, Searle believes he can reconcile the
relationship between the Background’s preconceptual capacities and social institutions’
constitutive rules. The diachronic element consists of two stages: in the first, a person develops
dispositions sensitive to a set of rules, which in the second stage culminate in a set of skills
(Searle 1995, 142). Constitutive rules are thus a causal factor in forming dispositions within the
agent, but the dispositional structure consists of the agent’s Background capacities as opposed to
the rules themselves. Having acquired appropriate dispositions, the original rules become
increasingly irrelevant as the agent’s performance becomes increasingly fluent or, to use
Dreyfus’s favored term, expert. In sum, the first stage entails a causal explanation, as the rules
are a causal factor in the agent’s acquisition of dispositions; in the second stage, the explanation
is functional, since the agent’s behavior functions in accord with the rules but, given its fluency,
involves more salient features that may be inexplicable in terms of any rules.
Even though Background capacities are essential to social reality, as suggested by the
preceding sketch, Searle is at pains to claim that this reality is mental as opposed to social,
biological, or purely physical. As with the paradox earlier, Searle (1983) cuts to the heart of the
issue, conceding that the Background is “indeed derived from the entire congeries of relations
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which each biological-social being has to the world around itself” but that “all this
embeddedness is only relevant to the production of the Background because of the effects that it
has on me, specifically the effects that it has on my mind-brain” (154). Culture, the particular
people one interacts with, and even one’s own body—apart from the brain—are the contingent
means for affecting the mind-brain. Hence, even if I, as my mind-brain, happened to be floating
in a vat rather than encased in a skull attached to a motile body, Searle claims that our mental
state (including its Background capacities) would be identical. While notable for the starkness of
its outline, I think Searle’s sketch lurks behind the testimony view’s reduction of social
interaction to belief transmission. It is thus best to view the picture not in terms of Searle’s
account of the mental but rather from the starting point of his fundamental ontology.
The problem with Searle’s fundamental ontology is that it is not fundamental. While his
sketch of evolution and the atomic theory of matter hold wide purchase—indeed, I think this
rather than any direct connection explains the parallels between Searle’s mind-brain picture and
the testimony view—there are issues with both of the two putatively fundamental theories. With
respect to evolution, as was the case with Goldman (§1.6), Searle is only concerned with the
principle of natural selection. Evolution thus collapses into adaptationism, which in turn makes
social interaction appear relevant only in terms of increasing chances of survival. Regarding the
second leg of Searle’s fundamental ontology: there are many educated people who, for various
reasons, do not believe in the atomic theory of matter if it entails materialism, as Searle’s
ontological hierarchy implies. Dissenting views run the gambit from certain interpretations of
Quantum Field Theory within physics to Dynamical Systems Theory within biology. Irrespective
of the ultimate status of materialism and evolution, Searle’s breezy attitude towards the
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fundamental character of naturalism is contemptible, especially since it is a pervasive attitude
that has, I think, obfuscated epistemic conceptions of social interaction.
Searle’s conception of the social suffers from most of the limitations noted with respect
to the testimony view. In terms of the cluster of presuppositions and tendencies of the testimony
view noted at the beginning of the chapter, Searle’s account exhibits three of the four issues. His
focus on fundamental ontology spares him the myopic fixation on the question of justification,
the first issue. But, as evidenced by the picture of the mind-brain above, Searle still considers
epistemic agents (i.e., their brains) as primarily passive receivers, the third issue. Likewise, the
definitive distinction between the mental and the social-biological reiterates the division between
the epistemic and practical dimensions of problem solving. Whether Searle’s account suffers
from the second issue—namely, basing epistemic interaction on the exchange of discrete
tokens—is more contentious. Searle and Dreyfus’s attention to know how means that epistemic
interaction is not reducible to exchanging propositional beliefs. But I think that Dreyfus’s portrait
of imitative learning and the concept of practical objective knowledge retains the basic notion of
individuals forming complete pieces of knowledge and then imparting it to one another. So even
though token statements or statement-like forms are not exchanged, there is still a discrete
transaction between two definitively circumscribed individual centers. Turner (1999) also argues
that Searle’s account of social reality is socially impoverished and, furthermore, he alludes to the
shortcomings of Searle’s fundamental ontology by challenging the distinction between brute and
institutional facts.
The distinction between brute and institutional facts relies on what may appear to be a
straightforward and compelling observation. Searle contrasts the question of whether there is
snow at the top of Mt. Everest to questions such as the value of money. The latter question
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relates to a social institution and is thus, Searle thinks, a social fact, while the former is a brute
objective fact that will be true or false irrespective of any individual’s belief regarding the matter.
As noted above, this distinction follows directly from the ontological hierarchy that the
assignment of functions is meant to establish. Turner’s (1999, 230-31) critical point specifically
regards how Searle uses this distinction to attack social constructionist analyses of science. That
is, Searle claims that because the objects of natural science concern brute facts, scientific practice
is objective in a way that practices concerned with social facts, such as finance, are not. But as
Turner notes and even Goldman concedes (§1.5), contemporary science has an extremely
attenuated relationship to anything like brute facts, which undermines the putatively distinctive
objectivity of scientific practice. In short, Turner’s point is that scientific practice is not
concerned with the brute facts of medium-sized dry goods. In Chs. 5 – 6, I argue that not even
medium-sized dry goods are brute enough to qualitatively distinguish them from the social, but
Turner has a different axe to grind with respect to Searle.
For Turner, treating scientific practice as exceptionally objective diminishes the
significance of the social interaction between scientists. This is in part a manifestation of the
mind-brain picture noted above in which Searle appears to suggest that there is as much
epistemically significant about social interaction as there is about my left pinky toe, since such
matters are only indirectly important via their effects on my mind-brain. It just happens to be the
case that other people—presuming I am not suffering the hallucinations of an in-vated brain—
offer more stimulation than my left pinky toe. Searle recognizes the behaviorist implications of
this picture and appeals to collective intentions as the distinctive and irreducible source and
characteristic of the social. And it is precisely this notion of we-intentions that Turner wants to
axe as part of his project of restoring the importance of interaction between individuals; a view
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that Turner thinks follows from the other aspects of Searle’s picture and is suggested by
Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge.

2.3

Substitutes for the Normative

One of Stephen Turner’s abiding interests in social theory has been in contrasting collectivist and
individualist models of social interaction. The tension is at the forefront of the (1994) The Social
Theory of Practices, the (2002) Brains/Practices/Relativism, and the (2010) Explaining the
Normative, though in the following I focus on some of his more recent discussions of the issue. I
will use Turner’s critique of Searle as a jumping off point for his (2012a, 2014) characterization
of tacit knowledge. Turner appeals to tacit knowledge, especially Polanyi, to argue against what
he sees as a dilution of social interaction by collectivist models. Turner finds empirical support
for his individualist picture in cognitive science, which I consider in the next section. But for the
present section, I focus on Turner’s critique of Searle and his attempt to recapture Polanyi’s
model of noisy, loose-knit imitative learning.
While the concept of tacit knowledge has been influential, Polanyi’s model of imitative
learning as apostolic succession has gained comparatively little attention. Dreyfus and Searle’s
work on know how are two such examples of Polanyi’s uneven legacy. The case of Searle is
noteworthy because he, unlike Dreyfus, gives extensive attention to the question of the social.
Given their complexity, social institutions—such as sports teams and money—and their
constitutive rules, represent the most difficult cases and are thus the sole focus of Searle’s
explanatory efforts. Turner (1999) notes that Searle’s strategy rests on a questionable
presupposition, namely that all forms of social interaction can be modeled on social institutions
even though not all and probably not even most social interactions (though who’s counting) are
based on an explicit set of rules, as is the case with institutions like football and money. As noted
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at the end of §2.2, one consequence of Searle’s emphasis on social institutions when paired with
his Background hypothesis is to move in the direction of behaviorism. Searle’s response to this
danger also indicates why he thinks social institutions are appropriate exemplars for all social
interaction.
Collective intentions are, for Searle, the distinctively social element that enables social
institutions and are the source of their normative character. As one example of institutions’
normative character, Searle (1995, 146) has us imagine a person who would eat a baseball rather
than try to hit it: such a person, he thinks, would fail in a fundamentally different way than
someone who swings and misses. The eater would fail to be a member of the baseball
community; put another way, the eater would have somehow missed, radically misunderstood, or
forgotten his acceptance of “We intend to play baseball.” It is this normative character, Searle
claims, that prevents his account from collapsing into behaviorism. Furthermore, if constitutive
rules are simply the formalization or crystallization of we-intentions, then social institutions
simply make explicit the underlying dynamics of all social interaction.
The concept of we-intentions, Turner (1999) notes, also addresses a problem in social
theory dating back to Hobbes. The problem concerns how to account for the origin of social
concepts in individual subjects—in the case of Hobbes, how to ground the concept of state.
Building such concepts out of asocial components has proved very difficult but, for many,
preferable to the notion of a group mind. The concept of we-intentions is meant to dissolve this
dilemma by having the “we” anchored in the individual without presupposing a group mind. Yet
Turner thinks that Searle’s Background hypothesis, sans collective intentionality, provides the
necessary tools for addressing the problem. This is the central move in Turner’s attempt to excise
we-intentions and their attendant normativity from Searle’s larger account.
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One consequence of the Background hypothesis is to reduce what needs to be explained
in terms of conscious I-intentions. Turner (1999, 224) writes, “The mechanism of accustoming
and the replacement of conscious rules with the causal structures of the Background that produce
skilled performances serve to do much of the work that the ‘internalization’ model formerly did.”
Given the primary role of preconceptual know how, it is unnecessary to explain complex
behavior in terms of an individual’s conscious intention to follow rules; like Searle, Turner
understands this to undercut social theories that claim the existence of internalized systems of
rules or concepts. But unlike Searle, Turner thinks that a group endeavor, such as a baseball team,
does not depend on intrinsic normativity but rather only requires extending the insights
suggested by the notion of preconceptual accustoming.
The differences between Turner and Searle become more pronounced the more poorly
bounded and ambiguous a group endeavor is. The case of baseball only suggests a very modest
difference: for Turner, all that is consciously needed is for players to individually intend and
thereby share the goal of winning the game, while for Searle, each endorses a normatively
binding “We intend to play baseball.” But with respect to more diffuse social institutions, such as
money, Searle’s account becomes more implausible. In contrast to baseball, it is hard to imagine
a we-intentional endorsement of money per se, yet Searle needs there to be something at least
analogous to conscious endorsement in order for the institution of money to be normatively
binding. Towards this end, Searle argues that our acceptance of institutions such as money
occurs tacitly, occurring via the Background accustoming of oneself to money use. Turner, by
contrast, thinks that Searle overlooks a more straightforward and empirically grounded account.
Diffuse social institutions require three basic elements, Turner (1999) argues, none of
which involve any primitive collective element. Mentioned above, the first element consists in
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consciously shared goals—whether to win a game or, in the case of money, to exchange goods.
The key role of the Background hypothesis, for Turner, is to show that minimal conscious
intentions such as shared goals are sufficient, since the Background process of accustoming
oneself to an activity accounts for the ensuing behavioral complexity. Given a sufficiently high
behavioral frequency of an activity—the second required element—the individual actors
constitute a loose-knit community, irrespective of the countless differences in belief that each
individual has regarding the activity. Finally, the third element substitutes out the intrinsically
normative we-intentions in favor of first-personal normativizing beliefs. That is to say, if an
individual has certain beliefs regarding money use, then he or she may censure others who do not
act accordingly. Hence, the normative is not primitive but rather is derivative on individual belief
and their enactment by individuals in relation to each other. Turner’s crucial point is that his
sketch is implied by Searle’s account, only it is not burdened with the inscrutable notion of
biological we-intentions that are tacitly consented to (228).
The substitution of normativizing beliefs for the normative establishes one respect in
which social interaction is intrinsically significant. While I return in §2.4 to Turner’s use of
Searle’s Background hypothesis in relation to cognitive science, I first want to link this emphasis
on social interaction to Polanyi’s model of imitative learning. Turner’s (2012a, 2014)
characterization of Polanyi sets the stage for the connectionist account of the next section.
Turner’s reading of Polanyi is guided by two features, namely Polanyi’s model of imitative
learning and his understanding of tacit knowledge as an actual cognitive phenomenon suited for
empirical study. These two features have direct implications for social theory.
The problem of the tacit, for Turner (2012a), is explaining in what sense it can be taught
or socially transmitted. Turner thus uses tacit knowledge as a litmus test for social theory,
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specifically whether social theories have given a sufficiently careful account of the interactive
dynamics between individuals. There is a tendency to base social interaction upon a shared
ground: whether the ground is an elaborate system of rules or a binding normativity, the
implication is that tacit knowledge must be a distinct entity that exists prior to a given interaction
in order to enable it. In contrast to this picture, Turner models social interaction on the act of
translation; more specifically, Turner envisions agents as improvising explanations that are
aimed at compensating for differences vis-à-vis a particular audience rather than tapping into a
pre-existing entity. Polanyi’s model of imitative learning is central to Turner’s account because it
exemplifies these features.
Turner’s focus on imitative learning is in tension with though does not contradict
Polanyi’s overall project. As noted in §2.1, Polanyi uses the model in part to emphasize the
importance of traditions, which in turn was part of his steadfast critique of logical positivism and
his argument for religion as possessing a meaningful role in culture. The science-facing
dimensions of the model—the dimensions that Turner seizes upon—concern the education of
novice scientists and the fundamental significance of discoveries in science. To briefly recap,
acquiring a master scientist’s tacit knowledge consists of learning to attend to various focal terms
(e.g., concepts, theories, experimental methods), which thereby involves the novice becoming
sensitive to countless subsidiary particulars (e.g., discerning salient experimental data) some of
which the master cannot even articulate (analogous to the nonsense syllables of the electric shock
experiment). This from-to structure of imitative learning thus demonstrates the vital importance
of mentorship, which occurs against a backdrop of enduring individual differences that are an
endogenous source of scientific innovation. Turner’s exclusive focus on these aspects of
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imitative learning results in a different conception of objectivity, as seen in his reconstruction of
the notion of the tacit coefficient.
Both Polanyi and Turner see the tacit coefficient as denoting the uniquely individual
grounding of knowledge. But Turner detaches this idea from the notion of objectivity as bare
universal intent discussed in §2.1, favoring instead a less common formulation by Polanyi in
which objectivity consists of an individual “striving passionately to fulfill…personal obligations
to universal standards” (Polanyi 1958, 17). The key aspect of objectivity thus shifts from away
from “universal intent” in favor of “universal standards.” Turner (2012a, 389) writes, “It
[objectivity] is a matter of acknowledging individual difference, and correcting it to a public
standard.” On this reading, objectivity consists of individuals correcting their personal
idiosyncrasies against an agreed upon standard rather than a bare intention that does not
necessarily refer to an agreed upon standard. This is a meaningful difference in part because
there are not always agreed upon public standards for individuals to correct themselves against,
such as in periods of scientific crisis. Turner’s definition reflects in part a fundamentally
different orientation to the question of objectivity and imitative learning.
While Polanyi gears his account of objectivity and imitative learning towards
characterizing science as a social practice and a historical tradition, Turner is interested in the
fundamental nature of the cognitive subject. Issues such as the nature of scientific crises are thus
of only derivative import. Rather than being a window onto science as a social practice, Turner
sees imitative learning as a window onto the underlying cognitive dynamics of each interacting
individual. This can be seen in Turner’s own characterizations of embodied performance and
imitative learning.
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In one of his most extensive descriptions of imitative learning, Turner (2012a) uses car
driving as an example. Car driving shares a feature that is exhibited by many other activities:
“Different people may perform the ‘same’ acts, such as driving or riding a bicycle, in different
ways that are functionally equivalent” (391). Functional equivalence suggests that despite similar
end results it is possible for people to differ dramatically in how they perform an act. Turner
continues:
To some extent these differences are smoothed out by training, an explicit process of
learning that provides feedback. But to a large extent the feedback is “wild” and consists
of actual experiences with other drivers and other situations that go beyond the book or
the driving school experience, and are individualized, because the individual has different
experiences. (391)
The passage is crucial for representing the overall effect that learning and experience more
generally has on individuals. Differences between individuals, which are endemic due to inherent
dissimilarities in people’s physical constitutions, are to a very limited extent addressed by
training the person in a given skill. In addition to the limits of training, further experience cuts
back in the direction of diversity, since different individuals have differing driving experiences.
A young adult who moves to a large city, for example, would have very different driving
experiences and thereby very different driving habits than her parents. Hence, only the most
conspicuous differences—those that would prevent the attainment of functional equivalence—
are “smoothed out” by training, which is to say that functional equivalence masks the underlying
diversity. Turner builds upon this sketch by detailing the dynamics of the training process.
Smoothing out a novice’s performance involves direct engagement. Turner offers the
following sketch of teaching someone how to drive:
What do we do when we articulate driving advice, for example to a novice driver? Do we
pull something out of a stock of previously unspoken but already tacitly present sayings,
which make the tacit explicit? Or do we repair inferences in a way that provides a
functional substitute for what we know tacitly for the particular audience in question, a
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novice driver doing something that we recognize that we would not have done—waited
too long to get into the turn lane, for example—which we can then formulate as practical
“knowledge” or a rule which is a functional substitute for the driving and lane changing
habits that we follow unconsciously. (392)
In characterizing what happens when advising a novice, Turner recognizes two basic options—
either the advice taps into a pre-existing stock of maxims, or it is spontaneously improvised on
the spot when confronted with a salient difference in performance. Given the nature of skills, as
described by Dreyfus and Searle, in which rules are irrelevant when it comes to expert
performance, the choice is clear for Turner: since there are no rules to tap into, the teacher
instead improvises a “functional substitute” for how he or she normally performs the action. The
functional substitute reflects both how the teacher normally performs an action and how the
novice’s behavior differs from it. Since the functional substitute is thus not an introspective
report, it cannot be identified as a psychological process in either individual but instead is tied to
the actual engaged interaction between the particular individuals.47 It is for this reason that
Turner warns against conflating the tacit that is made explicit and the tacit.48
Turner thinks his characterization of teaching someone how to drive generalizes to all
social activities. The ability to interact with others in particular contexts, not just learning
contexts, is itself a form of skilled know how. This is true whether the context is rush hour traffic,
biking in a group, or collaborative scientific research. Goldman addresses the latter context with
his concept of a product epistemology (§1.5), in which an individual must learn a community’s
medium and mode of communication. But the key piece missing from Goldman’s product
epistemology, from the perspective of Turner’s model, is the omnipresent role of the tacit.
Goldman’s product epistemology suggests that a community’s means of communication is an
47

This account substantiates Selinger and Crease’s (2006) claim that Dreyfus’s picture of coaching is
superficial.
48
Turner’s point relates to De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s (2007) “Rear Window” diagnosis that I discuss in Ch. 3.
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independent mechanism that an individual employs as a tool, whereas for Turner, becoming a
member of community consists in the more ambiguous notion of becoming fluent enough to “get
by” or “make oneself understood.” This extension of the imitative learning model exhibits the
essential features of the general model of social interaction suggested by tacit knowledge, which
I have labeled the translation view.
The main tenet of the translation view is that diversity amongst individuals is pervasive,
persistent, and thoroughly shapes epistemic interaction. At least two general consequences
follow from this fact: first, social interaction is intrinsically important, since it generates
knowledge rather than instantiating previously existing knowledge and, second, social interaction
is an inherently noisy and protracted process. The translation label stems from the ineliminable
need for individuals to translate the behavior and words of others into their own personal
competencies. Instructions and verbal reports in general—rather than being standardized
maxims—are provocative triggers that elicit and facilitate learning new skills and/or
accomplishing a joint task. That this type of translation is endemic to epistemic interaction is to
some extent masked by the coarse-grained standard of functional equivalence. The translation
view is further substantiated in the next section by filling out more of the underlying cognitive
dynamics. But this sketch sets the basic contours of what is to be explained by cognitive science
and is to some extent independent of the cognitive account.

2.4

The Cognitive Basis of the Translation View: Connectionism and Mirror Neurons

The relationship between the present and preceding section parallels in some respects the
relationship between Turner’s (1994) The Social Theory of Practices and his (2002)
Brains/Practices/Relativism. In §2.3, as in The Social Theory of Practices, Turner’s main focus
is to show that social interaction does not require a shared foundation. The 1994 book
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approaches this issue by criticizing the tendency within social theory of reifying social practices,
attributing to them causally efficacious properties on the basis of descriptions of individuals’
behavior. The 2012a essay substantiates this critique in connection with tacit knowledge, using
Polanyi’s emphasis on mentorship to detail an alternative to the reification of social practices. In
the 2002 book, as in the present section, I examine Turner’s efforts to motivate his alternative
picture by appealing to cognitive science. While touching on the 2002 book, my focus will be on
Turner’s engagement with Goldman’s nursery example in (2012a) and its connection to the
(2012b) discussion of weak empathy.
Turner’s model of imitative learning is detachable from his endorsement of
connectionism and mirror neurons but only up to an extent. It is possible to explain the contours
set by the imitation model using an entirely different cognitive theory—Turner himself alludes to
one alternative—but the connectionist and mirror neuron framework derives some of its appeal
from recognizing the imitation model as generalizable to all social interaction. If imitation is
taken to be the most basic explanatory target, then any alternative cognitive account would be
functionally equivalent to Turner’s own connectionist-mirror neuron account. In the following
section and chapter, I argue that while insightful the imitation model should be part of a broader
framework for modeling interaction, despite Turner’s pitching his cognitive account at a very
low, mostly unconscious level. To examine this issue, it is important to identify this low-level
target, which Alvin Goldman (2005) also addresses in attempting to explain the neural basis for
interpersonal understanding.
Goldman’s work on a simulationist theory of mind is an extension of his epistemics
project. Beginning with (Gallese and Goldman 1998), Goldman has linked his simulationist
account to the premotor cortex neurons better known as “mirror neurons.” For Goldman,
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simulationism and mirror neurons together offer a fine-grained neural account of not only
interpersonal understanding but also the underpinning of his fitting correspondence theory of
truth (§1.6). Goldman’s (2005) crying babies example, which Turner (2012a) directly addresses,
is helpful for identifying the essential features of his account. Goldman asks, “Do babies who
experience upsetness as a consequence of hearing another’s cry represent the latter upset? If not,
I don’t think it’s a case of either mindreading or interpersonal understanding” (n.p.).
Representation is thus understood as a precondition for social cognition, specifically cognizing
another person’s mental state. But when one baby’s crying spreads to another, Goldman thinks
this is instead a brute non-mental contagion response.
Two additional elements would be necessary for the second baby’s response to constitute
interpersonal understanding. First, the contagion response would have had to cause a simulation
routine in the second baby, which would represent the crying’s significance (e.g., the emotional
state of upsetness). Second, the listening infant would have to impute the representation to the
first baby and evaluate its accuracy given the other’s behavior. With respect to an infant, this
seems a bit far-fetched for even a simulationist, like Goldman. Within this picture, mirror
neurons are meant to elucidate more of the causal underpinning of the simulationist theory of
mind, accounting for how brute causal determination—in this example represented by the spread
of crying—can be reliably converted into an internal simulation routine, whose output is a
mental representation. Epistemic interaction thus reduces to representation matching, which
corresponds to the testimony view’s generic notion of discrete belief exchange. The need for
each individual to test and refine an internally generated representation provides the most
charitable way of reading Goldman’s “fitting” correspondence theory of truth.
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The mirror neuron-simulationist picture allows for some latitude in correspondence
relationships. The picture replaces the notion of there being one essential causally determinate
correspondence in favor of individually unique yet reliable isomorphisms. That is to say, each
individual’s mental representation of an “external” state of affairs is unique but, presuming that it
is a truthful representation, the representation is causally determined and is thereby reliably
produced. The need for discussion and enquiry, which may appear to be of little-to-no
importance given the seemingly all-or-nothing implications of causally determinate
correspondence, is explained by the fact that individuals must work to converge on and match
each other’s internally generated representations. While this latitude opens up a theoretical space
for more familiar notions of epistemic agency, I think it is still too cramped to adequately
account for creativity, as suggested, for example, by Polanyi’s characterization of scientific
discovery.49 While I press this point further in Ch. 3, Turner offers a more direct response to
Goldman’s representation matching picture.
Turner’s alternative to Goldman’s representation matching picture is notable in part
because it also begins with mirror neurons. Analogous to his argumentative strategy in relation to
Searle, Turner seeks to show that what Goldman considers to be the foundation of social
interaction is, in fact, unnecessary and most likely impossible. In terms of the crying babies
example, Turner’s starting point is the second baby’s mirror-like contagion response. Rather than
being the basis for producing a discrete internal representation, the second baby’s mirroring
response instead admits of greater refinement through continuous feedback. The initial contagion
response is thus on a continuum with, say, an adult’s ability to empathize, in the strong sense of
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I do not think the latitude offered by individually unique isomorphisms is enough to recapture the basic
notion of voluntary agency. This relates back to my claim in §1.6 that there is no qualitative difference
between Goldman’s non-voluntaristic and voluntaristic cognitive states (e.g., belief versus attention,
respectively).

96

consciously controlling one’s feelings in response to another person’s emotions. An adult’s
response possesses greater specificity in large part, Turner thinks, due to language, which
enables the mature agent to mimic and express more. This implies that empathy, in its strong
sense, doesn’t consist of a cognitive agent identifying a correspondence between one’s own
representation and another’s mental state, but rather the much more modest and open-ended
picture of the empathizer acting in a manner that is sensitive to the other person’s grief. One
reason to endorse Turner’s more modest picture of empathy is to address the basing-relation
problem that Goldman claims that all epistemologies suffer from.
Pace Goldman’s claim, I proposed in §1.5 that the issue stems from treating knowledge
in isolation from the practical dimensions of cognition. Turner’s characterization of the nursery
example implies a pragmatic standard of epistemic success: empathy consists in acting in an
suitable manner, not in identifying the other person’s mental state; teaching someone how to
drive consists in smoothing out any salient differences (i.e., any noticeable lack of functional
equivalence). The general shift suggested by Turner’s account is from justifying discrete beliefs
to exhibiting a competency. As a result, there is no need to identify a unique justificatory base,
since the “proof is in the pudding,” so to speak. One of Turner’s recurring lessons is that the
opaqueness of social interaction doesn’t just generate misunderstandings but is also what enables
their resolution. If epistemic success required each subject to end up with matching
representations, then all epistemologies would, in fact, be subject to the basing relation problem.
But the practical success of “getting by” or “making oneself understood” is all that epistemic
interaction requires and actually involves. The basic idea of continual refinement via feedback
sans discrete representation—which underpins the claim that representation matching is
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unnecessary—predates Turner’s interest in mirror neurons, relating back to an earlier interest in
connectionist models of learning.
In the (2002) Brains/Practices/Relativism, connectionism represents the general need to
scrutinize and displace much of social theory’s terminology. Turner’s point echoes the
motivation behind Goldman’s epistemics project: epistemology and, by extension, social
epistemology should be intimately concerned with the nature of the cognitive subject. For Turner,
the most important lesson of contemporary cognitive science is that “every mind is the product
of a distinctive and individual learning history” (1). Although other cognitive theories can
capture this essential idea—Turner specifically mentions the Turing-Chomsky model as an
alternative—Turner endorses connectionism. Connectionism pictures learning in terms of neural
networks that are gradually modified by ongoing experience. The shifting strengths of synaptic
connections correspond to the gradual refinement of a person’s behavior, the key idea being that
the differential response is produced directly by the empirical input’s affect on the synaptic
connections. Hence, while discrete representations may play a role at higher neural levels, they
are unnecessary for learning skills or, more generally, learning any manner of acting (e.g.,
comforting a grief-stricken friend). Turner’s point is that since representations are unnecessary,
it’s a bad idea to read them into places where they don’t seem to be. Turner appeals to mirror
neurons in an attempt to build on this basic connectionist picture.
One of the general problems for connectionism concerns the speed of learning. Some
learning appears to happen too rapidly for it to consist of the gradual modification of a neural
network. Imitative learning, for instance, can appear to be more direct than the brute stimulation
and consequent modification of a neural network, as connectionism by itself would imply. In this
context, Turner sees mirror neurons as a mechanism that detects salient aspects of empirical
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input (i.e., another person’s embodied performance) and simultaneously creates the potential for
the observer to mimic the behavior or at least aspects of the behavior. Mirror neurons thus offer
an explanation of why social contagion responses are of distinctive importance as well as how
some forms of social learning happen more quickly than the brute modification of neural
networks suggest. Turner supports this connectionist-mirror neuron picture by linking it to
empathy.
In (2012b), Turner presents his connectionist-mirror neuron account in terms of weak
empathy. In contrast to strong empathy, which corresponds to the familiar notion of consciously
controlling one’s feelings, weak empathy is mostly unconscious. Weak empathy refers to the
basic idea of the social contagion response described in Goldman’s nursery example. The key
move in (2012b) is to argue that weak empathy is not only explanatorily useful for
unambiguously social cases of learning but also for clarifying the nature of objectivity. Turner’s
argument is filtered through Franz Brentano and Max Weber’s respective conceptions of
Evidenz—which roughly means immediately intelligible or self-evident—which anticipates
Turner’s own conception of objectivity as an inferential regress-stopper (397).
The weak empathy model’s main interlocutors are normativist accounts, such as Searle’s
concept of we-intentions. Normativism offers its own account of objectivity within social
interaction: we-intentions, for instance, are meant to explain why it is wrong to eat a baseball
rather than try to hit it. The wrongness of eating the baseball doesn’t, on this type of account,
reduce to any combination of physical facts (e.g., the behavioral frequency of swinging or the
inedibility of leather-coated cork and rubber) but rather the norm created by the we-intention of
playing baseball. Appealing to physical facts appears to lead to an infinite-regress, leading to
further questions such as, why is it common to swing at baseballs? why do many players chew
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inedible tobacco product? and so on. Turner argues that his Evidenz-inspired concept of weak
empathy can provide such a regress-stopper, but without needing to appeal to intrinsic
normativity.
There are two symptomatic issues with the normativist approach. First, normativity is an
inscrutable primitive about which nothing more can be said. As noted above, in order to square
this with Searle’s naturalistic project, this leads Searle to the very curious and questionable claim
that we-intentions are a biological primitive. The second issue involves trying to characterize
normativity. Attempts to do so face a dilemma: either attempt to identify a universal normative
structure (i.e., the essence of rational discourse), or identify specific forms of normativity (e.g.,
natural language use, the discourse of particular scientific disciplines, legal proceedings, and so
on). If choosing the former approach, then one has to explain the persistent lack of consensus on
what the universal normative structure actually is, while the latter leads to a welter of hidden
normative structures, since there must be one to cover every potential regress. Turner thinks that
this dilemma is an artifact of the first issue, namely treating normativity as a primitive; thus by
offering an alternative account of norms, Turner argues that weak empathy invalidates the very
premise of normativism (2012b, 392).
Rather than tapping into a hidden structure, objectivity appears as an extension of
learning contexts. Turner uses arithmetic (“2 + 2 = 4”) as an example of what may appear to be a
universally objective truth and reconstructs it in terms of weak empathy (2012b, 394-95). There
are two types of input in learning contexts: empathic input (e.g., figuring out what the teacher
wants and observing the other students’ responses) and empirical input (e.g., counting objects).
Turner thinks that such experiences “empathically universalize” in the sense that any person who
could learn arithmetic would come to take “2 + 2 = 4” as self-evident after undergoing the
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learning experience. Objectivity is thus an interpersonal understanding that reduces to something
“seeming to be evident” rather than to being true (397).50 One upshot of this picture is that it
provides a straightforward explanation for possible future alternatives. Analogous to the case of
Riemannian space in geometry, it is possible that a radically different form of arithmetic could be
invented; given such an event, “2 + 2 = 4” may lose the appearance of necessity but not its
intelligibility, at least not to those people who have learned arithmetic as we know it (397). But
the most important validation of the weak empathy model, which relates back to undermining the
premise of normativism, is how it opens up for empirical enquiry what appears to be inscrutable
from the perspective of normativism.
The weak empathy model converges with various other empirical considerations. This
includes, of course, providing a suitable framework for explaining the underlying dynamics of
tacit learning and also providing support for generalizing the imitative model of learning. With
regard to the latter: by reconstructing the concept of objectivity in terms of interpersonal
understanding, imitative learning is not merely an efficient means for acquiring factual truths.
Hence, even though weak empathy’s main interlocutor is normativism, it substantiates the shift
away from justification to pragmatic competency as indicated by Turner’s reconstruction of the
nursery example. In terms of the arithmetic example, the equation “2 + 2 = 4” reflects the ability
to follow other people’s patterns of inference and recognizing those patterns as self-evident since
everyone else follows the same inferential pattern; it does not reflect the discovery of a material
truth, which would need to be justified by a strictly epistemic base. Accordingly, the basic lesson
of the critique of normativism and the modification of Goldman’s nursery example are the same:
interpersonal understanding does not require appealing to hidden elements—whether an intrinsic
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form of rationality or representational analogues to factual truths. It is worth more closely
examining Goldman and Turner’s respective accounts because despite their important
differences, there is also a shared presupposition that I want to challenge in Chs. 3 – 5. To
identify this shared presupposition, it is helpful to first more carefully examine the differences
between Goldman and Turner’s accounts.
The weak empathy model, in effect, dramatically loosens Goldman’s fitting
correspondence theory in two general respects. First, weak empathy implies there is a vastly
greater variety of empirical input: this is because the physical constitutions of individuals
inherently differ and also because of their unique experiential histories. While true of Goldman’s
account as well, the positing of individually realized isomorphic correspondence minimizes
diversity’s epistemic significance. Second, weak empathy implies that the articulation of our
experiences is profoundly shaped by our social interactions. That is, my understanding of my
experiences partly reflects what tacit aspects of experience I have made explicit, and what tacit
aspects I have made explicit depend on who I have interacted with. In sum, the first point
questions to what extent people correspond to the “same things,” while the second implies that
even if individuals could perceive the same things, an individual’s experience is significantly
influenced by contingent social interactive contexts, both past and present. Goldman’s fitting
correspondence theory is thus loosened to the point that the most epistemically salient goal is no
longer finding a correspondence between a representation and an independent reality but instead
the more modest and life-sized goal of attaining functional equivalence between my behavior51
and another’s (whether trying to teach or learn a skill). Yet, as implied by describing the weak
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empathy model as loosening rather than breaking the correspondence relationship, both Turner
and Goldman are committed to materialism as a fundamental presupposition.
The basic picture of the cognitive subject, for Turner and Goldman, is of material input
impinging on the subject, which the subject then processes,52 and which then affects the
individual’s behavior. Goldman and Turner differ over the details of each stage but agree on the
basic input-processing-output picture. As discussed in regards to each specific account, the
mirror neuron is an attractive concept because it addresses one of the basic difficulties of this
picture, namely accounting for how individuals’ determine the salient aspects of brute empirical
input: for Goldman, this issue appears in terms of the origin of internal simulation routines; for
Turner, how to account for rapid learning processes. The challenge of accounting for perceptual
salience relates to the Meno Paradox: it is difficult to characterize how agents discriminate what
is perceptually salient without thereby implying they already know what they’re actually
learning from the perceptual experience.53 I think the notion of brute empirical input as the first
isolable stage of cognition ultimately limits Turner’s account. To clarify the issue, it helps to
evaluate the weak empathy model in terms of the four presuppositions/symptoms of the
testimony view that I noted at the beginning of the chapter.
While it problematizes all four of testimony’s noted features, I think that the weak
empathy model only undermines three of them. The first and fourth features—testimony’s
abstract focus on justification and its division of epistemic and practical matters—were
undermined jointly by weak empathy’s conception of objectivity as interpersonal understanding.
The second feature regarding the circulation of discrete tokens was directly undermined via
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I use “processing” in the broad sense of any cognitive activity internal to an organism. In Ch. 3, I contest the
notion of delimited and isolable internal cognitive activity.
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In this regard, Polanyi’s concerns overlap with Hanson (1958) on discovery and Gibson’s (1966, 1) analysis
of “to sense” as detecting something as opposed to having a sensation.
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offering an alternative to Goldman’s representation matching picture. But it is the third issue—
viewing epistemic agents as passive informational receivers54—that the weak empathy model
still endorses.
All of the epistemologies that I have examined thus far consider empirical input to be the
isolable first stage of cognition. Cognitive subjects must receive empirical input before any
processing can occur and are thus passive in the sense that cognitive processing is derivative on
the received input. Materialism provides strong intuitive support for this picture: if agents and
objects are individuated as extensionally delimited entities, then perceptual input is required for
bridging the material gap. Weak empathy’s particular conception of this relationship—its
connectionist element—depicts an individual’s experiential history (i.e., the sum of empirical
input) as being inscribed on or effectively imparted to an individual’s brain (or the brain and
central nervous system). Hence, while weak empathy rightly emphasizes the pragmatic
dimensions of cognition, its endorsement of the input-receiver picture places it in something of a
hybrid position: the cognitive agent’s passivity has been thinned out to a bare minimum,
suggesting that the agent is a very active receiver but a receiver nonetheless. The enactivist
concept of sense-making, which I discuss in Ch. 3, challenges the input-receiver picture of
cognition. But in the present context, I want to examine the input-receiver picture by linking it to
a common understanding of naturalism, which Searle (1995) articulates when claiming that
every educated person should accept two fundamental scientific theories.
As discussed in §2.2, there are reasons to doubt whether Searle’s two fundamental
theories, as he understands them, are in fact fundamental. I think Searle’s sketch is, nevertheless,
helpful in articulating a pervasive though often assumed understanding of naturalism. The
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materialism noted in the above paragraph—which appears in Searle as the atomic theory of
matter—is often paired with an adaptationist interpretation of evolutionary theory, in which the
principle of natural selection is the sole general principle for explaining organisms’ evolutionary
history. Adaptationism’s exclusive focus on the survival of the fittest dovetails with materialism
in that scarcity of material resources is considered to be the formative influence on all evolved
characteristics. Since Turner has ably dispatched Searle’s (and Goldman’s) accounts, I will focus
on how the materialist-adaptationist framework manifests itself in the weak empathy model.
Naturalism as materialism-adaptationism manifests itself within the weak empathy model
in terms of three general issues. They are as follows:
(1) an impoverished account of the origin of normativizing beliefs,
(2) the epistemic significance of social interaction is reduced to instrumental benefits,
(3) the brain is viewed as the executive controller of all cognitive activity.
With regard to all three issues, Turner would grant each point but deny that they are, in fact,
liabilities. Substantiating my criticisms will occupy Chs. 3 – 5; so for the moment, I only want to
clarify each issue in order to the set the explanatory targets of each chapter. With regard to (1), I
accept Turner’s critique of intrinsic normativity insofar as it implies human exceptionalism, but,
on the other hand, I think there needs to be a more substantive account of the origin of
normativizing beliefs.55 More specifically, Turner takes it as a given that an individual has
normative beliefs about the world and from this shows that he can account for normativity within
explicitly social contexts. That Turner doesn’t see the need to account for the origins of an
individual’s normative beliefs reflects, I think, the belief that something like the generic notion
of a survival instinct unproblematically explains the origin of normativizing beliefs.
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In Ch. 3, I use enactivism and the related Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) framework to discuss the origins
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methodological naturalism.
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Granting a fundamental role to a survival instinct suggests that the fundamental
importance of knowledge is the material benefits it provides, an inference that leads to issue (2).
If the fundamental purpose of knowledge is the material benefits it provides, then it is a very
small step to inferring that the epistemic significance of social interaction should be explained in
terms of its instrumental benefits.56 To some extent, weak empathy can obviate this concern by
emphasizing the primitive role of contagion mirroring, but the attendant epistemic standard of
functional equivalence still reduces other people to a means for acquiring a skill. This latent
manipulationism also manifests itself in terms of the one-factor explanation issue discussed in
§1.7. There I noted a similarity between Goldman’s approach to the motivation problem (§1.6)
and Craig’s definition of knowledge as a social good (§1.7); the presumption that the primary
function of knowledge is to serve an instrumental benefit leads both to posit there being one
essential factor underlying diverse social phenomena. Issue (3) of the weak empathy model
exhibits this one-factor tendency in the form of trying to reduce all cognitive activity to the
weighting of synaptic networks.
Whether the brain is the executive controller of all cognitive activity is an empirical
question. In this respect, given the shifting sands of cognitive science, it is a difficult question to
approach. Yet, even conceding this proviso, I think that the weak empathy model places too
much explanatory weight on neural networks (i.e., connectionism) and particular kinds of
neurons (i.e., mirror neurons). The explanatory tasks that connectionism and mirror neurons
confront are, I think, better addressed by avoiding them, which is possible by avoiding the inputreceiver picture and its underlying egoism. I see this shift in the spirit Turner’s own insistence on
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not diminishing the importance of social interaction by appealing to hidden rational structures or
representations. While neural networks and neurons are not hidden in the same sense as
something like intrinsic normativity, the widely divergent and conflicting explanatory uses that
mirror neurons have been put to—such as feeding input to internal simulation routines or the
instantaneous weighting of connectionist neural networks—should be serious cause for concern.
The rhetorical uses of mirror neurons suggest they are analogous to a Rorschach test in which the
sundry strands of materialist accounts read into the mirror neurons whatever suits their particular
needs. Regardless of the ultimate status of mirror neurons, I think that recognizing the role of
community-level epistemic processes indicates that not so much should hang on the outcome.
One basic difference between weak empathy and the transformation view, which I will be
arguing for, is that the former reduces all social interaction to the one-on-one framework of the
imitation model. The latter, by contrast, recognizes epistemically significant processes that
emerge and operate at the level of communities, communities greater than two individuals. These
processes presuppose their individual participants but are irreducible to any individual cognitive
process.57 If there are emergent cognitive processes operant at the level of communities, then not
every cognitive process needs to be anchored in an individual center. Hence, I think that such
community-level processes suggest that appeals to neuroscience should be more circumscribed
and more judicious.
From this discussion of the weak empathy model, it is possible to round out the sketch of
the translation view offered in §2.3. The weak empathy model offers a cognitive basis for
generalizing the importance of imitative learning, as was suggested by tacit knowledge. Weak
empathy sketches a form of primitive, pre-conceptual imitation that is an innate ability of the
57
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human brain (and some other animals). Although beginning at this primitive level, Turner
believes it is on a continuum with and bleeds into conscious processes, especially strong
empathy. Weak empathy attempts to explain how, despite the profound and ineliminable
differences between individuals, social interaction is epistemically valuable. In sum, other people
amount to opaque exemplars that, by virtue of mirror neurons, we are predisposed to emulate.
While the translation view represents a significant advance beyond the testimony view’s
model of social interaction, its account is ultimately too corrosive. That is to say, the epistemic
significance of social interaction is not reducible to the sparking of mirror neurons. The
shortcomings of the translation view has been previously hinted at, such as with Polanyi’s
concept of tradition and Kusch’s insistence on the epistemic significance of community
membership. The latter is particularly noteworthy since despite the very real differences between
Kusch’s communitarian epistemology and Turner’s translation view, I think their respective
critiques of social theory offer two complementarity perspectives on one larger issue. Thus,
before pursuing an alternative to the translation view, it is first worth synthesizing these two
insightful critiques.

2.5

Social Theory: Individualist or Collectivist?

The dichotomy between individualist and collectivist/communitarian social theories, while of
some value, ultimately confuses the issues it is meant to address. This is seen, for instance, in
comparing Turner and Kusch’s respective uses of the dichotomy. While the former’s critique of
collectivist concepts and the latter’s critique of individualist testimony appear to pit each in
diametric opposition to the other, I think a closer look paints a much more complex picture, one
that transcends the individualist-collectivist dichotomy. Assessing the translation view in terms
of Kusch’s four point critique of individualist testimony is a helpful starting point.
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Turner’s individualist social theory raises many of the same concerns with the testimony
view as Kusch’s communitarian epistemology. Of Kusch’s four main criticisms, Turner agrees
on three. For both, testimony is wrong to posit social interaction as a merely derivative source of
knowledge since, leading to the second point, interaction does not consist of the transmission of
complete items of knowledge. The translation view also corroborates Kusch’s third criticism—
that items of knowledge are delivered solely by perception, memory, and inference—but for
different reasons. The weak empathy model grounds all knowledge in perception (i.e., the inputreceiver picture) but undermines the notion of itemized knowledge in favor of the continuous
refinement of skills. Since I scrutinized the input-receiver picture in the previous section, I will
focus on the translation view in relation to Kusch’s fourth criticism of testimony, namely that the
“testifier” and “recipient” need possess only minimal social knowledge of each other.
By emphasizing the individual differences and the noisiness of social interaction, the
translation view claims that people, in fact, only possess minimal knowledge of each other,
social or otherwise. For Turner, Kusch’s first three criticisms reflect the misguided belief that
epistemic interaction depends on a shared foundation. This shared foundation takes the form of
either a shared currency (e.g., Searle’s rational normativity) or the basis for a shared currency
(e.g., Goldman’s view that objective facts are the basis for sharing propositional beliefs).
Turner’s attack on collectivist concepts aims to counteract the glossing over of individual
difference and the whitewashing of social interaction wrought by the appeal to a shared
foundation. For Kusch, of course, the three criticisms point in the opposite direction—to the
neglect of epistemic communities.
The basic problem with the testimony view, for Kusch, is the conviction that all cognition
occurs within a discrete isolable individual. The fourth point regarding the importance of social
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knowledge serves as a jumping off point for Kusch’s communitarian epistemology. Two
interacting cognitive subjects are, Kusch thinks, often members of a shared epistemic community
and this shared membership directly affects the epistemic interaction. While I noted some issues
with Kusch’s proposal in §1.7, I think the basic idea that community membership and social
identities play a direct role in epistemic interaction is a valuable insight worth retaining. Towards
this end, Turner’s critique of collectivist concepts is a useful standard for refining Kusch’s
understanding of community. By way of introducing this revision, it is first worth noting an
underlying connection between the collectivist and individualist critiques.
Vacuous collectivism goes hand-in-glove with the disconnected individualism that Kusch
diagnoses. As touched on in relation to testimony’s motivation problem, picturing epistemic
agents as isolated units creates spurious gaps. In order to present something that resembles a
social theory, it is necessary to suture over these gaps, creating the need for vacuous collectivist
concepts. In short, if you carve epistemic agents up into self-contained units, then you have to
somehow explain the stickiness of other people. This is true even if it’s a very weak adhesive,
such as an innate disposition to mirror others. The fundamental issue—what I think is antithetical
to a properly social epistemology—is the conviction that there must either be an individual
mechanism or perceived instrumental benefit that steers an individual towards interacting with
other individuals. D’Agostino’s portrait of epistemic communities is an example of an account
that transcends this understanding of the individualist-collectivist dichotomy.
D’Agostino’s concept of shallow consensus—mentioned previously in Ch. 1—depicts a
form of community membership that shuns the collectivist notion of a shared foundation.
Shallow consensus refers to D’Agostino’s (2010) claim that agreements within epistemic
communities occur against a backdrop of extensive disagreement. This applies to all aspects of a
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community—from values of deliberation and evaluative standards to, in the case of scientific
communities, the particular judgments relating to theory choice. Shallow consensus is essential
for reconciling an epistemic community’s dual need for solidarity and diversity (89). With regard
to solidarity, research teams and individuals within a research team are able to reach consensus
despite important disagreements, many of which they are not even aware of, which is necessary
when dealing with extremely complex and multifaceted problems. This fragile solidarity
simultaneously ensures that consensual judgments do not preclude diverse approaches to and
explorations of a problem space (91). Unlike Kusch and Turner, D’Agostino sees the
individualist and collectivist poles in terms of a productive tension.
Social epistemology is itself a noisy and multifaceted problem space. In terms of this
picture, I see Turner and Kusch as exploring different patches of the problem space—imitative
learning and performative language-use, respectively—and D’Agostino mapping the problem
space itself. By themselves, Turner and Kusch’s models are only one-factor accounts of social
interaction but when assembled together as part of D’Agostino’s heterogeneous map, each offers
a valuable perspective on what are in fact thoroughly heterogeneous phenomena. But in order to
motivate this motley assemblage—which I detail in Ch. 4—it is first necessary to displace the
input-receiver picture noted above, since it is this picture that implies that it is possible to isolate
and dissect a fundamental nature at the root of the cognitive subject. In the following chapter, I
draw upon enactivism in order to reconceptualize the cognitive subject in terms of an essentially
active agent who cannot be examined apart from interactions with his or her contingent
environment.
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Chapter 3: Coordinated Interaction

3.0

Introduction

Over the course of Chs. 3 – 5, I assemble together a joint approach to cognition and social
epistemology, which I call the transformation view. The central tenet of the transformation view
is that cognition, especially cognition within a social context, is a transformative process. Or to
put the same point polemically, the transformation view objects to the notion of there being an
immutable innate cognitive core. While humans and other animals are not born as a tabula rasa,
I present a framework in which innate cognitive structures are profoundly plastic, shaped by the
contingencies of organisms’ individual and idiosyncratic development.
In the present chapter, I employ the enactivist approach to cognition in order to supplant
the input-receiver picture identified in Ch. 2. Accomplishing this goal involves the following
three tasks:
(1) provide a non-exceptionalist, non-saltationist naturalization of cognition,
(2) provide an account of intrinsic teleology, and
(3) offer an empirically grounded framework for evaluating intersubjectivity that
transcends the individualist-collectivist dichotomy.
To achieve these tasks, my use of enactivism centers on the concept of participatory sensemaking, as articulated by Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007, 2008). Participatory
sense-making sets the stage for examining community-level dynamics within social
epistemology in Ch. 4 and displacing manipulationism as a foundational assumption of cognitive
science and social epistemology in Ch. 5.
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While I endorse the concept of participatory sense-making, extending its insights beyond
dyadic interaction comes with difficulties. I examine what I think are some flawed attempts to
expand the scope of participatory sense-making. Most striking is Steiner and Stewart’s (2009)
argument that participatory sense-making presupposes a background social domain that consists
of structural norms. While intrinsic normativity plays an essential part within enactivism—as
indicated by (2) above—Steiner and Stewart’s proposal reflects, I argue, a re-entrenchment of a
normativism similar to Searle’s (1990, 1995) and which is antithetical to enactivism. In
criticizing Steiner and Stewart and others, I chart a different path for enlarging the scope of
participatory sense-making, one that links it to neo-Kuhnian social epistemology rather than to
Émile Durkheim.
The present chapter consists of three major parts. In the first (§3.1-3.2), I trace enactivism
from its beginnings in autopoiesis up to the concept of sense-making. As argued by Evan
Thompson (2004) and Di Paolo (2005), the concept of sense-making involves a break from the
strict structural determinism of autopoietic machines, a break that Varela alludes to in Weber and
Varela’s (2002) argument for intrinsic teleology. This opens up the conceptual space for De
Jaegher and Di Paolo’s concept of participatory sense-making, which I explicate in §3.3. The
last part of the chapter (§3.4-3.5) considers attempts to expand the scope of participatory sensemaking beyond discrete two-agent interactions. Despite the difficulties and dangers of expanding
the scope of participatory sense-making, I argue that it is a fruitful tool for analyzing larger-scale
and longer-term interactive contexts, an application that is mutually beneficial for social
epistemology and cognitive science.
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3.1

From Autopoietic Machines to Sense-Making: The Enactivist Approach to Cognition

The concept of sense-making—one of the core concepts of enactivism—represents the
culmination of more than two decades of work that began with Humberto Maturana’s interest in
the biology of cognition. Maturana’s (1970, 13) claim that “living as a process is a process of
cognition” shifts towards the more refined notion of “living is sense-making” (Thompson 2004,
386). Explicating the concept of sense-making sets the stage for De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s
concept of participatory sense-making, which, as the name suggests, is a direct extension of the
older concept. The concept of sense-making, however, has something of a tangled interpretive
history, which I unravel in the present section, beginning with its roots in the theory of
autopoiesis.
In a retrospective article, Francisco Varela (1996) attributes his joint work with Maturana
on autopoiesis to two general dissatisfactions. First, like Dreyfus (1972), Varela and Maturana
were dissatisfied with the notion of information as the key to understanding cognition (410).
While Dreyfus filters this concern through Heidegger and the topic of expertise, Varela and
Maturana were concerned with providing an adequate biological framework for cognition. Hence,
the second dissatisfaction concerns accounts of the biological cell: “one talked about the
molecular constitution of the cell, and used terms like self-maintenance, but no one, not even two
reunited Noble prize winners [George Wald and James Watson], knew what was meant by that”
(412). It wasn’t simply that accounts of cellular self-maintenance were inadequate but that most
biologists dismissed it as an idle question. In this context, autopoiesis was an intervention in
cellular biology, which Maturana and Varela hoped to extend to more complex life forms.
Autopoiesis signaled a fundamental epistemological and ontological change in how to
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understand living organisms, a change that has immediate implications for the nature of
cognition.58
In the first major English language publication of the theory of autopoiesis, Maturana and
Varela (1980) offer a concise definition of it and present the minimal case of cellular selfmaintenance. An autopoietic machine is defined as follows:
A network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components
that produces the components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations
continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced
them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they
(the components) exist. (79)
Cells are the paradigmatic exemplar of an autopoietic machine, absorbing external nutrients in
order to produce monomers, which, in turn, polymerize to form the cell’s membrane. Because
maintaining the cell’s membrane is a continuous undertaking, as expressed in (i), Maturana and
Varela identify the cell in terms of the homeostatic process of renewal rather than in terms of its
material composition at any given moment. While autopoiesis, as cellular self-production, is a
spatially bounded phenomenon, other biological processes of self-renewal need not be.
Autopoiesis is the most basic type of living organization, from which different forms of
biological autonomy can emerge.
Varela (1979, 1997) defines biological autonomy in terms of operational closure.
Operational closure is “a circular reflexive interlinking process, whose primary effect is its own
production” (Varela 1997, 73). As circular self-production, operational closure corresponds to (i)
above. But by abstracting away from the cellular context, the principle of biological autonomy
possesses a much wider scope of application, including multicellular organisms such as humans
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Maturana (2002, 16) describes the basic insight of autopoiesis as shifting from the question of “What is the
essence of that which I observe?” to the question of “how do I do what I do as an observer in observing?”. This
departure from cognitive realism will be further detailed in the present section.
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and various biological processes within such organisms.59 Enactivism is founded on this more
abstract principle of autonomy rather than autopoiesis, since it is the former that has direct
implications for characterizing all cognitive subjects, including humans (Thompson and
Stapleton 2009).
In collaboration with Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, Varela introduces the
“enactive” approach to cognition in the seminal 1993 book The Embodied Mind. Enactivism is
presented in contrast to cognitive realism, which the authors characterize in terms of a theory of
representation that is similar to what I labeled the input-receiver picture. The realist theory of
representation has three essential features: “(1) the world is pregiven; (2) our cognition is of this
world—even if only to a partial extent, and (3) the way in which we cognize this pregiven world
is to represent its features and then act on the basis of these representations” (135). The defining
characteristic of cognitive realism is thus positing an independent pre-given world as the
foundation for and target of cognition [(1) and (2)], while (3) denotes the representationalist
account of action. In choosing the “input-receiver” label, I emphasize the essentially passive first
stage of cognition shared by all realist theories and thus avoid overemphasizing the question of
representation that is—as Turner’s weak empathy model shows—to some extent a red herring.60
In this originary text, in spite of marshaling a great deal of empirical evidence in support of
enactivism, the authors still lean heavily on the theory of autopoiesis and enactivism’s contrast to
cognitive realism.
After an extensive discussion of color vision, the authors present enactivism as asserting
two key points. They are as follows: “(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and
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Varela was especially concerned with the autonomy of the immune and nervous systems, which are
distributed systems. Thompson and Stapleton (2009) offer insect colonies as another example.
60
For another characterization of cognitive realism, see Susan Hurley’s (1998) discussion of the “input-output
model.”
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(2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be
perceptually guided” (173). The first point corresponds to the idea of a perceiver-dependent
world—perception is an endogenous activity of an organism, not a recording of external reality.
This point reformulates one of the original consequences of autopoietic organization. Maturana
and Varela (1980) write:
Autopoietic machines do not have inputs or outputs. They can be perturbed by
independent events and undergo internal structural changes which compensate these
perturbations. … Whichever series of internal changes takes place, however, they are
always subordinated to the maintenance of the machine organization. (81)
Autopoietic machines are affected by external events but only in relation to their available range
of internal compensations, which are subordinate to self-maintenance. Anything falling outside
this range is either indifferent to the autopoietic machine or results in its disintegration. This is
the basic sense in which enactivism’s perceiver-dependent world does not reduce to solipsism or
an attenuated realism. Autopoietic self-organization is the minimal form of activity from which
more complex forms of activity, including cognition, emerge; documenting this emergence
corresponds to the second point above, with vision studies playing a central role.
Visual perception has played a special role in autopoiesis and enactivism since
Maturana’s earliest ruminations on biological cognition. Maturana (2002) attributes his original
doubts regarding cognitive realism to his attempts to understand pigeon vision in the 1960s.
Furthermore, visual perception lends strong intuitive support to the realist standpoint and so
being able to explain it from an enactivist perspective helps address some deep-seated resistance
to the framework. Studies of visual perception are so important to enactivism that they form the
principal topic of one of enactivism’s two major strands (Torrance 2006).
For Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, the color vision study is a bridge-building exercise
that links their broad interest in cognition and naturalism to technical accounts of perception. In
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contrast to this comprehensive project, Steve Torrance (2006) recognizes a second major strand
of enactivism, exemplified by O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) account of visual perception. In the
spirit of enactivism, O’Regan and Noë explain visual perception strictly in terms of an agent’s
sensorimotor coupling with the world, though they avoid the broader concerns of Varela,
Thompson, and Rosch. Unlike the color vision study, O’Regan and Noë don’t offer their account
as a bridge between minimal and human forms of cognition but instead as a standalone account
of human visual perception. Furthermore, O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory
diminishes the importance of first-personal experience and thus the relevance of phenomenology,
as noted by Thompson (2007) among others. The two strands of enactivism thus mark a
productive tension—the narrow focus of strictly sensorimotor accounts substantiating the general
enactivist orientation—but also an indication of some unresolved difficulties. In §3.4, for
example, I argue that if enactivism is identified with the narrow strand, then it is vulnerable to
Clark’s (2008) criticism that it reduces to a species of extended functionalism. One of the most
important differences between the broad and narrow strands—an issue indirectly alluded to in
regards to the role of first-personal experience and phenomenology—concerns the status of
teleology within enactivism.
One of the chief values of autopoiesis is its mechanistic characterization of selforganization. As suggested in the definition above and reiterated in Maturana (2002), autopoietic
machines are structurally determined, characterizable strictly in terms of their present coupling
state. While Varela never dismisses autopoiesis, he ultimately reinterprets it such that it includes
a teleological component. This marks an important dividing line between broad and narrow
enactivism, but before examining the details of Varela’s re-interpretation, it is helpful to first
consider Thompson’s (2004) intimate perspective on Varela’s previous reluctance. Thompson
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relates Varela’s response to a June 1999 email arguing that phenomenology is inconsistent with
anti-teleology as follows: “he [Varela] preferred to ‘shift the accent’ from teleology to original
intentionality, understood as the sense-making capacity proper to autopoietic units” (395).
Thompson was dissatisfied with this response since he thought that both the notions of original
intentionality and sense-making possess a teleological element. In a posthumously published
paper co-authored with Andreas Weber, Varela indirectly concedes the point by endorsing a
specific type of teleology.
Weber and Varela (2002) reappraise the role of teleology in relation to modern biology as
a whole. Teleological descriptions are common in modern biology, despite the consensus view
that Darwin’s evolutionary theory proves that teleology is absent from biological nature. The
authors note that this tension is usually explained away as a methodological fiction: biological
facts have a semblance of goal-directedness due to the influence of natural selection, a position
known as teleonomy. In the next section, I examine the teleonomy position in greater detail, but
for present purposes, it is sufficient to note that Weber and Varela argue for a form of teleology
that is compatible with Darwinian evolution. Weber and Varela distinguish between two
different but often conflated senses of teleology: “external seemingly purposeful design” and the
“internal purposes immanent to the living” (100). While Darwinian evolution undermines the
former, the authors argue that the latter is essential for understanding the organism as a unitary
locus of experience. Immanuel Kant’s ([1790] 1987) discussion of purposiveness is instructive
both as an anticipation of Weber and Varela’s formulation of intrinsic teleology and also as an
illustration of the strategy by which many theorists explain away intrinsic teleology. Kant’s
concept of purposiveness is often interpreted as only referring to an artifact of human cognition:
on this reading, if humans could intuit the physical universe, then organisms would appear as
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mechanisms like the rest of nature. While conceding that Kant’s own position is unstable, Weber
and Varela argue that there has been enough progress in science and philosophy to show that
purposiveness is, in fact, an empirical phenomenon common to all known organisms.
The progress that Weber and Varela have in mind consists in two parallel trends in
twentieth century philosophy and biology, namely the aforementioned autopoiesis theory and
Hans Jonas’s (1966) biophilosophy. Jonas notes that metabolism is common to all life but absent
from matter (3). Inherent to metabolism, Jonas argues, is a value-laden perspective, a “vital
identity” or “living form,” from which organisms exist as a continuous and total material flux
(76). Jonas’s ruminations on the character of life were inspired in part by a frustration with
existentialism’s myopic focus on humanity, metabolism providing a broader means for
understanding the nature of agency and emotion, both human and otherwise. In this vein, but
going in the opposite direction, Jonas generalizes Heidegger’s description of humanity’s
primordial concern with its mortal existence as an indication that nature shouldn’t be viewed as
an aggregate of indifferent forces (233). This is one of multiple ways in which Jonas argues for
intrinsic purposiveness within nature, another being his critique of cybernetics (116). While the
affinities between Jonas’s notion of metabolic value and autopoiesis are clear, Weber and Varela
argue for a more substantive relationship.
Weber and Varela (2002) present autopoiesis as empirically grounding Jonas’s
characterization of metabolism. That is, in conceptualizing the self-organizing properties of
matter, autopoiesis suggests how life could have emerged from brute matter. Mechanical
causality can thus account for the nature of life when understood in terms of circular causation.
Looking at the connection from the other direction, Varela uses Jonas to guide his
reinterpretation of autopoiesis as involving two modes of intrinsic teleology. The two modes are
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as follows, “First, a basic purpose in the maintenance of its own identity, an affirmation of life.
Second, directly emerging from the aspect of concern to affirm life, a sense-creation purpose
whence meaning comes to its surrounding” (117; original emphasis). The first mode corresponds
to the original definition of autopoiesis as a self-maintenant network of processes, while the
second is presented as a consequence of the first. This elaboration relies on the notion, noted
above, of an autopoietic machine’s range of internal compensations: the basic idea is that every
organism has a range of compensations and, accordingly, a range of interactions available to it,
which encompasses the sense it can make of its environment. Thus, sense is a product of an
organism’s interaction with its surroundings. In sum, Weber and Varela’s endorsement of
intrinsic teleology is presented as a clarification of autopoiesis that redresses modern biology’s
inadequate conception of the organism.
Varela’s modified interpretation is a fork in the road for the theory of autopoiesis. On the
one hand, it is possible to claim that autopoiesis—by revealing more of the mechanistic
underpinnings of living organisms—further suggests that teleology is a superfluous metaphysical
extravagance to be avoided. Introducing intrinsic teleology would be seen in this regard as
muddling the picture. Such a response is suggested by O’Regan and Noë’s displacement of firstpersonal experience. On the other hand, Varela’s endorsement can be seen as an advance that
unlocks more of cognition’s dimensions. Following this second path, I align myself with Di
Paolo’s (2005) emphasis on operational terms, though in §3.3 I note a danger in exclusively
focusing on them.61
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Thompson (2007) offers a distinct second way of pursing Varela’s endorsement of intrinsic teleology.
Thompson emphasizes phenomenology and is primarily interested in supporting Godfrey-Smith’s (1994)
strong continuity of life and mind thesis. While I am more closely aligned with Di Paolo’s focus on operational
definitions in enactivism, I note the irreducible significance of first-personal experience in §3.3 and Ch. 5.
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For Di Paolo (2005), Weber and Varela’s argument for intrinsic teleology points in the
right direction but falls short. The crux of the issue relates to the concept of sense-making: while
autopoiesis provides the language needed to talk about sense-making, Varela’s re-interpretation
conflates its conservative and adaptive aspects.62 Autopoiesis entails the norm of conservation
but not adaptivity. To delineate these two aspects, Di Paolo uses the example of falling off of a
cliff. Balancing on the edge of a cliff and falling over the edge are—as far as autopoietic
conservation is concerned—viable interactions, since neither cause system disintegration (436).
This short-sighted perspective results from autopoiesis’s structural determinism, which
characterizes a system strictly in terms of its present state; hence, it is only the thud against the
ground that violates conservation. This is, of course, useless to the organism that fell, since the
value judgment comes only after disintegration.63 This limitation doesn’t indicate a flaw with
autopoiesis, since its structural determinism underpins its systemic grounding of cognitive
terminology, which, in turn, is the foundation for its critique of cognitive realism (434). Rather
than jettisoning or re-defining autopoiesis, Di Paolo introduces adaptivity as a separate
operational term.
The concept of sense-making entails both autopoietic conservation and adaptivity. In
order to show that it is consistent with enactivism’s systems framework, Di Paolo offers the
following operational definition of adaptivity:
A system’s capacity, in some circumstances, to regulate its states and its relation to
the environment with the result that, if the states are sufficiently close to the boundary of
viability. … 1) Tendencies are distinguished and acted upon depending on whether states
approach or recede from the boundary and, as a consequence, 2) Tendencies of the first
kind are moved closer to or transformed into tendencies of the second. (438)
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In the next section, I clarify how intrinsic teleology relates to sense-making. For now, it is enough to note
that sense-making articulates a form of intrinsic teleology.
63
Di Paolo also recasts the same point in terms of bacteria, one of Varela’s favorite examples. Given only the
norm of conservation, autopoiesis accounts for why bacteria metabolize sugar, but not why bacteria swim up a
sugar gradient to higher concentrations of sugar (437).
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Adaptivity presupposes but is distinct from autopoietic robustness. While robustness provides the
basic all-or-nothing norm of viable self-identity, adaptivity specifies an organism’s current status
in relation to its viability. Adaptivity implies that an organism possesses some kind of awareness
of its viability boundaries and that the organism attempts to mitigate if not reverse a destructive
tendency via modifying its internal state or environmental coupling. Thus described, adaptivity is
grounded in systemic operational terms, though not the structural determinism of autopoiesis. It
is for this reason that Di Paolo views adaptivity as emergent upon autopoiesis.
The chief obstacle to recognizing robustness and adaptivity as distinct is that all known
organisms exhibit both characteristics. Yet there are synthetic cases of autopoiesis without
adaptivity, such as Tibor Ganti’s Chemoton reaction (Di Paolo 2005, 450). Furthermore, the
robustness-adaptivity distinction coheres with the two distinct connotations of sense-making,
namely uncovering and generating meaning (450). On this reading, uncovering meaning or
“making sense” refers to the basic process of self-maintenance (i.e., robustness); generating
meaning, on the other hand, consists in retroactively attributing significance to previously neutral
encounters based on whether they caused the organism to approach towards or recede from the
boundaries of viability. Enactivism has emphasized sense-making’s generative connotation only
because it contrasts more sharply with cognitive realism. While Di Paolo remains committed to
these two basic connotations, he later modifies the concept of sense-making by distinguishing it
from adaptivity.
Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher (2010) argue that adaptivity is a necessary though
insufficient condition for sense-making. In the definition of adaptivity above, there are two ways
an organism can address a destructive tendency: changing its internal state and/or changing its
relation to its environment. In the 2010 article, Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher restrict
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adaptivity to the former capacity, namely the ability to change one’s internal state. Sense-making,
by contrast, implies the additional capacity of motility. Hence, the most basic way of “changing”
or “regulating” one’s environmental relation is moving to a different place. The tumbling and
swimming of many types of bacteria exemplify a very primitive form of motility that enables the
bacteria to find higher concentrations of sugar. While all known organisms exhibit adaptivity, the
authors offer green sulfur bacterium as an example of a just-adaptive, nonmotile organism (50).
The upshot of distinguishing between just-adaptive and sense-making organisms is not a neat
taxonomy—the corresponding taxonomy, in fact, has a number of borderline cases such as
sessile or mostly sessile aquatic animals—but rather the distinction’s implications for
understanding agency. In this respect, the borderline cases redound to the credit of the distinction,
since they illustrate subtle differences within minimal forms of agency.64
The refinement of sense-making supplements Di Paolo’s (2005) sketch of agency.
Agential behavior is not simply an organism’s structured coupling with an environment but
additionally an organism’s regulation of the coupling (442). The latter, unlike pure autopoietic
coupling, has an intentional structure for the organism: it is possible for the organism to detect
whether a regulation has succeeded or failed in improving its viability condition. Furthermore, as
alluded to regarding the generative meaning of sense-making, this primitive agency entails
historicity, since an organism’s regulative responses mark and constrain its future interactions
(444). Reading this sketch in terms of the refined notion of sense-making, the three terms of
autopoiesis, adaptivity, and sense-making denote two constraining but underdetermined
relationships. In the first, autopoietic self-identity sets the open-ended goal towards which
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Furthermore, I do not think a lot hangs on whether adaptivity alone should be counted as a form of agency.
More important is recognizing how adaptivity informs motility and how motility enhances an organism’s range
of possible adaptive responses. Hence the value of having operational terms for each distinct aspect. See Fitch
(2008) for a related analysis of different minimal forms of cognition, which he formulates in terms of nano-,
micro-, and proto-intentions.
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adaptive responses are geared. Autopoiesis and adaptivity together capture the essential nature of
metabolism. In the second constraining relationship, metabolism acts as the open-ended goal for
sense-making activities. Sense-making activities generate values that are constrained but not
determined by metabolism and, given sense-making’s historical dimension, the constraints set by
metabolism can become highly mediated and thereby attenuated.
It was Di Paolo and De Jaegher’s (2007, 2008) work on the generation of values within
social contexts that prompted them to emphasize the specifically motile dimension of sensemaking. The basic premise of participatory sense-making is that individuals influence each
other’s bodily movements ubiquitously and often through simple, non-mentalistic means. Having
identified the regulation of bodily movement as the most primitive form of agency, the concept
of sense-making suggests that anything that consistently shapes an individual’s movement is
much more than an incidental input for an “actual” cognitive process. By grounding cognition in
viable interactive regulation, the concept of sense-making provides a less saltationist and
exceptionalist account of human cognition, a framework that undermines the input-receiver
model of cognition. My chief concern in the present chapter is to show how this naturalization of
agency and cognition provides a more comprehensive and straightforward framework for social
epistemology, as initiated by the concept of participatory sense-making. But before examining
participatory sense-making, it is first necessary to situate the basic enactivist model of cognition
in relation to two criticisms that I leveled in Chs. 1 – 2.
As noted in the present section, the enactivist approach that I am endorsing is committed
to a specific kind of teleology. Furthermore, this teleology is expressed in terms of an organism’s
adaptivity. Adaptivity may appear to be at odds with my previous critiques of adaptationism, as
discussed in regards to Goldman’s testimony model and Searle’s Background hypothesis. And
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my endorsement of the more general notion of intrinsic teleology may appear to be at odds with
my critique of Searle’s concept of intrinsic normativity. In the next section, I differentiate my
enactivist commitments from these positions. Doing so offers a broader perspective on the issues
that enactivism has negotiated in relation to its shifting interpretations of sense-making.

3.2

Teleology, Adaptivity, and Other Forbidden Things

The shifting interpretations of autopoiesis and sense-making reflect tensions within modern
biology as a whole. André Ariew and Mark Perlman (2002) offer a general perspective on the
topic, boiling the issue down to the following question: is there “a naturalistic, non-pragmatic
way to sustain the distinction between how an item functions and the function of the item?” (2).
Teleological explanations play a legitimate role in biology if there is a (potentially) meaningful
difference between an item’s present and its actual functions. For those who answer in the
affirmative, many use Darwinian natural selection as a grounding mechanism for functions. This
is an attractive strategy in the philosophy of mind because it is thus possible to account for the
nature of misrepresentations by branding it as possessing negative survival value (3). As touched
upon in §2.2, Ruth Millikan’s concept of proper function has been the most influential attempt in
this regard. Ariew and Perlman note the potential for Developmental Systems Theory to offer an
alternative grounding, a potential that I articulate by using the enactivist framework discussed in
the previous section in conjunction with Mark Bickhard’s interactive model of representation. To
set the explanatory target for this alternative grounding of functions, I first examine Ariew’s
(2002) discussion of Aristotelian teleology.
Ariew (2002) recognizes two basic types of teleology, both of which are present within
Aristotelian philosophy. There is (i) agency-centered teleology and (ii) teleology pertaining to
natural organisms (9). While both of these types are present within Aristotle, the former unlike
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the latter is also found in Plato and so Ariew labels (i) Platonic and (ii) Aristotelian. Agencycentered teleology roots functions in an agent’s conscious intentions; when scaled to the level of
the universe, nature appears as an artifact created by a very powerful agent (11). The second type
of teleology, by contrast, corresponds to an inner principle of change within organisms. One
form of this teleology corresponds to developmental processes that occur for the sake of an
organism’s self-preservation. Ariew considers the example of a plant’s roots growing
downwards: a plant is not consciously aware that it is good for its roots to grow downwards but
instead plants whose roots don’t grow downwards simply do not flourish (9). Rather than the
product of conscious intention, the second type of teleology is immanent to organisms, activating
potentialities specific to a species rather than a universal form. As a result, immanent teleology
doesn’t imply striving for what is best; this telos only implies relative usefulness. So, for
example, just because a plant’s roots grow downwards does not mean the development is ideal; it
is possible that a different root system would enable the plant to flourish even more (12). Hence,
immanent teleology implies a gradation of norms (i.e., worse-to-better) rather than an all-ornothing norm of best versus the rest. As discussed in the last section, with regard to sensemaking, having graded norms is essential to accounting for learning. Ariew sticks to the more
abstract notion of development in order to argue that Aristotle’s basic notion of immanent
teleology is integral to contemporary biology.
Ariew claims that Darwin’s principle of natural selection presupposes immanent
teleology. More specifically, natural selection presupposes organisms’ striving for selfpreservation, which corresponds to the graded norms of development (23). The basic issue is that
“blind necessity” alone is insufficient to account for organismal development, adaptation, and the
like (29). To bolster this reading, Ariew cites correspondence in which Darwin thanks Asa Gray
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for his remark that evolution restores a role for teleology (23). Ariew’s larger argumentative
strategy is to show that grounding biological functions by appealing to natural selection
presupposes Aristotle’s immanent teleology. To evaluate this strategy, it is worth returning to
Millikan’s account of proper functions.
Millikan (1984) introduced her concept of proper functions to account for what underpins
judgments of defectiveness. Hence, the concept of proper function applies to anything about
which it makes sense to talk of its dysfunction, whether mental representations, toasters, or
hearts (Millikan 2002, 116). With regard to cognitive realism, it is important to be able to claim
that instances in which a mind misrepresents external reality are dysfunctional cases. Millikan
(1984) believes that this requires appealing to the principle of natural selection for two reasons.
First, cognitive capacities are the products of evolution and they have survival value (93).
Second, and more decisively, Millikan thinks that defectiveness presupposes a historical
dimension as a basis for evaluating a given instance. The way something “should” function in
this context refers to what has been selected for in an evolutionary lineage (94). There are
various issues with this account, of which I will draw upon two objections from Robert
Cummins’s since his objections will set up an alternative view of teleonomy.
Expressing a common sentiment, Cummins (2002) views neo-teleology derisively. He
levels two major objections to Millikan’s general project. First and most fundamental, natural
selection does not create functions but instead only shapes what is already present (163). But,
given this criticism, it is possible to claim that identifying the function of a trait identifies the
dimension of performance relevant to assessing its adaptiveness (167). Cummins discounts this
line of reasoning on the grounds that it oversimplifies actual selection histories. An adaptation
need not correspond to improving a function—perhaps the adaptation nets an increase in
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efficiency or robustness or contributes to another function (168). The key point is that there is no
direct correspondence between functions and adaptations. It is possible to read Cummins as
indicating the need for supplementing Millikan’s position with immanent teleology (Ariew’s
position) or as undermining any substantive notion of teleology. One influential articulation of
this latter position is Colin Pittendrigh’s concept of teleonomy.
Pittendrigh (1958) coins the term teleonomy to discuss goal-directedness without
implying that the goal is causally operant in its own realization.65 There have been many
explications of teleonomy. Ernst Mayr (1974) defines a teleonomic process as one controlled by
a program, wherein a program is any coded information (101). Ernest Nagel (1977), by contrast,
offers a systems-property account in order to isolate specific functional aspects of complex
systems. Common to both approaches and various others is reducing teleology to a heuristic. For
Mayr, functional ascriptions aid in identifying behavioral programs, while for Nagel they simply
reduce to generic causal properties. For Mayr and Nagel, the aim is to identify the deterministic
mechanisms that underpin an organism.66 Enactivism, however, shows that teleology is in fact a
special form of causation, the recognition of which undermines the teleonomy view, offers an
alternative account of defectiveness, and improves on Ariew’s formulation of immanent
teleology.
Weber and Varela’s (2002) central insight was in recognizing the teleological
implications of operational closure. Pace Pittendrigh, operational closure identifies how “ends”
play a role in circular causation without implying “backwards” causation. Di Paolo’s (2005)
concept of adaptivity addresses Millikan’s question of defectiveness: dysfunction is whatever
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Similarly, Ariew (2002, 7) notes that most theorists have dropped “teleology” in favor of “functions” simply
in order to avoid the metaphysical associations of the former term.
66
Teleonomy thus corresponds to the interpretation of Kantian purposiveness as an artifact of the limits of
human cognition, in which heuristics partially reveal the actual causal mechanisms.
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moves an organism further away from its viability conditions. By thus relieving natural selection
of the burden of grounding all functional norms, Ariew’s argumentative strategy appears
somewhat myopic. While Ariew is right that natural selection presupposes an immanent
teleology, the central issue concerns adequately accounting for the organism as a unitary locus of
activity as opposed to a coincidence of forces. Providing such an account, as is enactivism’s goal,
shows that intrinsic teleology is not merely derivative upon nor even solely geared towards
natural selection. This is the point at which enactivism parts ways with Ariew’s account.
Ariew’s understanding of immanent teleology is at variance with enactivism regarding
purposiveness and intentionality. In contrast to enactivism, Ariew claims that immanent
teleology is non-purposive and non-intentional, but this is because he considers purposiveness to
imply conscious design and intentionality as implying representational aboutness. Last section’s
discussion of sense-making showed the rudiments of how enactivism departs from these claims.
This departure is important for it enables enactivism to avoid appealing to Aristotle’s notion of
“species form,” which may be more tractable than universal forms yet is still deeply
problematic.67 To buttress enactivism’s conception of intentionality and purposiveness, I now
turn to Bickhard’s interactive model of representation.
Bickhard’s (1996, 2000, 2002) interactive model of representation buttresses Di Paolo’s
(2005) sketch of adaptivity and brings into focus the issues of perceptual salience and learning.
Bickhard’s interactivist model complements enactivism, approaching many of the same issues
from the context of psychology. Offering an alternative account of representation is central to
reconceptualizing intentionality, as evidenced by Bickhard’s (1996) shifting the question of
representation from the usual one of content to the act of representing itself. Representational
67

For a notable though ultimately flawed attempt to ground the concept of species, see Hull (1990).
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content is a product of a system’s functional usage of a perceptual signal and thereby derivative
upon the act of representing.
Representations, first and foremost, serve to differentiate between different interactive
contacts. Bickhard (1996) writes, “differing environments may leave that (sub)system [whatever
initiates the interaction] in differing final internal states or conditions when the interaction is
‘completed.’ Such possible internal final states, then, will serve to differentiate possible
environments” (60; original emphasis). The term differentiation expresses the semantic
opaqueness between environment and interacting system. The final state reached does not bear
informational content from environment to organism. Instead, the only information that
perceptual differentiators contain about the environment is that it caused the given final state to
be reached; the internal state thereby only implicitly defines the environment (61).
Differentiation and implicit definition are the two foundations of interactive representation.
The concept of implicit definition dovetails with enactivist adaptivity. An organism does
not need to represent its environment as such but rather only what has a differential effect on its
viability state. Thus, built directly into implicit definition is perceptual salience—the organism
only perceives what is of differential significance. Because this account of salience treats the act
of representing as a primitive, it presupposes goal-directedness. Bickhard’s interactive model
clarifies the nature of primitive goal-directedness, showing that it is itself non-representational.
Rather than representations, at the most primitive level, goals are functional switches with a
success result (e.g., further processing/anticipation of another interaction) and a failure result
(e.g., a trial and error interactive process) (62). To illustrate the difference Bickhard reinterprets
one of Fodor’s (1990) examples concerning frogs. For it to eat, a frog does not represent, say, a
fly or a worm. Instead, the fly and worm appear as two potential types of interaction: “tongue-
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flick-at-a-point” and “tongue-flick-between-two-points,” respectively (64; original emphasis).
The frog thus anticipates specific kinds of eating opportunities, the salient issue being how to
flick the tongue rather than what the tongue flicks at.
Representation (as implicit definition) is inherently opaque or coarse-grained, though
capable of becoming more fine-grained with increasing interactive sophistication. Frogs flick
their tongues rather indiscriminately; fortunately, they live in a world where many of those
flicking opportunities bear edible fruit. If massive numbers of teenagers or philosophers took it
upon themselves to shoot BBs across their fronts, this would change the frogs’ world
dramatically. Perhaps frogs would become able to discriminate between metal projectiles and
buzzing things, maybe their diet would shift more towards crawling things, or maybe they would
die off. Regardless of this (thankfully) hypothetical situation, the key point is that what the frog
represents is inextricable from its interactive world because its representations are the product of
its actual interactions. Ingestion of metal spheres would constitute error and could trigger
learning new behavioral patterns, but for the vast majority of frogs who have been spared the
machinations of philosophers of mind, BBs don’t count as errors. Bickhard’s rendition of the
frog example thus illustrates how implicit definition entails error-guided learning.
For the interactivist model, misrepresentation is no longer an aberrant phenomenon in
need of explanation. Misrepresentation is inherent to implicit definition and is the basis for
detecting and then learning from error. There’s a profound sense in which you can’t be right
without having first been wrong. Error prompts refining one’s interactions and implicit
definitions; but refining implicit definitions does not make them bearers of external content.
They are still subordinate to the self-maintenant network of which they are a part and whose selfidentity is the motivating constraint from which the anticipatory interaction issues. Fitch (2008)
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highlights the serial nature of such learning and an attendant need for tagging, a proposal that I
buttress in Ch. 4 by further articulating Bickhard’s (2002) levels of knowing model. But for now,
in preparation for discussing enactivism’s specifically social implications, it is enough to clarify
why the individual as a self-maintenant locus of activity does not entail egoism. Towards this
end, Searle’s account of intrinsic normativity serves as a useful contrast.
Searle’s (1990, 1995) account of intrinsic normativity ties together the issues of
adaptationism, egoism, and intentionality discussed in this section. His identification of
intentionality with representational aboutness implies that individuals have a more determinate
relationship to the world than is actually the case. This, in turn, dovetails with viewing
individuals as motivated by egoistic self-interest: an individual’s desire appears in terms of what
thing(s) she wants to acquire from the world. The world is comparable to a shopping list.68 The
essential difference between egoism and enactivist self-maintenance is that, in the former case,
the default position is a static individual as opposed to the continuous interactive coping of the
latter. From the position of stasis, according to egoism, the individual chooses to interact with
her environment. This creates the false problematic that Searle’s we-intentions aim to solve: weintentions are meant to flip the switch from the isolated self to self “as member of a community.”
Searle’s normativity thus lacks the gradation essential to any learning process: someone
has committed to a we-intention or they haven’t. In place of a first-personal learning process, the
broad stroke of natural selection is meant to ensure that those for whom we-intentions do not flip
on are selected against. Furthermore, making the we-intention commitment tacit and then trying
to cash it out in terms of stronger and weaker only has the regrettable consequence of turning
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As in much else, Jerry Fodor is instructive: “What philosophers call ‘linguistic deference’ is actually the use
of experts as instruments….Epistemology…is mostly about money; e.g., about what I’m prepared to pay to
insure that one or other of my beliefs is true” (1995, 36-37). I take Fodor’s position as a reductio of much of
epistemology.
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normativity into an ethereal mystery rather than an integral part of a learning process. It is this
latter depiction of the social that De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s concept of participatory sensemaking offers.
In the present section, I have addressed two apparent tensions between my commitment
to enactivism and my previous critiques of adaptationism and Searle’s intrinsic normativity. In
doing so, I situated enactivism’s intrinsic teleology within the larger context of the philosophy of
science and buttressed Di Paolo’s (2005) sketch of adaptivity with Bickhard’s interactive model
of representation. The opaqueness of goal-directedness, as conceived by implicit definition,
together with sense-making’s emphasis on regulated movement opens up new ways for
examining social interaction.

3.3

An Enactivist Approach to the Social: Participatory Sense-Making

Enactivism makes possible an empirically grounded framework for analyzing and understanding
intersubjectivity that transcends the individualist-collectivist dichotomy. Hanne De Jaegher and
Ezequiel Di Paolo tap into this potential with the concept of participatory sense-making and its
central theme of coordination. Coordinated movement appears as an intrinsic dynamic
endogenous to interaction rather than an output of an individual cognitive mechanism, which in
the following is an important point of comparison between the enactivist approach and the
translation view. There are two rough groupings of essays that I consider in explicating
participatory sense-making: the first is devoted to the basic formulation of the concept and the
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second, centering on De Jaegher’s efforts, attempts to develop the concept beyond dyadic faceto-face interaction.69
De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s introductory (2007) article on participatory sense-making has
two general concerns. First, the authors needed to show that enactivism, despite previously
neglecting the topic, has valuable insights for social interaction. Toward this end, they situate
their concept in relation to the five core enactivist themes of autonomy, sense-making,
embodiment, emergence, and experience (486-88). The second task is to show that participatory
sense-making is more explanatorily parsimonious and powerful and better captures our everyday
experience of social interaction than what is commonly found in the philosophy of mind. De
Jaegher and Di Paolo diagnose philosophy of mind’s treatment of social interaction as the Rear
Window approach.
The Rear Window approach refers especially to the Theory-Theory versus SimulationTheory debate that has dominated the philosophy of mind’s concern for the social. On the Rear
Window approach, social understanding stems from “figuring out someone else’s intentions out
of our individual observations of them” (489). Theory Theory and Simulation Theory differ over
whether the observations of another person are fed into an inferential or simulation process, but
both share the basic picture of observations as the basis for imputing an intention to others. In
presenting an enactivist approach, De Jaegher and Di Paolo want their reader to feel just how
myopic this picture is: my social life does not occur through a pair of binoculars, nor did Jimmy
Stewart’s.
In the initial article, De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) state they are focusing on “the faceto-face encounters of everyday life” (486). In order to explicate the concept of participatory
69

The first group consists of De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, 2008), with Rohde (2010), and with Gallagher
(2010). The second group includes Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009), McGann and De Jaegher (2009), De Jaegher
and Froese (2009), and De Jaegher (2013).
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sense-making at this level, I primarily draw upon De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2008) since this
article focuses on the two concepts most relevant to participatory sense-making (i.e., autonomy
and sense-making) and its central theme of coordination.
As noted in §3.1, biological autonomy expresses cellular autopoiesis in more general
terms. An autonomous system consists of “several processes that actively generate and sustain an
identity under precarious circumstances” (35). Precarious conditions are simply situations in
which a process would tend to “run down or extinguish” without being part of an organized
network, which in the case of biological autonomy is self-organized. Participatory sense-making
identifies a novel kind of autonomy emergent in social contexts, namely the relational dynamics
of interaction (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, and Gallagher 2010, 443). Autonomy is also the foundation
of sense-making, the latter specifically entailing the additional capacity for spontaneous
movement and thus the presence of agency (§3.1). On the enactivist picture, motility remains the
center of mental activity for complex animals, such as humans (2008, 36). Given motility’s
primitive and abiding significance, anything that shapes an organism’s movement is integral to
its cognition.
Participatory sense-making examines social interaction in terms of how interactants
ubiquitously influence each other’s movements via coordinating factors. Two systems are
correlated if their behavior coheres beyond what is expected of them given each system’s
capabilities (2007, 490). Coordination simply refers to cases in which a correlation is nonaccidental (490). One of the chief tasks of the 2007 paper is to show that coordination often only
involves simple mechanisms of coupling. Towards this end, the paper lists a wide range of
coupling mechanisms, including the synchronized light flashing of fire flies and the
synchronized pendulum swinging of two people in view of each other (490). In short, because it
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is realized by countless mechanisms, coordination is so pervasive in nature that it is hard to avoid.
The larger implication for De Jaegher and Di Paolo is that coordination does not depend on
mental mechanisms.
Although it is only one form of coordination, synchronization receives the most attention
because it conveys the significance of timing to interaction. Synchronization need only be
relative (i.e., phase attraction between two systems) and, importantly, can involve very different
behaviors on the part of the two systems (2007, 491). For example, as noted by De Jaegher and
Di Paolo, Kelso (1995) considers an adult and child walking alongside each other. With little-tono mental effort, the two will adjust their gait to roughly match the other’s pace. This can be
realized in multiple ways (e.g., adjusting the length or frequency of strides) and, importantly, it
entails opposing compensations on the parts of the child and adult, which is at variance with the
translation view’s emphasis on contagious mirroring. Hence, it is helpful here to examine some
of the fundamental differences between the enactivist approach to the social and the translation
view.
For the enactivist approach, there is no substantial foundation for social interaction.
Coordination is an abstract notion that refers to any non-accidental correlation between two
systems. Mirroring is one particular form of coordination—salient within certain contexts, such
as apprentice training—rather than being the fundamental basis of all epistemically significant
social interaction. Avoiding a substantial foundation enables participatory sense-making to
capture a wider array of epistemic significance. In Ch. 4, for example, I argue that one of the
most significant aspects of social interaction is the sui generis creation of epistemic goals, which
the translation view obscures by positing functional equivalence as the most basic epistemic goal.
The positing of any general epistemic standard results in reducing social interaction to a means
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for accomplishing that end (e.g., acquiring a tacit skill). And it is this pervasive manipulationism
that I directly scrutinize in Ch. 5.
It should be noted, however, that De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s early discussions of
coordination do not sound all that different from the translation view’s model of tacit learning.
There are four types of coordination mentioned in the two introductory articles—synchronization,
mirroring, imitation, and anticipation.70 De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s interest in these four types is
connected with how they facilitate fluid, seamless social interaction. If coordination were
synonymous with smooth social interaction, then it would be tempting to read it as merely
broadening the enabling factors that underpin tacit learning, with tacit learning still being defined
by opaque mirroring. But the authors are clear that their list of coordinating factors is not
exhaustive; furthermore, I will be arguing that their emphasis on fluidity is a partly an artifact of
focusing on two-person face-to-face interaction, which becomes problematic if directly
extrapolated to larger-scale institutional contexts. Broadening coordination beyond factors
conducive to fluidity will further differentiate the enactivist approach from the translation view.
While the broad range of coordination factors provides multiple avenues for
understanding social interaction, for some social theorists this becomes a liability: the abstract
concept opens up too many avenues, so many that social interaction becomes indistinguishable
from other kinds of coupling. After all, among the original examples of coordination is the
synchronized oscillation of clocks, which is certainly not a social phenomenon. To address this
concern, De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2008) define social interaction as:
The regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, where the regulation is
aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an emergent autonomous
organization in the domain of relational dynamics, without destroying in the process the
70

De Jaegher and Di Paolo are not explicitly clear on the difference between mirroring and imitation.
Presumably the former specifically designates mirror neurons, whose exaggerated use in social theory De
Jaegher and Di Paolo (2008) directly criticize.
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autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter's scope may be augmented or reduced).
(39)
So while interaction itself emerges as an autonomous process, social interaction requires the
agents to maintain at least some individual autonomy. The qualification that social interaction
may augment or reduce the autonomy of the involved agents—which can be interpreted as
implying that autonomy falls on a one-dimensional spectrum—signals what becomes the central
theme of De Jaegher’s extension of participatory sense-making.
As a contrast to social interaction, De Jaegher and Di Paolo offer the example of heat
transfer within a crowd of people waiting for a bus. This sort of coupling is explicable strictly in
terms of brute physical determination and does not help hold the crowd together because it is
incidental to the situation (the prospect of a bus holds everyone together). It should be noted,
however, that on closer inspection the difference between social interaction and the intra-crowd
heat transfer is not necessarily cut and dried. Perhaps it is a cold windy day and people want to
stay warm, so they huddle close together rather than spreading out along the sidewalk. In this
scenario, the desire to stay warm may initiate conversations and a sense of camaraderie (or
disgruntlement) that would not have otherwise occurred. This is not meant as a rebuke to De
Jaegher and Di Paolo’s distinction but rather a cautionary note: what counts as a social
coordinating factor depends on the intimate details of particular situations including the actual
individuals involved.
In this respect, I see the enactivist approach as advancing the translation view’s emphasis
on the importance of improvisation within social interaction: the role of spontaneity only
increases when social interaction is not anchored to a particular subpersonal neuronal process,
such as mirroring. Participatory sense-making enables analyzing the interactive process as such,
in all of its haphazard and idiosyncratic glory (and terror). Indeed, capturing the spontaneity of
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social interaction is one of the concept’s chief selling points, since much of social theory suffers
from a staleness that results from treating the idiosyncrasies of interaction as merely incidental to
the actual cognitive processes. The Rear Window approach exemplifies this blandness by taking
another’s behavior as merely data for judging his or her individual intentions.
The Rear Window approach is in part an artifact of the previously discussed inputreceiver picture of cognition. This picture places pressure on reducing any cognitively salient
factor to an individual mechanism, since cognition is meant to be precisely what the individual
does to the input, which then informs the individual’s subsequent behavioral output. Discarding
the input-receiver picture allows participatory sense-making to avoid the proliferation of
homunculi dressed up as subpersonal neuronal processes. This indicates what is participatory
sense-making’s most rhetorically persuasive selling point—namely, its greater explanatory
parsimony. When compared to the enactivist approach to the social, the TheoryTheory/Simulation-Theory debate, looks like a Ptolemaic exercise in epicycle adjustment rather
than a conceptual clarification of our best science. Participatory sense-making is accordingly first
and foremost an intervention in the philosophy of mind.
For De Jaegher and Di Paolo, however, the most substantial appeal of participatory
sense-making is its usefulness for informing empirical research. The (2010) article that they
coauthored with Shaun Gallagher is a primer for how to employ the enactivist approach to social
interaction within a controlled experimental setting. The article canvasses studies that share an
affinity with the enactivist approach, cites a case in which the framework has already informed
research, and offers a set of questions for future research. The authors thus address what they
consider to be the most pressing issue facing the concept of participatory sense-making; to wit,
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showing that it has a well-defined and valuable research use. The second most important issue is
whether the approach can be extended beyond two-person face-to-face interaction.
From the outset, De Jaegher and Di Paolo believed that participatory sense-making could
directly inform larger-scale forms of interaction. In (2007), they cite works in sociology that take
face-to-face encounters as the basic frame of analysis (e.g., Goffman 1983, Sacks 1992), while in
(2008) they pitch participatory sense-making as a corrective to sociological theories that focus
exclusively on collective processes. The (2008) article thus identifies the converse error to
philosophy of mind’s Rear Window approach, positioning participatory sense-making as a
corrective to the excesses of both overly individualist cognitive science and overly collectivist
sociology, the two errors having created a spurious gulf between the fields. De Jaegher and Di
Paolo see participatory sense-making as balancing and thus bringing into focus the respective
roles of individual and interactive factors. Yet the manner in which participatory sense-making
has been extended beyond the two-person context—spearheaded by De Jaegher—is, I think,
founded on some troublesome premises. De Jaegher’s efforts center on the spectrum of social
coordination, an abstraction that appears in the introductory articles but which comes to take on a
much greater significance in De Jaegher’s subsequent works.
As presented in (2007, 2008), the spectrum of participation offers some suggestive
insights on two-person interaction. The spectrum is based on degrees of coordination: on one
side of the spectrum lies mere “orientation” and, on the other, “joint sense-making.” In the latter
case, it may be very difficult or even impossible to tease out each individual’s distinct
contributions. Compare this to an example of orientation, in which I happen upon a person
looking for something and ostend in order to direct his or her search (2008, 42). In this case, it is
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quite easy to delineate each individual’s contributions: one is the desirous searcher and the other
a helpful pointer; importantly, the searcher’s desire would exist irrespective of my presence.
De Jaegher, Di Paolo, and Gallagher (2010) tentatively propose that the spectrum is a
general indicator of the affective character of interaction. The proposal has some empirical
support within the psychotherapeutic context: there is a correlation between, on the one hand,
high bodily coordination between therapist and patient and, on the other, a patient’s positive
assessment of the therapy session (2010, 442). This link is buttressed by Fuchs and De Jaegher’s
(2009) pairing of coordination with phenomenology’s concept of mutual incorporation. Fuchs
and De Jaegher claim that the reciprocal shaping of interactants’ movements (i.e., coordination)
causes and is caused by a decentering of subjective experience for each person (i.e., mutual
incorporation). While De Jaegher and Fuchs are right to link coordination and mutual
incorporation, it is a mistake to identify a general correspondence between high bodily
coordination and positive affective states. Phenomenology constrains cognitive science in part
because first-personal experience is stubbornly idiosyncratic.71 While high bodily coordination
might correspond to positive emotional states in the therapeutic setting, this does not generalize
to all social settings.
McGann and De Jaegher (2009) recast the correspondence between coordination and
first-personal experience as a dichotomy between fluid and rigid interactions. For the remainder
of the section, I focus on problematizing these one-dimensional spectra of sociality, especially as
it is expressed by the fluid-rigid dichotomy. The issues raised here reappear in a starker terms in
Steiner and Stewart’s (2009) account of the social domain and participatory sense-making’s role
therein, which I scrutinize at length in §3.5.
71

For more background on the relationship between cognitive science and phenomenology, see Merleau-Ponty
([1945] 2012), Gallagher (1997), and Thompson (2007).
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The main goal of McGann and De Jaegher (2009) is to give an account of social
perception in terms of social contingencies. One hope is to reconcile the Noë-O’Regan
sensorimotor contingency theory with the broader Varela strand of enactivism; participatory
sense-making’s emphasis on operational terms makes it an attractive point of contact. In this
context, fluidity appears as sensitivity to social contingencies. That is to say, being socially
skilled entails the ability to improvise based on the changing emotional states of ourselves and
others (427-28). Lack of social skill, by contrast, implies rigidity and predictability, an inability
to engage one’s particular audience. In making this connection with Noë and O’Regan’s
sensorimotor contingency theory, I think that McGann and De Jaegher erode some of
participatory sense-making’s value. Indeed, the sensorimotor contingency theory reflects the
guiding intuition behind the various one-dimensional spectra of greater or lesser sociality:
interpreting greater sociality in terms of unpredictability dovetails with Noë and O’Regan’s
privileging of quantifiable motility over first-personal experience.
De Jaegher (2013) bolsters the fluid-rigid dichotomy by articulating it in terms of
political theory. Drawing upon Gilligan and Richards (2009), De Jaegher frames the dichotomy
in terms of horizontal democratic forms of association in contrast to top-down patriarchal social
organizations. The connection is ambitious, representing an attempt to show participatory sensemaking’s relevance to analyzing entire societies. This extension is predicated on yet another
spectrum, namely a spectrum of power symmetry. De Jaegher writes, “When interacting with
another person, or with an institution, one or other partner may be more or less ‘dominant,’ more
or less influential. In such asymmetric relations or interactions, the degree of influence that each
partner has is different” (23).
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De Jaegher’s understanding of dominance as a matter of “more or less” corresponds to
the earlier interpretation of autonomy as one-dimensional. Accordingly, this symmetry of power
roles directly corresponds to the spectrum of coordination. On the less social end, highly
asymmetric institutionalized interaction corresponds to orientation, since it is easy to delineate
the differing contributions by the authority and the subordinate. On the other, De Jaegher offers
the example of a lawyer-client relationship as a case of greater symmetry/joint sense-making: the
lawyer and client work together to interpret the law to their advantage. But even in this case of a
messier, horizontal type of interaction, institutions still appear as rigid things—as an inert
resource for individuals to draw upon—since the laws and courts are simply means to advance
one’s interests. Institutions appear as inert objects because they are identified with rules, similar
to how Searle interpreted institutions as founded upon we-intention statements. It is this reified
understanding of institutions that I challenge in §3.5 and Ch. 4. But there is a more immediate
problem with the fluid-rigid dichotomy.
The basic issue with the dichotomy between fluid and rigid interaction is best illustrated
by one of the studies repeatedly cited in its support. Granic (2002) uses Dynamic Systems
Theory to model parent-child relationships. Granic is specifically interested in how patterns of
hostility between parents and children can emerge despite each party’s amicable intentions, a
phenomenon she attributes to behavioral attractors (273). In both McGann and De Jaegher
(2009) and De Jaegher (2013), Granic’s cases of hostile parent-child behavioral patterns are
glossed as instances of rigid patterns of social interaction. That is, since the hostility occurs
against each individual’s intentions—thereby reducing the autonomy of each—the pattern is
rigid in the sense that it predictably occurs irrespective of the circumstances of the encounter.
But Granic herself does not think of hostile and other negatively valenced interactions as being
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more “rigid” than positive ones. Behavioral attractors stabilize both positively and negatively
valenced patterns of interactions. From a therapeutic perspective, Granic is most interested in
identifying and figuring out how to destabilize negative patterns, but this does not imply that
negative patterns of interaction possess any greater stability or “rigidity” than positive ones.72
While the motile profiles described by De Jaegher’s various spectrums are relevant and may in
some circumstances strongly correspond to particular affective states (e.g., in the
psychotherapeutic context), they cannot serve as context-independent indicators. This is because
sociality simply does not consist of a one-dimensional spectrum of greater or less. The
quantifiability of this kind of spectrum is attractive from the perspective of a controlled
experimental setting but ultimately obscures important dynamics within the larger-scale and
longer-term institutional contexts that De Jaegher aspires to examine.
In Ch. 4, I detail novel kinds of sociality that can emerge within the constraints of
hierarchical organizations. Moreover, these emergent social organizations can enable epistemic
achievements that would be otherwise impossible. But before turning to this matter, I first want
to consider a critique and also a refinement of participatory sense-making. In §3.5 I examine
Steiner and Stewart’s (2009) attempt to situate participatory sense-making within sociology. I
think Steiner and Stewart’s revision brings into starker relief the issues with the one-dimensional
spectra discussed here. In §3.4 I consider Andy Clark’s (2008) critique of enactivism as a whole.
72

Consider the following, not terribly far-fetched scenarios: a friendship of mine may center on a shared hobby
or interest, let’s say football. Whenever I see the other person, whether at work, the grocery store, or the post
office, we chat about the latest football news and commiserate over the latest setbacks. The person, him- or
herself, becomes an attractor for the topic of football. Importantly, this may be a positive or negative
relationship. If he or she is just a casual acquaintance, then there’s nothing necessarily wrong with our
predictable pattern. And this is so even if we are not particularly mindful of each other’s affective states, since
such mindfulness may be largely superfluous insofar as our encounters stick to the topic. Alternatively, there
may arise special occasions when the pattern becomes objectionable: maybe we encounter each other at a
mutual acquaintance’s funeral and can’t help ourselves. Yet, to complicate this latter scenario, if the mutual
acquaintance also shared a passion for football, raising the topic may actually be an appropriate form of coping.
All of this is by way of saying—indeed, insisting—that the significance of a social interaction’s rigidity or
flexibility depends on the particular circumstances and the idiosyncrasies of the people involved.
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Clark argues that enactivism is simply a species of “wide functionalism.” I argue that Clark’s
critique holds water only if enactivism is identified with Noë and O’Regan’s sensorimotor
contingency theory. But, contrary to the tenor of McGann and De Jaegher (2009), the lesson I
draw from Clark’s critique is to sharply distinguish the sensorimotor theory from enactivism as a
whole and participatory sense-making in particular.

3.4

Extended Functionalism?

Given that mind is embodied and environmentally embedded, Andy Clark (2008) recognizes two
defining stories that divide how these facts inform cognitive science. First, the “Special
Contribution Story” claims that “specific features of the body (and perhaps the world) make a
persistent, non-trivial, and in some sense special contribution to our mental states and processes”
(39). This is contrasted with the “Larger Mechanism Story,” which claims that “aspects of body
and world can, at times, be proper parts of larger mechanisms whose states and overall operating
profile determine (or minimally, help determine) our mental states and properties” (39). As is
suggested by characterizing the stories in terms of operating profiles, Clark believes that the
body’s epistemic significance should be understood in terms of the functional role it plays in
cognition. Accordingly, Clark endorses the latter story, in which the basic units of analysis are
functional mechanisms, of which the body is just one among many. I will detail and scrutinize
Clark’s position in Ch. 5 since it occupies a peculiar place in regards to social cognition and
epistemology.73
Presently, I am interested in how Clark (2008) mutes the enactivist approach by reducing
it to Noë and O’Regan’s sensorimotor contingency theory. Clark summarizes enactivism as
73

Even though Clark himself doesn’t consider social interaction to be of any special cognitive significance
whatsoever, both Gallagher (2009, 2011, 2013) and Sutton (2010) employ his Extended Mind hypothesis to
argue for the distinctive epistemic import of the social.
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follows: “The central claim is that perception is nothing other than implicit knowledge of socalled ‘sensorimotor contingencies’; that is to say, knowledge of the effects of movement on
sensory stimulation” (41). Enactivism is thus reduced to the claim that perception depends on our
implicit knowledge of the likely effects of our body’s movements. In other words, our sensory
organs continuously factor in the motion of the body of which they happen to be a part and thus
the body contingently plays a role in cognition. Having pinned the enactivist position to a
particular claim about the body’s functional role, Clark opens the door to his larger functionalist
framework: “For now, I simply note that from the fact that (as seems highly likely) our human
experience really does depend in part on many idiosyncratic aspects of our embodiment, it does
not follow that only a creature thus embodied could have those very experiences” (42). If the
body plays a specific functional role, as Clark interprets enactivism, then it is theoretically even
if not yet practically possible to design an artifact that will serve the same function.
Clark’s gloss of enactivism misses the importance of intrinsic teleology. It is not simply
that sensory organs happen to anticipate their body’s movement but, more fundamentally,
perception is tied to a nonrepresentational normative directedness (§3.2). This normative
directedness, as explicated in Bickhard’s interactive model of representation, accounts for
perceptual salience. In short, salience corresponds to what is anticipated, unless the organism
encounters error, which is itself salient and affords a learning opportunity. Clark skirts the issue
of agency and simply presupposes an answer to the problem of salience.
Within the functionalist framework, desire is compartmentalized from cognition. As a
result, Clark’s functionalist analyses take the problem-to-be-solved as the given starting point
and attempt to show how the goal is achieved. This method of analysis is tied to a version of the
well-worn input-receiver picture: “For what embodied experience actually delivers as the
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baseline for learning and metaphorical thought surely depends on some complex mixture of
bodily form, environmental structure and (possibly innate) downstream internal processing” (54).
Cognition is meant to be founded on sensations impinging upon the body. The impressions on
the body correspond to what is perceptually salient, which is then passed “downstream” to neural
processors. The body is thus merely a “gross physical bedrock,” serving a particular instrumental
role for the more important neural processing (56). Clark leaves open the possibility that some of
the neural functions may be learned and thus perhaps some of the filtering occurs in the nervous
system. Overall, this schematic harkens back to the testimony view’s reduction of other people to
being informational filters.
The issue of perceptual salience is raised by the input-receiver picture critique but not
Hurley’s (1998) more familiar input-output sandwich critique. Directly addressing the latter,
Clark writes, “Extended functionalists thus reject the image of mind as a kind of inputoutput sandwich with cognition as the filling…. Instead, we confront an image of cognition quite
literally bleeding into the world” (49). The input-cognizing-output sandwich refers to the more
specific claim that cognition only occurs within the body or skull of an individual. The inputreceiver critique, by contrast, applies to Clark’s extended functionalism, and the testimony and
translation views, assigning a version of the Meno Paradox to each. Simply put, if passive
reception is the primitive foundation of cognition, how could an organism filter out what is
perceptually salient without already knowing what it is they are perceiving. To ape the title of
Clark’s (2008) article, no matter how hard you “press the flesh,” no amount of pressure will tell
the organism what matters, what is salient, what should be passed along to processors
“downstream.”
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The issue with Clark’s gloss of enactivism highlights the problem I raised in the previous
section regarding De Jaegher’s efforts to develop participatory sense-making beyond dyadic
interaction. De Jaegher too closely aligns participatory sense-making with enactivism’s narrow
strand and its privileging of motility over idiosyncratic first-personal experience. Such a link,
Clark’s critique suggests, reduces participatory sense-making to a species of extended
functionalism, an avowedly anti-social cognitive theory. In the following section, I turn to
Steiner and Stewart’s (2009) direct criticism of participatory sense-making. Partly because they
are attempting to improve the concept, Steiner and Stewart’s perspective is even more telling.
Their argument for situating participatory sense-making within structural normativity obscures
participatory sense-making’s most insightful and radical ramifications for large-scale social
contexts.

3.5

Structural Normativity?

Like Clark (2008), Pierre Steiner and John Stewart (2009) believe that enactivism is ill-equipped
when it comes to higher-level cognition. But unlike Clark, the authors argue that enactivism need
only be supplemented in order to address this lacuna, supplemented by recognizing the role of
structural normativity. Toward this end, Steiner and Stewart propose a “strong” definition of
social interaction: “a truly social domain … is always defined by a set of structural norms. … [in
which the structural norms are] impersonal, culturally inherited and to a large extent independent
of the individuals” (527). A social domain is here understood to be more than simply interacting
individuals; it additionally entails heteronomous submission to and inheritance of a normative
order. Steiner and Stewart thus present what they consider the second pole of enactivism, from
which it can address higher-level cognition.
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The proposal is meant to be in part a corrective to De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s concept of
participatory sense-making. The specific issue with participatory sense-making, as they see it, is
the concept “fails to distinguish between the mechanisms and processes which contribute to the
maintenance of social interactions, and the constitution of the domain as properly social in the
first place” (544). The claim is that the coordinating mechanisms identified by participatory
sense-making only help to sustain social interactions as opposed to constituting them. As
evidenced by the strong definition above, constitution of a social interaction presupposes
structural norms.
The appeal to structural norms finds ample traction in much of contemporary philosophy.
The most prominent formulation is by what Chauncey Maher (2012) refers to as the “The
Pittsburgh School,” and its central theme of the “space of reasons” (Sellars 1956). There are two
defining characteristics that link Steiner and Stewart’s account of structural norms to the
Pittsburgh School: (1) both endorse human exceptionalism in which social interaction between
persons entails a qualitative leap from other organisms’ intra-species interactions and (2) human
language is the focal point and source of humans’ distinctive social normativity. The weight
placed on human language in (2) lends the strongest support for (1). The exceptional human
world is analogous to and enabled by acquiring the conventions of a language. Additionally, (2)
is often motivated by a distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, in which human
language is understood to be a precondition for the creation of rules necessary to uniquely human
behavior. Language, according to this line of reasoning, is thus constitutive of uniquely human
behavior. Consider the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules—which underpins
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Steiner and Stewart’s criticism of participatory sense-making above—an optional but prominent
third characteristic of the structural normativity position.74
In concert with (1) and (2), Steiner and Stewart argue that there is a “gulf” between
(human) language and animal communication because the former involves a reflexive element
(541). Stewart (2010, 15) further clarifies the putative gap between language and animal
communication, describing animal communication as “stereotyped reactions” to signals
exhibited by “all normal members of the species.”75 Language, by contrast, is not stereotyped
because of its combinatorial power. Due to its exponentially greater expressive power and
thereby greater potential for error, Stewart argues that the combinatorial mechanisms of language
must be supplemented with a mutual intention to communicate that fosters the repair of
meanings (16).76 The mutual intention to communicate noted by Stewart corresponds to the
strong definition of the social in Steiner and Stewart (2009). Hence, Steiner and Stewart argue
for human exceptionalism based on the unique properties of human language, specifically its
combinatorial power and the expressly social domain generated by the mutual intention to
communicate.
Adopting a label from Turner (2010), I will refer to theories committed to (1) and (2) as
instances of “normativism” in order to contrast it from the concept of normativity that I have
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As discussed in §2.2, the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules also figures prominently in
Searle (1969, 1995). It was first articulated by Rawls (1955). Haugeland (1998) provides a more recent
perspective on the distinction’s significance for the philosophy of mind.
75
Tellingly, Stewart (2010, 17) grants a modicum of linguistic normativity to primates who are capable of
sign-language and leaves it as an open question whether domesticated cats and dogs possess a rudimentary
form as well. In the following, I argue that this places too much weight on the nature of language taken by
itself and has the effect of turning social normativity into a ghostly alter universe that haunts the physical one.
76
It’s worth noting that Stewart (2010, 24) also sketches more of the putative evolutionary progression from
stereotyped communication to language: on this sketch, the earliest written forms of language were lists of
persons and things; as the lists grew, the pictorial symbols were ordered phonetically, which was the precursor
to the combinatorial power of a fully-fledged phonetic language.
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endorsed in §3.2.77 Steiner and Stewart’s account of language mitigates one of the chief
complaints leveled against normativism, namely that its human exceptionalism is antinaturalistic.78 Stewart’s (2010) evolutionary sketch, in particular, suggests how the exceptional
nature of human language could have emerged out of more primitive forms of communication.
Furthermore, the account maintains the linguistically generated and enforced social normativity
that is championed by normativism. In §2.2-2.3, I examined this type of social normativity in
connection with Searle’s (1995) we-intentions.
Despite their differences, Steiner and Stewart’s (2009) heteronomous submission to a
social domain serves the same purpose as Searle’s we-intentions. Both found social interaction
on an all-or-nothing commitment: for Steiner and Stewart, either someone is or isn’t a part of a
given social domain, depending on whether the individual has heteronomously inherited its
normative order; for Searle, either someone has or hasn’t formed a we-intention. Both
formulations describe a special form of objectivity generated by social normativity. In Searle’s
baseball example from §2.3, for instance, social norms make eating a baseball qualitatively
different from the mistake of swinging and missing at a baseball. Steiner and Stewart put the
same point as follows, “Unlike natural laws or biological norms, it is quite possible for an agent
to behave in a way that does not respect a social norm; the sanction is no more, and no less, than
that the behaviour in question will not be recognised as a socially meaningful and appropriate
action” (530). Language enables the creation of a normative order, such as baseball, in which
many actions may be possible but would be sanctioned as wrong, such as eating a baseball. And
the basic sanction is to exclude the individual from the social domain. Conceptualizing this
77

See Turner (2010) for a comprehensive review of the various types of normativism and their general pattern
of argumentation. My present task is comparatively modest: I am only sketching enough of normativism to
gain a better perspective on Steiner and Stewart’s proposal.
78
See Ch. 3 of Turner (2010) for a review of other attempts to naturalize normativism. I am concerned
specifically with Steiner and Stewart’s attempt since they draw upon enactivism.
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special form of objectivity is meant to be one of the principal appeals of normativism, since it
provides a clear basis for moral and political philosophy.
But the cost of endorsing this linguistically generated objective social normativity is dear.
Later in the section, I challenge Steiner and Stewart’s claim that enactivism needs to be
supplemented by normativism. But first, I want to examine the price of endorsing the objective
social normativity. There are three issues common to the different varieties of normativism,
including Steiner and Stewart’s enactivist flavor, all of which have been raised by Turner (1994,
2010).
First and most general, is the puzzle of inheritance. How exactly are normative orders
acquired by individuals? It is important to notice that Steiner and Stewart’s evolutionary sketch
does not address this issue, since it only identifies population level trends. A social theory worth
its salt should be able to account for how actual interactions produce the definitive characteristics
of social normativity in individuals. Or, at the very least, a social theory should not undermine
the possibility of providing such an account. The standard normativist line glosses over this issue
by simply appealing to the evident fact that the vast majority of humans acquire languages. With
particular languages come particular cultures, customs, and so on; the acquisition of normative
structures is analogous to acquiring the syntax of a specific language. The troubling tendency of
this line of reasoning is to avoid teasing out the actual dynamics of inheritance, which as a result
conflates descriptions of behaviors with causal explanations. Turner (1994) diagnoses this
tendency in connection with the more general appeal to “social practices.”
Probing the actual dynamics of language acquisition and social interaction highlights the
second issue. Explanations based on objective normative structures are faced with a two-horned
dilemma: either attribute characteristics to the normative structure that are outrageously complex
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and thus implausible or, taking the other horn, are empirically well-supported but do not require
appealing to a normative structure at all. Normativist theories side-step this issue by claiming
that appeals to structural norms are necessary for giving a coherent account of social
interaction.79 Brandom’s (1998) deontic scorekeeping exemplifies the former horn, implying that
there is effectively one currency within linguistic communities for enforcing its norms. This
scorekeeping system is meant to be obliquely intimated in the hodge-podge of beliefs one has
regarding other people’s credibility and the like.80 By focusing on naturalizing normative
structures, Stewart and Steiner represent an instance of the latter horn, in which normative
structures are an unnecessary fifth wheel. But I will wait to substantiate this claim until I
evaluate their interpretation of enactivism later in the section.
The third and most damning issue with structural norms, however, is that—contrary to
their very purpose—they are anti-social. The impersonal nature of structural norms—from
whence their special sort of objectivity is meant to derive—annihilates the details of interaction
and the idiosyncrasies of individuals. As a result, structural norms dilute the very experience of
social interaction. Steiner and Stewart attempt to characterize the experience of structural norms
by linking it to Merleau-Ponty’s ([1945] 2012) phenomenological description of anonymity.
Structural norms, on this reading, exert their normative force by appearing as an anonymous
other. But anonymity is a relationship that holds between people—a random stranger or the
mailman is anonymous to me—whereas structural norms are objective and “independent” of
individuals. More generally, cultural artifacts—whether rules of etiquette or an artwork—are not
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More specifically, accounts that do not appeal to normative structures are thought to be subject to an infinite
regress. Turner (2010) attributes this claim to a vicious circularity, in which the need for normative regressstoppers is smuggled into pseudo-empirical descriptions of social interaction.
80
In this regard, Brandom’s scorekeeping account shares an affinity with reductionism within the testimony
view, as discussed in §1.2. In the context of distributive justice, Walzer (1983) challenges such reductionism—
which he refers to as one currency views—in arguing for “complex equality.”
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anonymous to me even if the person who made the artifact is. The ascription of subjective
agency to an artifact is analogous to the slippage from behavioral descriptions to causal
attributions noted above in connection with the first issue. By drawing attention to the fleeting
yet non-trivial nature of coordinating factors, participatory sense-making strengthens Turner’s
suspicion that appeals to objective normative structures—structures that exist prior to and
independent of particular circumstances—undercut the uniquely social aspects and experiences
of interaction.
Having examined three general issues with normativism and noted that Steiner and
Stewart’s variety of normativism—despite its naturalistic credentials—fails to address them, it is
worth evaluating their claim that enactivism in general and participatory sense-making in
particular presupposes normativism. Thus far, I have focused on the normativist elements of their
proposal, so I now turn to examining how their variety of normativism relates to enactivism.
The enactivist flavoring of Steiner and Stewart’s proposal has two aspects. First and most
obvious, they endorse participatory sense-making, though limiting it to single isolated
interactions. Second, emergence and circular causation figure prominently in Steiner and
Stewart’s naturalization of higher-level cognitive abilities. Both of these aspects are most evident
in Stewart (2010): the evolutionary sketch suggests how human exceptionalism emerged from
more primitive precursors; regarding circular causation, Stewart also hypothesizes that written
language both caused and was caused by the spatialization of consciousness, with these two
factors ultimately producing fully-fledged reflexive consciousness. I consider this second point
to be a salutary contribution to enactivism, even if it exaggerates the differences between human
and animal communication and does not support Steiner and Stewart’s larger conclusions, such
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as limiting the scope of participatory sense-making. Instead, participatory sense-making’s limited
scope is a result of Steiner and Stewart’s flawed interpretation of enactivism.
The apparent need for structural norms is predicated on an overly narrow understanding
of enactivism. This narrow reading is hinted at in the passage above concerning the purported
differences between social and biological norms. In the passage, Steiner and Stewart claim that
social norms can be violated, whereas biological norms cannot. The basic sanction for violating a
social norm is exclusion from the corresponding domain, but violating a biological norm, on this
reading, is lethal. Steiner and Stewart thus interpret biological norms as reducible if not identical
to autopoiesis. Accordingly, the authors elsewhere conflate enactivism with autopoiesis:
The paradigm of Enaction is rooted in a strong theoretical definition of ‘life’: to wit, the
theory of autopoiesis. This is a key element in rendering plausible the idea
that sensorimotor interactions between a living organism and its environment
can sensibly be considered as ‘cognitive,’ because it places a constraint on
these interactions that renders them meaningful. (527-28)
Conspicuously absent in this sketch of enactivism is any recognition of intrinsic teleology and Di
Paolo’s (2005) concomitant distinction between autopoiesis and adaptivity. Likewise, Thompson
and Stapleton (2009, 24) argue that biological autonomy—in contrast to autopoiesis—is the
foundation of enactivism. Biological autonomy entails adaptivity, which in turn does not merely
constrain interaction but involves a primitive normative directedness.81
As a result of disregarding intrinsic teleology, a spurious division appears between brute
material determination and socially normative behavior. Steiner and Stewart write, “Because of
heteronomy [i.e., submission to a normative order], behaviours are not mere physical movements,
mere reactions to some external stimuli or constraints; they become actions involving
81

Stewart (2010, 3-4) reiterates the conflation of enactivism with autopoiesis: “Now the key point [regarding
the connection between enactivism and cognitive science] is this: what the world ‘is’ for the organism amounts
to neither more nor less than the consequences of its actions for its sensory inputs.” Because Stewart only
notes how perception is linked to consequences of an organism’s actions, enactivism appears reducible to Noë
and O’Regan’s sensorimotor contingency theory.
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responsibilities” (529). The authors thus suggest that humans—in contrast to other animals—do
not merely react to external stimuli or constraints. Here, Steiner and Stewart are at odds with the
entire enactivist project: autopoiesis and biological autonomy entail that organisms do not merely
react to external stimuli but rather ENACT their world. Normative directedness is built into the
very notion of adaptivity rather than depending on the ethereal notion of linguistically
constituted normativity.
Since it is only a primitive directedness, intrinsic teleology cannot by itself account for
the specialized norms exemplified in large-scale knowledge communities. My proposal, however,
is to use primitive normative directedness as a bootstrap for developing participatory sensemaking beyond isolated dyadic interactions. Turner’s (1999) account of social institutions, as
presented in §2.3, serves as a useful guide. To briefly recapitulate, Turner recognizes three
general factors at play in social institutions: (1) consciously shared goals, (2) a high behavioral
frequency of an activity, and (3) first-personal normativizing beliefs. The first factor alludes to
the importance of explicitly written rules and other artifacts, such as a nation’s laws or a team’s
playbook; the third factor refers to one individual’s beliefs about another and her willingness to
impose them. The second factor involves individually habituated patterns of behavior, which are
the definitive dynamic of tacit learning.
Habituation carries the brunt of the explanatory burden for Turner. Social habituation
involves explicit conventions and instruction—thus explaining why certain behaviors are more
frequent in one community as compared to another—but habituation is also inherently
idiosyncratic. This is ensured by the ubiquitous differences in individuals’ bodies, a fact that is
partially concealed by the tacit dimension of learning. That is, individuals learn how to perform
roughly the same action but in very different ways, often without even realizing the differences
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in their performances. Enactivism can incorporate this model of social institutions and thereby
their specialized norms within a more expansive framework.
Given its rejection of the input-receiver picture, enactivism does not lean as heavily on
habituation and, furthermore, reconceptualizes the process of habituation itself. With regard to
the latter, Bickhard’s model of error-guided learning (§3.2) offers one such reconceptualization:
habituation for Bickhard, is in part the product of repeatedly successful anticipations. By thus
indexing habituation to future-oriented cognition, Bickhard’s model helps demystify what habits
and other aspects of an individual’s experiential history are relevant in a given circumstance.
Indeed, enactivism suggests that an individual’s experiential history is significant in more ways
than just the brute weighting of neural networks. The forward-looking orientation of enactivism
thus alleviates the explanatory burden of habituation while maintaining its significance.
Enactivism similarly incorporates the role of normativizing beliefs. Coordinating factors
entail that individuals influence each other in more ways than just imposing beliefs on one
another. Drawing attention to the inchoate, messier dynamics of social interaction pulls further
away from normativism’s human exceptionalism, since the formation of a belief (e.g., a
normativizing belief) can be understood to presuppose linguistic normativity (and all that this
entails on the normativism view) whereas coordinating factors most decidedly do not.
Participatory sense-making thus corroborates the tenor of Turner’s approach even if not
its details. As suggested by the incorporation of habituation and normativizing beliefs above,
enactivism does not so much undermine Turner’s account as reframe it within a larger suite of
coordinating factors. The enactivist framework does, however, depart from the translation view
in regards to the individualist-collectivist dichotomy. Whereas for Turner and the translation
view, the defining characteristic of social interaction is the opaque boundaries between
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individuals, the ubiquity and cognitive significance of coordination undermines the notion of
there being well-defined boundaries between individuals. In Ch. 5, I focus on the issue of egoism
and its manifestation in cognitive science in terms of the manipulationist presupposition. But I
want to approach this issue after having discussed enactivism’s implications for social theory.
Having a more careful explication of community-level epistemic dynamics will help overcome
the egoist presuppositions found within cognitive science and social epistemology.
My approach to social theory unsurprisingly cuts against Steiner and Stewart’s use of
sociology. They appeal to the “hard-won achievement of social science” in support of claiming
that autopoiesis and structural norms are the two poles of enactivism (534). Specifically, they
endorse Giddens’ (1976, 121-23) “duality of structure,” which posits human agency as both
constituting and constituted by social structures such as language. In this regard, participatory
sense-making merely serves to elucidate the micro-dynamics that occur within the constraints of
objective normative structures. But, as suggested by my appropriation of Turner (1999), I think
that participatory sense-making has more radical implications for social theory.
Participatory sense-making undermines the plausibility of there being a qualitative gap
between linguistic normativity and material determination, a gap that gives an ethereal character
to normativism’s depiction of social interaction. Coordination occurs at multiple timescales and
via a variety of mechanisms, such as linguistic signification. While there may be some heuristic
value to speak of social structures as objective entities set over against individuals, and there may
even be some heuristic value in talking as if the structures possessed agential powers, actually
positing their existence would presuppose a stability that simply does not exist and, even more
importantly, would obscure the individual idiosyncrasies at play. In contrast to normativism, I
believe all forms of normativity emerge from and are only differences of degree from the
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primitive sense of normativity as nonrepresentational directedness. As a result, my position
shares a much closer affinity with Turner, since both prefer a firmly naturalized, non-saltationist,
non-exceptionalist account of social interaction.82
While participatory sense-making’s implications for social theory are dramatic, they are
not unprecedented. Many of enactivism’s insights have been prefigured by an offshoot of
sociology—neo-Kuhnian social epistemology. The present chapter has thus shown some of the
far-reaching ramifications of rejecting the input-receiver picture in cognitive science. The one I
have given the most attention to is overcoming the individualist-collectivist dichotomy in social
theory, a task that I have initiated by sketching how the concept of participatory sense-making
can be used in larger contexts than isolated dyadic interaction. Ch. 4 builds on this sketch of
participatory sense-making by showing its explanatory value to neo-Kuhnian social
epistemology.
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This is analogous in spirit to Hans Jonas’s (1966) criticism of existentialism’s exclusive focus on humanity,
previously noted in §3.1. Importantly, Jonas sought to gain perspective on humans by noting the role of
broader biological factors.
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Chapter 4: Coordination in Epistemic Communities

4.0

Introduction

Some of the most important and dramatic implications of enactivism cannot be realized without
linking its account of the cognitive subject to social epistemology. Cognitive science and social
epistemology mutually constrain each other, with social epistemology offering longer-term and
larger-scale perspectives on the cognitive subject. The task of this chapter is to use social
epistemology’s population-level perspective—its identification of emergent community-level
cognitive processes—to further undermine the belief that the brain is the executive of all
cognitive activity.
One obstacle to realizing this task, however, is that social epistemology to date has not
adequately accounted for the embodied nature of cognition. In §4.1, I revisit Bickhard’s
interactive model of representation in order to clarify the relationship between embodied
cognitive science and social epistemology. Enactivism’s embodied cognitive subject, I argue,
dovetails with the social epistemology inspired by Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science.
K. Brad Wray (2011) carefully explicates in what sense the epistemology of Kuhn’s
philosophy of science is social. Importantly, Wray argues that Kuhn’s epistemology is also
“evolutionary,” possessing deeper connections to biology than Kuhn himself acknowledges.
Wray’s explication, which I detail in §4.2, is helpful for establishing the potential of and also
lacunae within Kuhn’s work that neo-Kuhnian social epistemology has subsequently built upon.
This sets up my analysis of two major works in neo-Kuhnian social epistemology: Fred
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D’Agostino’s (2010) Naturalizing Epistemology (§4.3) and William Rehg’s (2009) Cogent
Science in Context (§4.5).
The central theme of D’Agostino (2010) is how communities of enquiry balance both
conservative and innovative impulses, which Kuhn (1977) refers to as the “essential tension.”
Like Kuhn, D’Agostino is primarily interested in how institutional mechanisms facilitate
balancing these competing needs. But D’Agostino broadens his account beyond scientific
communities and the question of theory-choice, focusing on the more general question of
epistemic divisions of labor. My analysis of D’Agostino in §4.3 has two ends: first, identify
dynamics endogenous to epistemic divisions of labor that enable individuals to engage in novel
cognitive activities and, second, explain how D’Agostino’s account complements and
strengthens the enactivist cognitive subject.
In §4.4, I consider two varieties of disembodied social epistemology. Importantly,
Fuller’s (2002, 2011, 2012) social epistemology is a direct inspiration for D’Agostino’s account.
My critique of Fuller thus serves two ends: it shows that an embodied epistemology provides a
more nuanced perspective on D’Agostino’s mapping of epistemic communities and, second, it
provides the resources for further revising Kusch’s communitarian epistemology (§1.7, §2.5).
From this vantage point, the issue with Kusch’s communitarian epistemology is its linguisticallycentered normativity. This shift away from disembodied normativity is extended via Rehg’s
concept of cogency.
In the final section of the chapter, I consider Rehg’s (2009) argumentation theory, which
details “microsocial” dynamics within communities of enquiry. This helps to clarify the
relationship between the institutional mechanisms described by D’Agostino and participatory
sense-making’s treatment of two-person interaction. The key concept of Rehg’s theory is
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cogency, which entails that argumentation is a context-specific process that involves an
indefinite range of possible factors. Examining the immanent nature of argumentation gives a
more fine-grained perspective on how epistemic agents are simultaneously empowered and
constrained by their communities.

4.1

Relating Embodiment and Social Epistemology: Two Ways of Regulating Error

In §3.2, I used Bickhard’s interactive model of representation to resolve an apparent tension
between enactivism’s endorsement of both intrinsic teleology and adaptivity and my previous
criticisms of Searle’s normativity and Goldman’s adaptationism. Bickhard’s model, in its barest
form, consists of nonrepresentational goal-directedness that is refined via the dual functions of
environmental differentiation and implicit definition. I return to Bickhard’s model in this section
in order to identify two types of learning, whose reciprocal development bears on the link
between cognitive science and social epistemology.
As noted in §3.2, Bickhard (1996) regards learning as an ability to cope with error
feedback. Bickhard (2002, 1) develops this view by identifying two basic ways of regulating
error: (1) the regulation of the interactive processes between a rational system and its
environment and (2) the construction of new interactive “(sub)systems” that act as a “kind of
metaregulation.” That is to say, upon encountering error, the two non-exclusive options for an
organism is to (1) modify how it interacts with its environment or (2)—to use mentalistic
vocabulary weighted toward persons—refine its understanding of the environment. The first and
most basic type of error regulation—which most organisms are limited to—corresponds to the
first level of Bickhard’s “levels of knowing” model (Bickhard 2002, 8). Animals83 such as

83

In the following, I prefer the term “organism” or “animal” to “rational system.” While I endorse Bickhard’s
(2002) conception of rationality—which complements the previously discussed accounts of learning and
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humans can abstract from (1) and thereby represent aspects of the environment in terms of
interactive possibilities. Importantly, this new level—which is the first instance of (2)—is itself
open to abstraction. Abstracting from (2) would in turn create a new higher level of knowing that
is also open to abstraction and so on, with no determinate upper bound on the levels of
abstraction.
For the present discussion, I am specifically concerned with the process of abstracting
from a lower to a higher level of knowing and its implications for the general relationship
between (1) and (2). As opposed to a passive mirroring or encoding relation, abstraction entails
an “unfolding” of values implicit in lower levels (Bickhard 2002, 13). Importantly, such
unfolding can generate errors between levels, such as a conflict between a newly articulated
value and a previously held one. Given such a circumstance, there are various ways of resolving
the conflict: for example, one of the values may be modified or discarded or the domain of one
or both may be restricted (Bickhard 2002, 15). The key is that lower and higher levels of
knowledge mutually constrain each other: it is not predetermined whether a value from a lower
or higher level will take priority or, taking up the other general alternative, whether it is possible
to reconcile the values. Furthermore, abstraction—insofar as it corresponds to the internal
development designated by (2)—is not an internalization of but rather runs in parallel to external
processes (Bickhard 2002, 13).84 Understanding the parallel development of (1) and (2) holds the
key, I argue, to understanding the related though distinct insights of cognitive science and social
epistemology.

perceptual salience—I do not have the space to rehearse his argument and so refrain from using “rational
system” in order to avoid any misleading associations.
84
It’s worth noting that the role of abstraction thus addresses the criticism leveled by Dreyfus (1972, 236) and
Searle (1983, 150) against Polanyi, which claimed Polanyi’s framework required an internalization of rules.
The criticism occludes some of the empirical dimensions of tacit knowledge that were argued for by Polanyi
and also Turner.
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The parallel development of (1) and (2) is reciprocally enabling. The abstractions of (2)
facilitate the creation of more specialized environmental niches that in turn dramatically reshape
(1). A notable example of an epistemic niche is an institutionalized community of enquiry—
which, as extensively detailed by social epistemology, facilitates novel forms of cognitive
activity and levels of abstraction. This latter implication thus designates a way in which (1)
reshapes (2). That is, the construction of epistemic niches, such as research institutions, play an
integral role in new levels of abstraction that fall under the direct purview of cognitive science.
The development of (1) and (2) thus run in parallel in the sense that there is no isomorphic
correspondence between them—that is, (2) doesn’t internalize (1)—even though the two
mutually influence and enable developments within each other.85 De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s
concept of participatory sense-making occupies a special place with regard to this parallel
development, since participatory sense-making relates directly to both (1) and (2).
Participatory sense-making is Janus-faced. As an extension of enactivism, participatory
sense-making is concerned with the cognitive subject as such; while as a model of face-to-face
interaction, participatory sense-making is concerned with a vital type of epistemic niche. It
should be noted, however, that one of enactivism’s most important insights is that the cognitive
subject cannot be modeled in a vacuum. Hence, participatory sense-making’s concern with twoperson interaction is not simply an add-on to a core enactive subject but rather the articulation of
a particular interactive mode. Separated from all modes of interaction, the cognitive subject is a
meaningless abstraction. The present chapter is concerned with how participatory sensemaking’s insights on two-person interaction shade into the larger-scale domain of social
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The reciprocal relationship I have in mind is a reflective equilibrium, as articulated by John Rawls (1999)
who was inspired by Goodman (1983). I develop this connection in Ch. 5.
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epistemology. To help situate this proposal, I offer the following outline of Chs. 3 – 6 in
connection with the reciprocal relationship between (1) and (2) above.
The following outline of Chs. 3 – 6 complements the one presented at the end of Ch. 2.
There I noted the main tasks of Chs. 3, 4, and 5; to wit, to undermine the input-receiver picture
of cognition, to identify community-level cognitive processes, and, finally, to undermine the
egoist presupposition within cognitive science and social epistemology. From the present
viewpoint, Ch. 3—via the concept of participatory sense-making—counteracts the tendency to
inflate the importance of abstract representations by offering a balanced characterization of how
refinements in an organism’s interactions with its environment [i.e., (1)] relate to refinements in
the representations of its environment [i.e., (2)]. The present chapter articulates participatory
sense-making’s implications in terms of larger-scale epistemic niches, thus building upon
enactivism’s basic characterization of (1). Ch. 5 focuses on the nature of (2), using the present
chapter’s more comprehensive account of social niches to challenge egoist reductions of the
cognitive subject. Finally, Ch. 6 concludes that given the reciprocal nature of (1) and (2), there is
no fixed cognitive core that underpins individual subjects.

4.2

Kuhn as a Bridge to Contemporary Social Epistemology

Thomas Kuhn is the most influential intellectual figure behind social epistemology.86 Wray
(2011)—as the title Kuhn’s Evolutionary Social Epistemology suggests—explicates Kuhn’s
philosophy of science with an eye towards the contemporary field of social epistemology. In the
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The label “social epistemology” gained currency in the late 1980s with Steve Fuller’s founding of the
eponymously named journal. As evidenced by my interest in Kuhn’s influence on the field, my understanding
of social epistemology has undertones of Fuller (2002). Yet I find Fuller’s (2012) mapping of the field
unhelpful—he pits his own politically oriented approach against “analytic social epistemology”—because
Fuller disregards the embodied nature of cognition. In fact, Fuller (2011) proposes the chimerical goal of
disembodied minds. I return to this issue in §4.4.
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present section, I draw upon Wray’s explication in order to give more context to two neoKuhnian works that I examine in §4.3 and §4.5. On the one hand, Kuhn sets the explanatory
targets for much of social epistemology while, on the other, suffering from some major lacunae
that have been forcefully highlighted by the contemporary field.
To understand Kuhn’s uneven contribution, it is helpful to start with his formative
interest in the psychology of discovery. In particular, Bruner and Postman (1949) influenced
Kuhn greatly. In Bruner and Postman’s study, subjects were asked to successively identify five
playing cards, some of which were painted in the opposite color (e.g., a black three of hearts)
(209). It took on average four times longer for test subjects to identify such “trick” cards (210).
The key lesson that Kuhn drew from the study is that “perceptual organization is powerfully
determined by expectations built upon past commerce with the environment” (Wray 2011, 51;
Bruner and Postman 1949, 222). This psychological finding bears on the process of discovery in
science, offering one explanation for why discoveries can be protracted affairs.
Speaking to the pressing issues of science, Kuhn’s epistemology is intimately concerned
with the continual growth of knowledge and the obstacles to said growth. As discussed in §2.1,
Polanyi (1958) also approaches the issue of scientific discovery using psychology, a connection
that is much more substantial in Polanyi than in Kuhn. Despite his interest in the Bruner and
Postman study and Gestalt psychology more generally, Kuhnian epistemology is ultimately far
more indebted to the philosophy of language than to psychological accounts of perception or any
other details of embodiment. This priority is evident in how Kuhn modified his understanding of
scientific revolutions.
In the wake of criticism of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn eventually
stopped characterizing scientific revolutions as paradigm changes, which—akin to the Bruner
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and Postman study—he had described as gestalt shifts in perception (Kuhn 1962, 85; Wray 2011,
15). In place of gestalt shifts, scientific revolutions came to be understood as lexical or
taxonomic changes within a particular discipline. This shift dovetailed with Kuhn’s emphasis on
theory choice and the overarching role of the philosophy of language. Like Rehg (2009, 44) and
in concert with my previous criticisms of linguistically based conceptions of normativity, I find
Kuhn’s dependence on the philosophy of language of dubious value.
But the development within Kuhn’s thought did have the beneficial effect of bringing
more attention to the complexities of “normal” science. Wray (2011, 137) goes so far as to claim
that Kuhn offers revolutionary and evolutionary perspectives on science, a decidedly more
nuanced picture than The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ stark dichotomy between normal
science as mere articulation of a paradigm and revolutions as irreversible conversions to new
paradigms (Kuhn 1962, 111). Wray’s characterization refers to Kuhn’s use of the term
“evolution.” Kuhn (1992, 115), for instance, uses “evolution” as a metaphor for the proliferation
of scientific disciplines.
Wray argues that despite Kuhn’s limited metaphorical intentions, the specialization of
science reflects an important feature of scientific theories’ ontological status. The proliferation of
specialties suggests that science is not converging on one universal ontology.87 Science is
“pushed from behind”—constrained by its previous theories and their attendant vocabularies and
taxonomies—rather than converging on a single picture of the natural universe (Wray 2011, 203).
In short, Wray judges Kuhn’s epistemology to be evolutionary since Kuhn depicts science as a
historical process that lacks a fixed telos.
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For a complementary perspective, see Nancy Cartwright’s (1999) The Dappled World. Rather than
considering the sociological dimension of scientific practice, Cartwright argues against universalism in science
based on the nature of scientific laws, which she claims are only domain-specific regularities.
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Kuhn (1992) views himself as avoiding the excesses of both realism and relativism. Even
though science is not converging on a unified account of a theory-independent reality, Kuhn is an
internalist with regard to theory change (Wray 2011, 160). In this context, internalism entails the
claim that scientific disputes are settled on the basis of evidence rather than factors putatively
“external” to science, such as political concerns or other such interests. Political concerns and the
like are of no epistemic significance, according to Kuhn. The internalist position is directed
especially against the so-called strong program in the sociology of knowledge, which Kuhn
invested a great deal of effort in criticizing, such as in his 1992 essay.88
As evidenced by his critique of the strong program, Kuhn construes the social dimension
of epistemology narrowly. The essential feature of science’s social dimension is, on Kuhn’s view,
how individuals weigh objective criteria differently (Wray 2011, 161). Given the domain-general
values of accuracy, simplicity, consistency, scope, and fruitfulness, for example, individual
scientists will prioritize each differently, differences that impact the evaluation of competing
theories. This subjective dynamic is understood to cause risk spreading within scientific
communities and also offers another explanation for why scientific disputes can be protracted.
Yet, insofar as it’s epistemically significant, the subjective weighting of criteria acts only to
spread risk within a community by ensuring that scientists will work on competing theories
(Kuhn 1977, 332). The subjective factors ultimately do not play a role in theory choice: after
some period of time, the community’s efforts either produce a clear winner (one that everyone
endorses) or the community branches into different specialties.
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Kuhn took particular issue with the strong program’s “symmetry principle”—in which the same types of
explanations should be employed for successful and unsuccessful knowledge claims. Kuhn believes that the
principle obscures the distinctive role that nature plays in scientists’ formation of beliefs. See Bloor ([1976]
1991) for the first and most famous defense of the symmetry principle; for a general overview of the strong
program, see Barnes, Bloor, and Henry (1996).
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Philip Kitcher challenges Kuhn’s exclusion of political concerns and interests for very
different reasons than those of the strong program. Taking up the theme of risk spreading,
Kitcher (1990) argues that a broad range of interests are in play. In a scenario reminiscent of
James Watson and Francis Crick’s discovery of DNA’s structure, Kitcher imagines a community
of scientists pursuing the structure of a very important molecule (“VIM”). In a situation where
the discovery would earn a coveted prize (e.g., a Nobel Prize), Kitcher argues that a community
composed of ruthless egoists would achieve a better spread of effort and risk than if all of the
scientists were pursuing high-minded ideals (e.g., acquiring truths) (16).89 Additional and less
sordid interests—such as national or personal loyalties, personal investment, and so on—also
ensure a diverse distribution of effort. It is important to note that Kitcher’s incorporation of these
diverse interests rests on the same justification as Kuhn’s own understanding of the social
dimension of science: for both, these social factors are instrumentally valuable for furthering
research.90 Kitcher thus shows that one of Kuhn’s most important themes—the distribution of
risk within a community—involves a diverse range of interests that promote rather than detract
from scientific enquiry and thereby should not be counted as external to science. In other words,
Kitcher makes the compelling (and, in retrospect, somewhat obvious) point that the credit
mechanisms of science are not incidental to its progress and growth, indeed they are more than
incidental to its very subject matter.
The role of what Kuhn considered external factors does not undermine Kuhn’s
evolutionary picture of science. With regard to the latter, Kitcher (2001) introduces the concept
of “significance graphs” to model the trajectory of scientific research. As with Kuhn’s picture,
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D’Agostino’s (2010, 53-54) discussion of communication inhibitors, such as first-mover bias and social
comparison pressures, bolster’s Kitcher’s point by suggesting that there are common factors that can
overwhelm any differential weighting of objective criteria.
90
In Ch. 5, I challenge this type of manipulationist reduction of epistemic interaction.
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Kitcher recognizes a profound and ineliminable historical dimension to scientific research:
“Because some instruments, techniques, sites, or model organisms become embedded in the
significance graphs of different fields, so that researchers know how to use them, the evolution
often shows a kind of inertia” (81). The breakthroughs of a field act simultaneously as
constraints, with their associated terms and techniques possessing an inertia that can inhibit
further discoveries. Although Kuhn’s picture is not undermined, it is significantly broadened
with the incorporation of political concerns.
The contingent trajectory of research, as described by significance graphs, highlights the
need for what Kitcher calls “well-ordered science” (117). That is, without actively scrutinizing
and revising its direction, science will not serve the collective good of human society, falling far
short of what it could contribute. Kitcher (2011) further develops the concept of well-ordered
science and includes a more extensive critique of the notion of value-neutral science. Once it is
granted that science should help human society with particular types of problems—such as
battling disease and improving access to life necessities—any use of resources within science
reflects a value judgment. This is not to say, as Kitcher notes, that science should not pursue
purely theoretical problems, since such problems satisfy human curiosity—which in itself carries
value—and also has the potential of indirectly addressing practical problems (109).
Although I find the Kitcher’s concept of well-ordered science problematic—especially its
use of an “ideal conversation” as a normative standard (106)—well-ordered science serves well
as an immanent critique of Kuhn’s internalism. Kitcher shows that Kuhn is wrong to judge
political and other social interests as of no epistemic value, a broadening of Kuhnian
epistemology that has been even further developed by other theorists. In the next section, I
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examine one such theorist, Fred D’Agostino, who considers the division of labor within research
communities in contrast to Kuhn and Kitcher’s focus on risk distribution.

4.3

D’Agostino’s Federal Model of Enquiry

The best starting point for D’Agostino’s treatment of epistemic divisions of labor is his broader
understanding of social epistemology’s domain. D’Agostino organizes his account around the
concept of an “assembly bonus,” a concept adopted from social psychology and management
science. The concept of an assembly bonus refers simply to a benefit wrought from pooling the
cognitive efforts of different individuals without specifying any particular type of task or activity
(Collins and Guetzkow 1964). Accordingly, the subject of Naturalizing Epistemology is not just
scientific disciplines as such but communities of enquiry in general.
One reason for drawing upon fields such as management science is a lack of substantive
analyses of epistemic divisions of labor within social epistemology, despite it being a familiar
theme. Kitcher (1990), for example, takes up the theme in “The Division of Cognitive Labor,”
but only addresses its “subjective” dimension (D’Agostino 2010, 113). That is, Kitcher addresses
how individual attitudes to a problem differ but does not consider the actual process of breaking
down a problem into smaller tasks within a collaborative group. The subjective dimension of the
division of labor consists of interpersonal communication issues, such as the previously
mentioned obstacles of first-mover bias and social comparison pressures (§4.2). And Kitcher’s
egoistic pursuit of prizes represents one means of overcoming such obstacles.91
Shallow consensus straddles the subjective and objective aspects of epistemic divisions
of labor. As mentioned previously (§1.6, §1.7, §2.5), shallow consensus describes a
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D’Agostino notes other “disinhibitors” that help to overcome communication issues, including “multiple
accountabilities,” “novelty premiums,” “asset ownership,” and “intrinsic motivation” (64).
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communicative pattern in which agreements provisionally conceal underlying disagreements.92
In this respect, shallow consensus relates to the subjective dimension of divisions of labor,
enriching the picture of risk spreading discussed by Kuhn and Kitcher. While useful for
communicative purposes, shallow consensus is an artifact of working in complex, multifaceted
problem spaces, which corresponds to the division of labor’s objective dimension. Shallow
consensus is thus a useful point of entry for examining how enquiries fare in such problem
spaces.93
D’Agostino (2010) considers how four different types of enquiry fare in complex
problem spaces: exhaustive, myopic, parallel, and modular enquiry (127). Exhaustive enquiry
guarantees finding a global optimal solution but is inefficient given its time and resource
demands; myopic enquiry is efficient but is not effective for finding an optimal solution. Parallel
enquiry can be both efficient and effective but presupposes that a problem space is decomposable
into independent tasks. Any residual interdependencies between tasks render a parallel enquiry
inconclusive, potentially pitting individuals at cross purposes.
The final type of enquiry is a response to the fact that problem spaces often cannot be
decomposed without residual interdependencies, especially not without presupposing the very
knowledge of the domain that is sought after. Modularity is a design that creates a “high degree
of independence or ‘loose coupling’ between component designs by standardizing component
interface specifications” (128). Modularity thus reflects the fact that standards must be
constructed for how decomposed components should relate to each other.
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One of shallow consensus’s many insights is to help bridge the Kuhnian notions of normal science and
scientific revolutions. Shallow consensus suggests that disagreements exist but are minimized in relatively
“normal” periods, while during crises people actively seek and draw attention to them. Importantly, there is a
range of intermediate situations between these two extremes.
93
To be clear, shallow consensus and the need for a division of labor result from the complexity of problem
spaces and humans’ bounded rationality (20). I discuss bounded rationality below.
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To illustrate modularization and how it differs from parallel enquiry, D’Agostino draws
on the example of designing sub-systems of a computer from Baldwin and Clark (2000). While it
is most efficient to separate the tasks of designing a computer’s hard drive system and its
motherboard—the first step of modularization being the division of such tasks—there are still
residual interdependencies between the designs. Baldwin and Clark (2000, 49) note that in their
case study there were as many possibilities of conflicting designs as there were compatible ones.
Modularization is an effort to minimize the possibility of such conflict. The second step—which
is the decisive difference between parallel and modular enquiry—consists in building an
“interface” between the tasks. The interface assigns parameters for each task in order to ensure
consistency, acting as a “design rule” for the separate teams (D’Agostino 2010, 128).
The assurance of consistency comes at a cost: designers lose the ability to explore some
possible solutions. This is the basic sense in which fixing parameters imposes a path dependency
on the eventual solution. Only an exhaustive enquiry can guarantee that there is not a more
effective global solution, but using an exhaustive enquiry to validate a modular one would
undercut the latter’s efficiency. Modularity thus mitigates though does not eliminate the tradeoffs between efficiency, effectiveness, and conclusiveness found in exhaustive, myopic, and
parallel enquiry, respectively. Modularization is not by itself a methodological blueprint for
enquiry but depends on broader dynamics within epistemic communities.
Given the limitations of modularity, D’Agostino notes the need for “both division and
diversity to pursue enquiry in complex situations” (134; original emphasis). That is, it is
necessary to have different teams create different design rules and then compete, producing
knowledge that is less myopic than a single modularization but still much more efficient than an
exhaustive enquiry. Having competing teams thereby mitigates but does not eliminate the
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myopia that results from modularity’s path dependency. D’Agostino writes, “we are stuck with
history…‘the explanation of why something [such as a problem-solution] exists rests on how it
became what it is’” (135). Solutions to complex problems must be understood in terms of
historical paths. The arbitrariness that results from path dependency is independent of the
arbitrariness produced by the sordid motives of individual researchers (136). It is important to
note that the objective path dependency of enquiry reframes the importance of political interests
and the like, since such interests do not veil what would otherwise be value-neutral enquiry.
Furthermore, D’Agostino’s account of path dependency augments Kuhn’s “evolutionary”
epistemology. The basic insight shared by both is that enquiry should be understood in terms of
where it has come from rather than as approaching a determinate endpoint. The concept of
modularity shows that this is not merely an artifact of the rhetorical demands of winning
arguments but intrinsic to the very posing of problems/tasks. With modularity, it is also less
tempting to conflate successful solutions/theories with being the most “fit.” Although I fully
embrace a biological approach to epistemology—as indicated by my endorsement of
enactivism—appealing to evolution in the context of social epistemology, as in the case of Kuhn
and Wray, is fraught with danger. Even though biological evolution does not entail equating
evolution with optimal fitness, the adaptationist intuition is difficult to shake. Modularity clearly
illustrates how a superior path may be reasonably set aside because it appeared inferior at an
early stage of enquiry.
Building upon the generic notion of an epistemic division of labor, D’Agostino proposes
a “federalist model” of enquiry (133). The basic purpose of the model is to conceptualize how
intra-research team dynamics relate to the community-level competition of different teams. The
federal model demarcates a community of enquiry along a horizontal and a vertical axis
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consisting of “jurisdictions” and “levels,” respectively (147). A jurisdiction consists of a
deliberative body that partitions a research domain. Some jurisdictions run in parallel to each
other, some overlap, while some subsume others. Levels correspond to hierarchies between
various jurisdictions, the highest level possessing only one deliberative body. At lower levels, the
deliberative bodies are research teams that work roughly in parallel and compete with each other.
Higher levels act as “adjudicators” for lower ones, with the highest level being the final
adjudicator. An adjudicator, whether at the highest level or only a relatively higher one, has a
privileged perspective on the competition between two teams (149). The adjudicator will have
access to more information than either team had when each began, will be less attached to either
solution than the respective teams, and can judge each solution in terms of its path as a whole.
The federal model, with its horizontal and vertical axes of enquiry, to some extent idealizes the
structure of actual epistemic communities.94 In a particular community of enquiry, the roles of
team member and adjudicator are often mixed up, with individuals serving multiple functions
and working on multiple teams.95
The federal model of enquiry thus accomplishes the main task of the chapter—namely, to
identify cognitive processes that are endogenous to particular epistemic communities. Within a
research team, individual cognitive tasks are structured by modular interfaces in order to ensure
coordination with other individual efforts. That is to say, individual efforts are not isolated
activities that are aggregated to form a group product. The significance of modularization is
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Kitcher and Wray both allude to the federal model’s two axes. Wray (2011, 175) states that there is “a sense
in which research teams can be said to ‘believe something’ or ‘hold a view,’” which indicates a fundamental
difference between team collaboration and the larger community within which it occurs. Of more direct
relevance, Kitcher (1990, 17) notes that his model of a purely self-interested community of individuals only
excels if it is divided up into “fiefdoms.” Yet neither Wray nor Kitcher explore the general dynamics between
these two axes.
95
As I detail in §4.5, Rehg’s (2009) Fermilab case study substantiates and also complicates D’Agostino’s
model of parallel and hierarchical axes of enquiry.

176

evident from the need for competition between different groups, a result of the myopia induced
by modularization’s path dependency. Furthermore, the crucial role of adjudication can only
occur within such a community. In sum, the efforts of individuals can be properly understood
only in relation to how they complement and compete with others’ efforts.96 Furthermore, the
risk spreading emphasized by Kuhn and Kitcher suggests that, in such communities, individuals
themselves understand their efforts in relation to others.
The emergent patterns identified by the federal model of enquiry are, I argue, general
types of coordination. On my reading, the federal model identifies patterns of joint sense-making
and thereby extends the insights of participatory sense-making to larger social contexts. Yet even
though his account complements enactivism and its concept of participatory sense-making,
D’Agostino himself falls short of endorsing an embodied epistemology. This is in part because
D’Agostino brackets the issue of the fundamental nature of knowledge in order to focus on
describing epistemic communities. The upshot of this argumentative strategy is that
D’Agostino’s account stands on its descriptive merits, which makes the account relevant for a
wide range of theorists. The downside, on the other hand, is that the account is open to reinterpretations that cut against the spirit of D’Agostino’s model.
Ladyman (2012, 605), for example, faults D’Agostino (2010) for not addressing the
question of what knowledge and justification are. Such questions must be addressed, Ladyman
thinks, in order to naturalize epistemology, which the title of D’Agostino’s book promises to do.
Ladyman thus proposes that a more appropriate title would have been “socializing knowledge”
(605). Accordingly, Ladyman suggests an individualistic reconstruction, asking whether it is
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One implication of path dependency is the need for narrative explanations of epistemic communities. This is
notable since attempts to show that interactive dynamics are quantifiable at times appear to insinuate that
controlled measures and experiments are the ideal form of social analysis. See, for instance, De Jaegher, Di
Paolo, and Gallagher (2010).
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better to think of Kuhn and D’Agostino’s essential tension as existing at the individual level.
D’Agostino’s description of community dynamics would thus explain how a larger social group
balances out each individual’s unique blend of conservative and innovative impulses (606).
Ladyman’s proposal echoes the approach to social epistemology exemplified by the testimony
view, in which social aspects are strictly derivative upon individual cognitive mechanisms.
While Ladyman does not himself pursue the following line of reasoning in his brief
review, his proposal can cite D’Agostino’s own distinction between the objective and subjective
dimensions of the division of labor. As noted above, D’Agostino distinguishes between the
objective and subjective dimensions of epistemic divisions of labor in order to differentiate
between, on the one hand, the decomposition of a problem and, on the other, Kitcher’s focus on
differing individual attitudes toward problems. For theorists like Ladyman, the objective
dimension is more fundamental than the subjective one. It is clear from D’Agostino’s own
account how the objective dimension shapes and supports the subjective one. For example, he
writes: “the very existence of the objective impediments may serve to ‘tune’ our communities of
enquiry to work effectively in overcoming the subjective impediments” (143). It is, in this
manner, important that the environment is a complex problem space because this complexity is
what elicits and fosters a division of labor and a diversity of approaches.
Yet the reciprocity of the relationship—how the subjective dimension shapes and
supports the objective one—is not as apparent. D’Agostino details the significance of having an
appropriate culture of enquiry, such as a culture that includes shallow consensus. But such
considerations are easily re-situated within Ladyman’s individualistic epistemology as mere
exigencies and, as such, they would be incidental to the nature of objective knowledge. Such a
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reading could even grant that human understanding of objective reality is always tied to and
constrained by the historical trajectories of our epistemic communities.
On this Ladyman-inspired reading, enquirers compete with each other to better
approximate aspects of the objective world, despite being stuck with inherent arbitrariness. This
interpretation is consistent with Kuhn’s evolutionary epistemology so long as it is not claimed
that all of science’s disciplines are approximating the objective world in a unified manner. Hence,
the interpretation reads Kuhn’s evolutionary epistemology as essentially a contemporary version
of the Tower of Babel story. In this context, D’Agostino’s mapping of epistemic communities
would be a manual for individuals to better navigate the aspects of the objective world that they
are specifically concerned with.97
In sum, while D’Agostino shows how social epistemology informs cognitive science—
counteracting the latter’s tendency to treat interactive environments as merely input for cognitive
processing—it is also important to recognize how cognitive science informs social epistemology.
With regard to the present discussion, embodied cognitive science is useful for showing how the
subjective dimension also shapes and constrains the objective one, which thereby counteracts
realist re-interpretations of D’Agostino, such as Ladyman’s individualistic reconstruction.
The frog example from §3.2, for instance, indicates what is wrong with a realist
interpretation. The lesson of the example is that a frog perceives tongue-flicking opportunities
(e.g., a flick-at-one-point, a flick-between-two-points, and so on)—as opposed to first identifying
an object (e.g., a fly or worm), then determining whether it is edible and, if so, what tongue flick
the object demands, and, finally, acting on a desire to eat by actually flicking its tongue. Instead,
97

The plausibility of this interpretation stems in part from D’Agostino’s (2010) overall task of charting factors
that aid and hinder assembly bonuses. While D’Agostino’s practical aims are not themselves problematic and,
indeed, are of obvious value, I argue in Ch. 5 that a manipulationist interpretation (e.g., the idea that epistemic
agency is only a means for acquiring objective knowledge) is problematic. D’Agostino himself does not
address this question.
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objectivity is a function of how an organism partitions its world into interactive possibilities: that
is, how it anticipates, acts, and then differentially responds to the feedback from its actions.
Only if there were a dramatic change in a frog’s environment—such as people flicking
BBs in the frog’s visual field—would a frog need to refine its discrimination of tongue-flicking
opportunities. But even given such a refinement, perception would still consist of differential
contact rather than the reception and subsequent processing of external content.98 Because it is a
function of an organism’s interaction with its particular environment, objectivity is not more
fundamental than subjectivity. Given the teleology intrinsic to cognition—that is, the
nonrepresentational goal-directedness of self-maintenant processes—it is appropriate to conclude
that the subjective aspect of enquiry reciprocally shapes the objective one.
Embodied epistemology, as articulated by enactivism and Bickhard’s model of errorguided learning, is thus one way of responding to Ladyman. If knowledge is in its most primitive
form skillful interaction with the world, then providing a “how” as opposed to a “what” account
does, in fact, help to naturalize epistemology. Yet it is not entirely clear how sympathetic
D’Agostino is to an embodied epistemology. As evidenced by some early glowing references,
D’Agostino’s anti-realism is tied to Martin Kusch and Richard Rorty rather than embodied
cognitive science (2). The closest that D’Agostino comes to endorsing embodied epistemology is
in his discussion of “bounded rationality” (20). Bounded rationality is a formal description of
some cognitive limits inherent to finite beings. D’Agostino’s goal with the concept is to show
that the collectivization of inquiry is a response to “in principle” considerations as opposed to
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It is worth noting that understanding perception as differential contact buttresses social epistemology’s
concern with the details and dynamics of epistemic communities. It implies that epistemic niches in general—
scientific institutions being particularly notable examples—are not merely a means for more efficiently
filtering information but rather are an integral part of perception.
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merely practical exigencies. That is, epistemic communities are more than the aggregate effort of
what would happen if a single individual had more time and resources.
Of the seven factors that D’Agostino notes in connection with bounded rationality, the
first and most important one is inexhaustibility. Echoing the familiar Kuhnian theme of
nominalism, inexhaustibility refers to the endless ways in which any material state of affairs can
be described (21). In this respect, D’Agostino’s anti-realism, like Kusch, is closely tied to the
philosophy of language. This focus is borne out by the rest of the factors that D’Agostino
discusses. Reflexivity, for example, is even more closely related to Kusch: when a claim is made
regarding agents and those agents subsequently become aware of it, the claim may be either
reflexively undermined or confirmed. Reflexivity thus highlights the performative dimensions of
language use.
Rather than linking these factors to the embodied nature of cognition, D’Agostino moves
towards more abstract matters. The other factors of bounded rationality explicate the nominalist
implications for human deliberation. While bounded rationality thus addresses key issues within
the domain of social epistemology, without the explicit link to an embodied epistemology it
remains vulnerable to realist re-interpretations.
Demonstrating the pertinence of embodied cognitive science completes the section’s
second major task; to wit, to show the reciprocity between neo-Kuhnian social epistemology and
embodied cognitive science. D’Agostino’s federal model of enquiry counteracts cognitive
science’s tendency to downplay the significance of epistemic niches, while conversely,
embodied cognitive science forestalls realist reconstructions of D’Agostino’s account. One of the
chief obstacles to this connection, however, comes from within neo-Kuhnian social
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epistemology; in the next section, I consider a neo-Kuhnian social epistemology that is at odds or,
at the very least, in serious tension with embodied epistemology.

4.4

Two Disembodied Social Epistemologies

In the present section, I contrast my proposed connection between social epistemology and
enactivism with two varieties of disembodied social epistemology. The hallmark of the latter is
the belief that social interaction rests upon mutually recognized truths. Fuller (2002, 2011, 2012)
and Kusch (2002a), each in their own distinctive way, endorse such a view. At stake between
embodied and disembodied conceptions of social epistemology, I argue, are competing accounts
of normativity, with the former providing a more nuanced and heterogeneous account. To
motivate an embodied social epistemology, I model its normative dimensions on Bickhard’s
account of error-guided learning, which entails that normativity is an immanent phenomenon. I
introduce this model by way of critiquing Fuller’s social epistemology, a critique that provides
the resources for then reconstructing Kusch’s communitarian epistemology.
Fuller’s epistemology is directly informed by political philosophy. Fuller (2002, 6)
claims that epistemology is nothing other than political philosophy applied to the community of
enquiry. The political nature of epistemology relates to the same basic issue raised by Kitcher
(2001, 2011)—namely, scarcity of resources. Fuller (2012) writes:
Much of the ongoing discussion, especially among analytic epistemologists, about
whether science “aims for the truth” has been misdirected because, in my view, the
interesting disagreements arise less over that question than which truths are worth
pursuing and the means by which they are pursued. (269)
The passage is important, in part, because it alludes to Fuller’s commitment to a realist
metaphysics—in which truth is a correspondence relationship between an idea and a material
state of affairs—a commitment that is easy to overlook given his vigorous criticisms of analytic
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social epistemology. But the issue with analytic social epistemology, for Fuller, is not its notion
of objective truth as such but rather its disregard for the issue of how resources should be
allocated in scientific research.99
Fuller’s distinctive brand of realism, which he labels “realizationist,” emphasizes the
pliability of material states of affair. Fuller (2012, 272) writes, “my position would be more
accurately described as ‘realizationist’ (rather than, say, ‘relativist’). I believe that we
increasingly come to turn into reality whatever we conceive.” Fuller is optimistic about the
potential for science to structure physical reality in order to meet our desired conceptions of it.
Given this potential and the wide range of possibilities to pursue, it is essential that research
realize the most beneficial desires or values.
More important than any of its specifics, Fuller beckons to a wide and radical range of
trans- or post-humanist possibilities. Trans-humanism is founded on the idea that humans are
“intellects that happen for now to possess animal bodies” (Fuller 2011, 63). If the human mind is
multiply realizable, then future technology could in principle supplant the human body. Fuller’s
unique twist on this theme is to emphasize its potential for achieving political equality and
liberty, so long as the technological advances extend to everyone (57). This relates back to what
Fuller (2000, 2002, 2012) has long considered the underlying purpose for acquiring any kind of
knowledge—namely, to free oneself from domination by others.
In short, if our epistemic communities are working towards the right ends and working
together, then Fuller thinks it possible to realize equality between people and thereby address
what is perhaps the most basic injustice of contemporary society. The role of social epistemology,
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Fuller lumps Kitcher together with analytic social epistemology based on Kitcher (1993) in which Kitcher
defends the objectivity of science. Conspicuously absent, however, is any mention of Kitcher’s (2001) notion
of well-ordered science, whose central tenet is the need for citizenry to inform the direction of science, a
proposal quite similar (even if less flamboyant) to Fuller’s own.
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in this picture, is to “remov[e] obstacles to both the expression of epistemic interests
and knowledge of the results of actions taken on those interests” (2002, xvi). That is to say,
social epistemology should improve the efficiency of the public’s communication of its desires
and, second, track and communicate the effects of the ensuing epistemic projects. Ideally, social
epistemology in this way acts as a shared foundation for our epistemic undertakings by
informing the public of the competing values at stake and the most efficient means for realizing
these values.
Despite many useful insights and provocations, Fuller’s account founders on his
commitment to multiple realizability, which presupposes the associated realist metaphysics.
Fuller’s argument for multiple realizability is woefully inadequate, which is to say almost nonexistent. The argument rests on a critique of embodied epistemology; while resting one’s case
primarily on the demolition of another position often hints at a straw man, the strategy is familiar
in the philosophy of mind. What is unpardonable, however, is Fuller’s equivocation of
embodiment with Darwinian evolution.
With always a taste for intellectual duels and dichotomies, Fuller (2011, 51) equates the
embodiment-multiple realizability issue with an ideological struggle between earth-bound
Darwinian biology and a theistically-inspired universal life and intelligent design science. The
closest that Fuller comes to acknowledging enactivism or any other flavor of embodied cognitive
science is a single reference to evo-devo (evolutionary-development) theory (61). Making
matters worse, evo-devo theory is interpreted as part of biology’s more general rediscovery of
purpose in nature that—given the dichotomy between Darwinian evolution and intelligent
design—appears to support shifting away from the putative chains of earth-bound embodiment
thinking.
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One result of the Darwinian straw man—in which natural selection is considered the only
driving force of evolution—is that Fuller, like Clark (§3.4), fails to heed the role of intrinsic
teleology or intentionality within embodied cognitive science and epistemology.100 This is most
evident in the caricature of equality and liberty above, wherein the body appears as an aggregate
of material needs that the mind takes care of as if they were menial chores. The body’s physical
needs are thus considered incidental to the mind’s powers—as if the body were just another
aspect of the material world that biologically dependent minds wisely choose to maintain.
According to this picture, a human mind could just as easily perceive potential food as the color
of tree bark—at least if the mind were freed from the chains of the biological body and thereby
the chore of feeding it. In this manner, values like political equality and liberty appear as
objective normative standards, which form the blueprints for how best to engineer material
reality. To provide an alternative to this picture of values and the attendant conception of
normativity, I first briefly revisit the concept of intrinsic intentionality discussed in Ch. 3.
Intrinsic intentionality is the basis for but does not itself consist of conscious intentions or
representational aboutness. This distinction corresponds to Weber and Varela’s (2002, 100)
distinction between two senses of teleology: the most common sense of “external seemingly
purposeful design” corresponds to representational aboutness while the second sense—“internal
purposes immanent to the living”—denotes the biological nature of intrinsic intentionality. While
Fuller thinks that the normative dimension of social epistemology is exhausted by conscious
design, on the enactivist view, values emerge from and remain intimately linked to the immanent
purposiveness of living beings. Cognition, on this latter view, consists of an inherently valueladen perspective on the world; as opposed to being an incidental chore, metabolic constraints
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In fairness to Fuller, much of the contemporary teleology literature is geared towards the principle of
natural selection, as discussed in §3.2. Yet when taking post-embodiment as a general goal, it is incumbent
upon him to reach for fruits higher up on the tree.
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are the originary source of meaning and serve as the most basic normative standards for learning.
Given this concept of intrinsic intentionality and immanent normativity, I will now articulate the
implications in contexts that are thoroughly awash in representations, specifically contexts in the
domain of social epistemology, in contrast to cases of minimal cognition in which the role of
metabolic constraints are apparent. Bickhard’s interactivist model (§3.2, §4.1) has already
provided an important first step to achieving this by grounding representations in
nonrepresentational goal-directedness. To link Bickhard’s model of representation and his
related account of error-guided learning to social epistemology, I first connect it to D’Agostino’s
brief remarks on the normative implications of his book Naturalizing Epistemology.
D’Agostino (2010) hints at more nuanced forms of normativity than envisioned by Fuller.
Near the end of Naturalizing Epistemology, for example, D’Agostino styles his account as
possessing “a definite whiff of the normative” (178). While D’Agostino pitches his account on
the basis of its descriptive merits, he notes that a map of a terrain—such as his mapping of
epistemic communities—has normative implications for any user, even if the mapmaker does not
tell the user where to go. When connected to an embodied epistemology, D’Agostino’s point is
more profound than he himself insinuates. Not just maps but descriptions in general carry
normative significance, albeit more indeterminate and inchoate than, for example, a command.101
In this manner, it is profitable to read D’Agostino’s comments from the perspective of
Bickhard’s notion of levels of knowing.
Descriptions repartition an agent’s interactive possibilities. To describe something is to
abstract from a particular interactive context, with the greater abstractness affording new
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interactive possibilities and potential errors, creating a new level of knowing.102 Descriptions are
thus not value-neutral representations of a material state of affairs but, rather, a value-laden
perspective on what aspects of an interactive context an agent considers most relevant and salient.
This reckoning of descriptions dovetails with the translation view’s model of tacit learning (§2.3),
in which verbal instructions are improvised in the midst of interaction as opposed to being part of
a universal recipe for performing a given skill. By conceptualizing the role of embodied skills,
tacit knowledge points to the limits of objectifying the normative dimensions of epistemology.
An embodied epistemology suggests a related though decidedly more modest role for
social epistemology than Fuller envisions. Rather than setting the menu for how scientists should
cook up a post-human future, social epistemology’s focus is more retrospective in identifying
interactive patterns within communities, a project exemplified by D’Agostino’s federal model.
The interactive patterns indicate, in part, inchoate forms of normativity—in particular, social
epistemology can point to patterns that do not correlate with and may even be contrary to the
conscious intentions and epistemic goals within a community. To flesh out more of the
immanent normativity at work in such scenarios, I turn now to reconstructing Kusch’s
communitarian epistemology within an embodiment framework.
In §2.5, I used the concept of shallow consensus to reconcile Turner’s individualism and
Kusch’s collectivism in order to move beyond the individualist-collectivist dichotomy. Having
since introduced the enactivist cognitive subject and D’Agostino’s federal model of enquiry, it is
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Beliefs are, on this view, an especially important form of abstraction but neither an epistemically nor
normatively primitive one. In exploring the nature of perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 2012, 32)
makes a related though more fundamental point. Criticizing both empiricist and intellectualist accounts of
perception, he argues that conscious attention does not clarify “preexisting givens” but rather actively
constitutes new, determinate objects. Merleau-Ponty thus considers all conscious thought as derivative upon
agents’ embodied interaction with their environments. In this manner, the epistemic significance of beliefs
stems from their determinacy but not primitiveness.
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possible to build upon this sketch. Specifically, I want to reconstruct Kusch’s notion of social
identity or status, using my characterization of the normativity of descriptions as a guidepost.
Social identities are, I argue, opaque coordinating factors or behavioral attractors that structure
interaction.
To briefly recap Kusch’s (2002a, 2013) position: social identities are a social kind. Other
social kinds include money and marriage; for Kusch, money, marriage, and social identities are
all constructed via the medium of language. Drawing upon Craig (1999), Kusch (2013) argues
that the concept of knowledge originated due to the need to mark a specific type of social
identity—namely, being a reliable informant. As a result, the concept of knowledge, like money
and marriage, is itself a social kind. On this picture, social kinds act as a shared foundation for
interaction. With regard to being knowledgeable, an interaction involving a person who holds the
status will be structured such that he or she will be expected and trusted to provide information.
Language provides a stability that imbues social kinds with a meaning that supersedes the
particulars of any given social interaction. Social identities thus function as a mutually
recognized or shared foundation for interaction.103
The dilemma confronting Kusch’s position is similar to the one that confronted Searle’s
concept of we-intentions, as diagnosed by Turner (§2.2). Either the shared social identity is so
vague as to be vacuous, or it is so rich that it’s wildly implausible that it’s actually shared by
individuals. My alternative account, following the spirit of Turner’s modification of Searle,

103

In accordance with this picture, Kusch (2002a, 2) states that the goal of communitarian epistemology “is to
understand, rather than change, epistemic communities.” Kusch thus sees his communitarian epistemology as
purely descriptive. In the context of the testimony literature, Kusch is right to distance himself from normative
approaches such as Goldman in which the details of interaction are often ignored as extraneous. But Kusch’s
characterization of communitarian epistemology’s goal wrongly presupposes that description and
understanding can be value-neutral. Embodied epistemology suggests that any change in understanding has
normative implications.
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jettisons the notion of a shared identity in favor of a more ephemeral and inchoate notion that is
geared towards and also derivative upon actual engagement between individuals.
On my account, social identities are ambiguous descriptors whose meaning depends on
the particulars of actual interactions, including each individual’s unique experiential history. A
social identity is an abstraction, which—like other kinds of descriptions—partition an interactive
space, thereby modifying the range of relevant interactive opportunities. The range of recognized
interactive opportunities is partly a function of an agent’s prior interactions, on the basis of
which she has refined her expectations when confronted with negative feedback. It is in this
sense that social identities serve as coordinating factors or behavioral attractors: the former
relating to the concept of participatory sense-making and the latter to Granic’s account of
aggressive patterns of behavior (§3.3).104
Thinking of social identities as coordinating factors or attractors helps to explain a social
status’s relatively stable meaning without annihilating the idiosyncratic dimensions of social
interaction. Salient differences in individuals’ respective perceptions of a social identity can be
smoothed out (or further entrenched) via the continuous feedback and refinement of encounters.
There may even be crucial differences in individuals’ understanding of a social identity that go
unrecognized because circumstances have not yet brought them to the fore. This is the sense in
which social identities are shallow or opaque. Agreement conceals pervasive underlying
disagreements, but without undermining the role that social identities play in interaction.
To illustrate how a social identity can structure interaction, I offer the following
hypothetical scenario, inspired by D’Agostino’s federal model. Consider the effect that learning
104

While social identities and linguistic descriptions appear discordant with De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s (2007,
2008) own examples of coordinating factors, this mostly results from their rhetorical context. De Jaegher and
Di Paolo’s main objective is to counter cognitivism within the philosophy of mind. Furthermore, I am treating
social identities in terms of how they influence social interaction, thus maintaining the priority that De Jaegher
and Di Paolo give to the dynamics of engagement.
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of social comparison pressures within epistemic communities could have on an individual
researcher. She might, for instance, be less likely to remain reticent when another team member
voices a point at variance with her own findings. When offering the dissenting viewpoint, she
can think of herself as searching for a “hidden profile” as opposed to making trouble or attacking
her team member. This difference can be expressed in terms of the contrasting roles of a team
helper as compared to a trouble-maker.105 The difference can have a decisive influence not only
on whether the dissenter will share her divergent findings but also—granting that she might
voice her concerns without having learned of social comparison pressures—influence whether
the contribution will be constructive. The perspective of searching for a hidden profile and
helping one’s team is a stronger rhetorical position than challenging a team member.106
The relevant social identities in my example—“team helper” and “trouble-maker”—are
more ephemeral than an idealized status like “being knowledgeable.” The hypothetical scenario
thus diverges from Kusch’s discussion, yet I think such fleeting social roles draw attention to the
formation of identities and thus the dynamics that underpin more stable ones. Accordingly, I
propose that more stable and widely recognizable social identities are a product of the same
general dynamics—an opaque abstraction that is continuously refined and reinforced via social
encounters.
Rehg’s (2009) concept of cogency dovetails with the present account of social identity.
Cogency, for Rehg, represents the many context-specific factors that determine whether an
argument is found to be persuasive within a particular epistemic community. Possible factors
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This shift in perspective and consequent influence on behavior is a good example of how intellectual
understanding possesses normative implications. In Ch. 5, I touch on this theme in relation to Gallagher’s
(2005a) distinction between cognitive ownership and agency.
106
Conversely, Rehg (2009) offers a case of a researcher who lacks sensitivity to the rhetorical dimension of
enquiry and, as a result, is excluded from an epistemic community. I detail this case and the rhetorical
dimension of enquiry in the next section.
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include values such as openness, a person’s argumentative temperament, and who receives credit.
The indefinite range of possible factors is offset by the need for individuals to demonstrate their
relevance to a particular situation. Rehg thus suggests that the normativity of scientific
argumentation involves “microdynamics” specific to particular interactive contexts (67). In the
next section, I bolster my critique of Fuller and Kusch’s disembodied social epistemologies by
detailing the contextual normativity of scientific argumentation.

4.5

Cogency and the Immanent Normativity of Epistemic Communities

The guiding theme of Rehg (2009) is “Kuhn’s Gap,” which refers to occasions when an
argument is persuasive but not logically compelling. Rehg’s concept of cogency relates to the
“microdynamics” of persuasion in comparison to Kuhn’s focus on macro-social institutional
forces. Kuhn’s merely superficial treatment of persuasion is evident from Wray’s depiction of
the evolutionary aspect of Kuhnian epistemology: when a scientific community confronts a
theoretical dispute, either there will ultimately be a clear winner, or the community splits into
separate disciplines (§4.2).
D’Agostino improves upon Kuhn by drawing on psychology and organizational studies,
as detailed in §4.3. But D’Agostino considers these factors in terms of the institutional dynamics
that either hinder or promote the communication of information, with the overarching theme
being the discovery of a “hidden profile.” The concept of shallow consensus comes closest to
Rehg’s concern with cogency, but it only denotes a negative dynamic—that persuasion occurs on
the basis of very thin agreements—without detailing the process of reaching such agreements.
The centerpiece of D’Agostino’s account—in keeping with Kuhn’s focus on macro-social
institutional forces—is the federal model’s two-axis model of epistemic communities.
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With its treatment of microsocial dynamics, Rehg’s (2009) theory of argumentation helps
substantiate the link between the institutional forces discussed by Kuhn, Wray, and D’Agostino
and the enactivist account of the cognitive subject presented in Ch. 3. Rehg begins with the
common idea of cogency, namely cogency as the “convincing quality” of an argument (6). This
open-ended definition enables the term to cover a range of different meanings, with the disparate
meanings a reflection of cogency’s context-dependence.
As one illustration of cogency’s context-specificity, Rehg examines the process of
collaboration and publication at Fermilab, a particle physics research laboratory. The case study
specifically deals with the research and discovery of the top quark, which spanned the years
1993-1995.107 Fermilab is an institution within which many different research teams collaborate.
In connection with the top quark research, there were four separate teams: two teams counted
lepton decays, one team counted dilepton decays, and a fourth team reconstructed the kinematics
of the decay events (Rehg 2009, 169). To pool and publish the four teams’ results, the writing
process involved four social roles: convener, godparent, writer, and audience (171). Two people
acted as conveners, whose task was to convene meetings and record their minutes. The
conveners asked each team to appoint a godparent, whose task was to provide an independent
critique of the paper drafted by the writers (the third role). After the draft passed the godparents,
it was then meant to be presented to the audience, which consisted of all the Fermilab scientists
who were not part of the four teams. The presentation to Fermilab as a whole acted as a final
check before journal publication.
The case study exhibits the basic features of D’Agostino’s federal model while also
presenting some complications. The four teams worked in parallel, corresponding to the
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For the Fermilab case study, Rehg draws heavily upon Kent Staley’s (2004) book on the discovery of the
top quark.
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horizontal axis of the federal model, yet only two used the same technique. The difference in
methodology led to some controversy regarding the kinematics group’s claims, which I return to
below. There was also a complication with respect to the vertical axis: while the godparents were
meant to provide an independent critique of the paper draft, they ended up participating directly
in its writing. The break with agreed-upon procedure, while criticized, was justified on the
grounds that it improved the quality of the paper (172). Hence, procedures and institutional
structures were improvised upon when it was considered beneficial to the research.
The writing procedure—that is, the four social roles and three writing phases of draft,
revision, and presentation to Fermilab as a whole—was formulated in the wake of having
rejected a “four short papers” proposal. The rejection of this proposal—referred to within
Fermilab as the “October massacre”—was due to the view that the papers were being rushed
without sufficient vetting and motivated the additional second and third phases in the
subsequently agreed-upon writing procedure. The perceived rush in the prior proposal was due
largely to the kinematics team, who wanted to publish their evidence for the existence of the top
quark before the other teams. Complicating matters, two of the team members (Garry Goldstein
and Richard Dalitz) were outsiders brought in because of their expertise in kinematics analysis.
The tense situation brought to the fore the difficulties involved in the collaboration of
different types of specialists. The kinematics team claimed to have conclusive evidence for the
top quark but none of the Fermilab scientists outside of the kinematics team were fully qualified
to judge the claim’s technical details. The difficult circumstance highlights the wide range of
factors involved in argumentation, including the already discussed dialectics of the writing
procedure. The kinematics team’s rush to publish conflicted with the values of openness and
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thoroughness, which in turn prompted Fermilab scientists to formulate the four social roles and
three phases of paper writing.
Rhetorical considerations also played a part in assessing the kinematics team’s proposal.
Krys Sliwa—the Fermilab scientist in charge of the kinematics team—described Gary Goldstein
as “overexcited” (177). Goldstein’s temperament—his ethos—suggested to Sliwa and some of
his other colleagues that he lacked the capacity for responsible judgment, and he subsequently
lost access to Fermilab’s data (177). There was at least one additional major factor that
influenced the assessment of the kinematics team, and it corresponds to the concern for credit
attribution stressed by Kitcher (1990). If the kinematics team had published their paper first, then
credit for the top quark discovery would have fallen primarily on scientists who were not part of
Fermilab. At issue are not merely the selfish interests of Fermilab scientists but the credibility of
Fermilab as a whole. Maintaining the credibility of the institution itself is crucial to its continued
existence, a concern that also played a part in withholding data from an August 1993 conference
presentation.108
Rehg interprets the Fermilab case study as displaying an immanent contextualism. All
three of the major factors—the dialectical, rhetorical, and credit issues—took on their particular
significance because of the kinematics controversy. The dialectical values of openness and
thoroughness, for instance, only became relevant argumentative considerations when the
kinematics team sought to publish their findings before the three other teams. To further
conceptualize this immanent dynamic, Rehg draws upon Habermas’s notion of transcendental
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By withholding data from the 1993 Ithaca conference, the Fermilab scientists avoided prematurely claiming
the discovery, which would have opened them up to objections they were not prepared to address. Alternately,
if they had presented all of the data without claiming the discovery, they risked other researchers claiming the
discovery first and thereby impugning Fermilab’s reputation. For Rehg, it’s important that Paul Tipton, the
Fermilab presenter, both piqued the interest of his audience and demonstrated his competency by
acknowledging that he had not shown conclusive data (171).
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standards or pragmatic presuppositions of conversation.109 Yet Rehg dispenses with the notion of
a transcendental standard and takes them instead as a critical heuristic, thereby inverting
Habermas as follows: rather than being regulative ideals for all conversations, values such as
openness must be fought for by a particular agent in order for them to be meaningful in a
particular context (e.g., the value of openness prompting the creation of a new writing procedure)
(160).
Rehg’s immanent contextualism complements embodied epistemology. The above
controversy, for example, can be modeled using Bickhard’s terminology. The kinematics team,
from this perspective, created a situation in which the abstract values of openness and
thoroughness were recognized by Fermilab scientists as relevant tools for restructuring the
interactive space (i.e., the creation of the four social roles and three writing phases). In this sense,
the values were not determinate blueprints but rather a means for differentially responding to a
particular interactive context. In this regard, the values, like the temperament of the scientists,
acted as coordinating factors.
Rehg’s major contribution to embodied epistemology lies in his reconstruction of a
tremendously complex form of normativity. Scientific argumentation is about as far from
minimal cases of cognition as one can get, yet the contextualism of scientific argumentation
suggests that normativity retains an immanent character. Rehg’s theory of argumentation
unpacks a kind of rationality long held dear by philosophers of mind and, in doing so, supplants
the notion of objective rationality in favor of the context-specific notion of cogency. Ironically,
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See Habermas (1979) for his initial formulation of a “universal pragmatics” for communication.
Habermas’s (1984, 1987) Theory of Communicative Action builds upon this picture by arguing against narrow
conceptions of rationality in the social sciences; one of Habermas’s most important claims, in this regard, is
that rationality is responsive to moral and evaluative claims, not just empirical facts. Although it departs from
Habermas’s notion of transcendental ideals and counterfactual mode of analysis, Rehg’s immanent
contextualism dovetails with the pragmatic current in Habermas’s work.
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one possible response to this interpretation of Rehg’s theory is to claim that the Fermilab case
study is too complex. That is to say, sub-atomic particles are such an extraordinary subject
matter with only an extremely attenuated connection to humans’ perceptual capacities that the
normativity exhibited in the corresponding enquiries is not representative of more common
epistemic endeavors and interactions. The idea here—to paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr.—is that tough cases make bad laws.
While I concede that the top quark discovery is an extraordinary case, it is not
extraordinary to take the collaboration of diverse specialists as a fitting exemplar for epistemic
interaction. Even though most people have not had education comparable to the training of a
particle physicist, the experience of meeting and working with people whose skills are
dramatically different from our own—and also to a large extent unknown—is a familiar and
formative one. Analogous to the situation of Fermilab’s scientists vis-à-vis the kinematics
experts, it is common for individuals to deal with people whose claims they cannot directly
assess. Yet it is crucial to negotiate such situations, to negotiate the pervasive and persistent
differences between others and us in time- and resource-sensitive circumstances.
Taking the collaboration of diverse specialists as an exemplar for epistemic interaction
signals a critical departure from both the testimony and translation views. The latter takes
apprenticeship as a universal exemplar, wherein there is a succession of individuals whose skills
resemble but productively differ from each other. On this picture, our agency is largely
determined by how individuals have been sculpted by sensory stimuli. In terms of the present
discussion, the basic issue with this picture is that all interactions are grafted onto the structure of
mirroring, which introduces a superfluous and thus costly step to social interactions that are
dissimilar to apprentice training such as the collaboration of diverse specialists.
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For the testimony view, the exemplary aspect of epistemic interaction is, of course, a
speech act—specifically one that involves the faithful reporting of objective reality. Oftentimes,
testimony theorists begin with the most mundane, trivial, and dehydrated scenarios with the
hopes of establishing a foundation for the interesting stuff. Alvin Goldman (1999, 23), for
instance, establishes the objective character of knowledge using the example of whether milk is
in the fridge. Quite simply, a person’s belief about whether there is milk and the fact of the
matter are logically independent. Accordingly, knowledge is a correspondence relation between
a person’s belief and an objective state of affairs. With this conception of knowledge in hand,
Goldman casts the goal of social epistemology as increasing people’s stock of true beliefs.
Knowledge is thus dehydrated in the sense that its practical connotations are taken to be of an
entirely incidental and derivative nature. Likewise, social interaction is epistemically significant
only as a means for passing beliefs along.
For the transformation view, by contrast, the contextual nature of knowledge entails that
knowledge is intrinsically linked to practical connotations and ramifications. Knowledge is, first
and foremost, skillful engagement with the world. With regard to social epistemology, one
crucial implication is that the toy examples that are especially pervasive within the testimony
literature are false starting points. The underlying methodology of extrapolating from clear-cut
examples to the interesting stuff is misguided because it is the interesting and messy stuff that
transforms us.
It should be stressed, however, that the transformation view does not discount the
everyday lives of cognitive agents. Indeed, agents’ everyday lives are interesting precisely
because of the endless ways in which our superficially routine behaviors are shaped by
transformative epistemic experiences. Consider, for instance, the following odd but eminently
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plausible scenarios: the accountant who maintains a spreadsheet that tracks his mate
compatibilities, as if the value of a romantic partner could be inventoried like the property of a
company; or the former army sergeant who still keeps a weekly “load list” for groceries, as if she
were still requisitioning goods for a platoon; or the professor who itemizes his thoughts into
numbered bullet points, as if he were in a classroom rather than a casual conversation. In keeping
with these sorts of strange yet common examples, the Fermilab case study represents a more
general shift in priority—favoring the analysis of innovative cutting-edge epistemic pursuits over
trivial examples. Since many of our cutting-edge epistemic pursuits are massively complex
community endeavors, one important consequence of the shift is to marginalize single
mechanism or single purpose characterizations of social interaction. Such characterizations
depend largely on extrapolating from the misleading simplicity of toy examples. In Ch. 5, I
challenge another closely related obstacle to appreciating the multifaceted role of communitylevel cognitive processes—namely, manipulationist reductions of social interaction.
The present chapter has canvassed neo-Kuhnian social epistemology in order to identify
salient community-level cognitive processes. Two of the most important dynamics have been the
modular epistemic division of labor conceptualized by D’Agostino’s federal model of enquiry
and, second, the immanent normativity conceptualized by Rehg’s argumentation theory. The
former suggests that individual cognitive activity is intimately tied to larger community
processes, while the latter suggests that enquiry involves an indefinite range of potential factors
whose ultimate relevance are determined by the interaction of particular cognitive agents.
Together, the two dynamics show that individuals’ epistemic agency is intimately bound up with
though not determined by larger social contexts. In Ch. 5, I round this picture out by challenging
the egoist presuppositions pervasive within cognitive science and social epistemology.
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Chapter 5: The Encultured Mind

5.0

Introduction

Dominant within cognitive science and social epistemology is a largely assumed utility or
manipulationist viewpoint regarding the subject’s relationship with objects in its environment.110
The present chapter examines this manipulationist presupposition in the context of the so-called
“four E’s” of cognition. The term 4E cognition refers to embodied, embedded, extended, and
enacted cognition and the corresponding theoretical frameworks, which have all leveled
trenchant attacks on traditional cognitivism and methodological individualism (Menary 2010b).
One indication of the general progress made is the noticeable shift in polemical targets, with
many 4E critiques now directed at other 4E theories. My critique of the manipulationist
presupposition focuses on the extended view and two competing versions of the enactive view.
The manipulationist perspective underpins one of the most general pictures of the
cognitive subject. John Sutton (2010) poses the problem as follows:
Are culture, artifice, and moral practice optional extras, merely dispensable surrogates
which ride on top of the brain’s own unchanged tendencies? Or are they instead in one
form or another inevitable, structuring supplements which construct and maintain the
biological process that they simultaneously and deeply transform? (212)
Sutton contrasts two basic ways of understanding how socialization and experience more
generally impact the human mind: a core view in which socialization only augments innate
capacities, and an encultured view in which a person’s mind depends on experience—especially
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The term “manipulationism” stems in part from Menary’s (2007, 2010a) eponymous thesis, which I address
in §5.5. Menary’s thesis exemplifies a much broader approach in cognitive science and social epistemology, in
which other people appear as just another epistemic resource to be exploited.
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socialization—for structuring plastic innate capacities. Directly challenging manipulationism
first requires, I argue, undermining the notion that a cognitive subject possesses an innate and
fixed core. Once this is accomplished, I then examine the temporal directionality of first-personal
agency.
The chapter contains two major parts: a critique of Andy Clark’s Extended Mind
hypothesis (EM) and an analysis of three varieties of enactivism. In §5.1-5.2, I use EM and its
associated functionalist framework as a symptomatic case of manipulationism and an exemplar
of the core view. By shrinking the core down to a bundle of multiply realizable processes,
functionalism represents what is perhaps the most plausible version of the core view but
ultimately, as Di Paolo (2009) suggests, undermines the very notion of a mind. There have been
a number of attempts—contrary to Clark—to apply EM to the social dimensions of cognition. In
§5.3, I consider two of the most prominent attempts in this regard: Gallagher’s proposal for a
critical cognitive science and Sutton’s historical cognitive science. While both offer insights and
advances, I argue that overcoming manipulationism requires completely abandoning
functionalism. Toward this end, I resituate Gallagher and Sutton’s proposals within the enactive
movement.
Before directly linking my interpretation of enactivism (Chs. 3 and 4) to Gallagher and
Sutton’s proposals, I canvas two other varieties of enactivism. I explicate Daniel Hutto’s Radical
Enactive Cognition hypothesis (REC) and Richard Menary’s Cognitive Integrationism (CI) in
sections §5.4 and §5.5, respectively. Although Hutto’s and Menary’s projects ultimately dovetail
with each other, they reflect importantly different priorities: REC is an account of basic
cognition founded on Hutto’s critique of representationalism, whereas CI is centered on
Menary’s concept of cognitive practices. Both Hutto and Menary discuss the epistemic

200

importance of enculturation, yet I argue their accounts are hindered by manipulationism.
Treating enculturation in terms of historical causal chains, Hutto and Menary conceive of the
cognitive subject in strictly retrospective terms, as if the only epistemically significant aspects of
the agent were those sculpted from evolved mechanisms and objective norms. In the final section,
I argue that recognizing the prospective nature of agency opens up new dimensions of epistemic
significance, including the productivity of inchoate goals that help to explain the profound
epistemic importance of social interaction. The task of the chapter is thus not only to draw
attention to the transformative dimensions of cognition, but to do so while not annihilating the
intrinsically first-personal and future-oriented perspective of the cognitive subject.

5.1

The Extended Mind, Functionalism, and their Vanishing Cognitive Subject

Andy Clark’s Extended Mind hypothesis represents one of the most plausible though still flawed
articulations of the core view. In presenting its vision of the cognitive subject as a
biotechnological hybrid, the Extended Mind hypothesis (EM) both extends the boundaries of the
cognitive self while shrinking the innate and fixed core that it entails. One of my primary tasks in
the next two sections is to identify the essential core implied by EM despite Clark’s own at times
conflicting characterizations.
The general framework of EM was discussed previously in §3.4 in relation to Clark’s
critique of enactivism. There I criticized Clark’s functionalism for failing to account for intrinsic
normativity and consequently perceptual salience. In the present section, I focus on three other
aspects: on identifying the basics tenets of EM, on Clark’s careful rhetorical framing of EM, and
on explaining how EM relates to the functionalist movement in the philosophy of mind.
Examining the latter relationship raises the issue of the fundamental nature of the cognitive
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subject; in the next section, I consider how Clark can respond to this issue and argue that it
results in an unwelcome manipulationism.
The argumentative strategy motivating EM is driven by an intuition pump. Clark (2008b,
xxvi) presents EM as an attack on the “bioprejudices” of the “BRAINBOUND” view, which
holds that “the (nonneural) body is just the sensor and effector systems of the brain” (original
emphasis). In their introductory article, Clark and Chalmers (1998) formulate the parity principle
as the chief means for challenging brainbound intuitions:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it
done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive
process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. (8;
original emphasis)
If two operations serve the same functional role, then, the authors suggest, the only reason to
count the neural manifestation as cognitive but not the external one would be the aforementioned
“bioprejudice.” The two by now well-rehearsed examples of extension from the introductory
article are of playing Tetris and the hypothetical Otto who suffers from Alzheimer’s and, as a
result, depends on his notebook as a memory aid. In keeping with the rhetorical thrust of the
intuition pump strategy, the Tetris and Otto examples serve less to illustrate the dynamics of
extended processes than to enable Clark and Chalmers to dispatch some preliminary objections
to EM.
Most pertinent to the present discussion is the portability objection, which stems from
what Clark and Chalmers refer to as the vision of the “Naked Mind.” The objection consists of
claiming that what counts as cognitive is strictly the “package of resources” that a subject can
always bring to bear on a task, irrespective of the local environment (Clark and Chalmers 1998,
10). This picture of the Naked Mind closely relates to what I have labeled the core view. Despite
rebutting the objection, Clark and Chalmers endorse the underlying picture: they write, “there is

202

something to this objection…the brain (or brain and body) comprise a package of basic, portable,
cognitive resources” (10). The difference between EM and the Naked Mind position is thus
largely terminological: both agree there is a suite of core processes, yet Clark and Chalmers
believe that the cognitive label should not be restricted to just these processes. In the next section,
I unpack why Clark is committed to the existence of innate and fixed core processes, but for now
I want to note EM’s general consonance with the vision of the Naked Mind, specifically the
shared view that the individual subject is the endogenous center of cognition. Clark and
Chalmers think that the parity principle alone would incorporate too many external resources—
would lose focus of the cognitive self—and so they formulate three supplemental criteria for
further restricting what external resources count as constituent elements of cognitive processes.
The three additional criteria are as follows: the external resource must be (i) a constant in the
user’s life, (ii) easily accessible when needed, and (iii) trusted (17). The end result, Clark and
Chalmers believe, is a more expansive picture of the cognitive subject that simultaneously avoids
the excesses of panpsychism.
In the vast literature that EM has garnered, Clark has stuck closely to the rhetorical
contrast between the brainbound and extended views. In terms of a positive argument for EM,
Clark has offered a diverse array of extended cognitive processes, including detailed analyses of
such coupling dynamics; this positive aspect of Clark’s argument is exemplified by the first part
of his 2008 Supersizing the Mind. But when faced with criticism, Clark prefers instead a threepronged strategy linked to his carefully crafted rhetorical position: first, focus on the contrast
between EM and the brainbound view; second, note how the parity principle’s supplemental
criteria retain an individual center of cognition; and third, attribute any fundamental
disagreements to a conflict of intuitions. Missing from this general discussion is a careful
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account of the fundamental nature of cognition and the cognitive subject, in particular the
relationship between EM and the larger functionalist framework of which it is a part.
For Clark, the functionalist movement within the philosophy of mind addresses the most
basic questions concerning the fundamental nature of cognition. Yet upon closer inspection, this
argumentative division of labor fails due to the fact that Clark’s version of EM is inconsistent
with functionalism. To highlight this tension, I turn first to Clark’s (2010) method for
determining the coarseness of functional roles before assessing the general relationship between
EM and functionalism.
After conceding that he lacks a precise standard for differentiating an individual’s
extended belief system from a “contingent” one, Clark (2010) encourages the reader to follow
the intuitive path set by him and Chalmers. Clark writes,
Chalmers and I tend to favor a rather coarse notion of the required functional role in
which all that matters is that the information be typically trusted and that it guide gross
choice, reason, and behavior in roughly the usual ways … in ways that would not cause
constant misunderstandings and upsets if the agent were somehow able to join with, or
communicate with, a human community. (62)
The coarseness that Clark refers to in the above passage is a matter of how tight the requirements
should be on counting something as part of an individual’s cognitive system. To this question,
their intuitions favor the following answer: if an individual could usually succeed in employing a
resource within a community, then it seems reasonable for an individual to rely on and trust the
resource, which in turn favors treating the resource as more than a contingent coupling relation.
To anyone who still resists following EM’s path, Clark surrenders any hope of conversion: “nor
do I see how to further argue this case with anyone whose intuitions differ” (62). More telling
than any of its specifics, the passage encapsulates Clark’s rhetorical strategy and also suggests
how deeply presupposed the individualism of the core view is within EM.
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Regarding EM’s individualism, the topic of human community only arises in the above
passage due to Kim Sterelny’s (2004) critique of EM. Sterelny argues that when individuals
employ extended processes, they must guard against informational sabotage by others, and as a
result extended processes increase rather than decrease the cognitive load on their individual
users. Rather than questioning Sterelny’s Hobbesian depiction of human communities, Clark
(2010, 61) simply suggests that epistemic agents only protect themselves against an
“ecologically normal level of vulnerability.” Hence, the “upsets” that Clark refers to above are in
part cases where, by trusting an external resource, an individual is taken advantage of by another
person. Later, in connection with Clark’s 007 principle, I return to the Hobbesian character of
EM’s individualism. For the moment, I only want to suggest that despite Clark’s careful
rhetorical framing of EM, the question of how to employ functional analyses is not satisfactorily
answered by appealing to intuitions, which brings us back to the issue of EM and functionalism’s
relationship.
To assess the relationship between EM and functionalism, it is first worth sketching some
background to the latter. Common to all functionalist theories of mind is the multiple
realizability thesis of mental states. The multiple realizability thesis states that “a single mental
kind (property, state, event) can be realized by many distinct physical kinds” (Bickle 2013).
Putnam (1967a) uses the experience of pain as an exemplar of a mental kind that is multiply
realizable, as it is clear that many different animals share the experience. In presenting the
multiple realizability thesis, Putnam’s direct critical targets were mind-brain identity theorists
and behaviorists; as an alternative, many including Putnam (1960, 1967a, 1967b) have used
functionalism as a positive account of mentality that begins with multiple realizability.111
111

The relationship between Putnam and functionalism is complicated to say the least. Putnam (1988) reverses
course, using multiple realizability to argue against functionalism on the grounds that the latter ultimately
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In keeping with the multiple realizability thesis, functionalist theories of mind deny that
mental states should be identified with a particular physical constitution. Accordingly, the central
tenet of functionalism is that a mental state should be understood in terms of the role that it plays
within a cognitive system—more precisely, the mental state’s “causal relations to sensory
stimulations, other mental states, and behavior” (Levin 2013). As glimpsed above in Clark and
Chalmers’ approach to identifying functional roles, one of the central difficulties of
functionalism is how exactly to characterize the inputs and outputs of a cognitive system.
Paralleling the notions of broad and narrow mental content, Ned Block (1990) characterizes two
basic ways of carving up a functionalist cognitive system—namely, in terms of “long-arm” and
“short-arm” functional roles, respectively. Long-arm roles correspond to broad mental content,
since these functional roles include things from the world when identifying the inputs and
outputs of a system, whereas short-arm roles only recognize inputs and outputs internal to an
individual organism. The upshot of the short-arm approach is that it can straightforwardly
explain how people in different environments can share the same mental state, since the mental
inputs are not tied to particular external objects that invariably differ across environments. But
the trade-off of the short-arm approach is that it is unclear how to account for subjects with very
different physical constitutions, such as the oft-used examples of aliens and androids not to
mention the physical differences across humans. Both feats—identifying the same mental state in
two individuals who are in different environments and identifying the same mental state across
humans or in a human and a very different creature—are significant appeals of functionalism and
so it is vital to retain each. The tension is symptomatic, I argue, of the problematic conception of
individuality within functionalism in general.

reduces mentality to behavioral dispositions. But even more recently, Putnam (2012) adopts a “liberal
functionalism” in contrast to the machine functionalism that he previously defended.
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Within functionalism, the problem of how to individuate cognitive agents has received
less attention than the question of how functional processes relate to each other. The literature
surrounding Fodor’s (1983) modularity of mind hypothesis is emblematic of how the existence
of a viable concept of individuation is often presupposed. Fodor’s modularity hypothesis asserts
that the low-level subsystems—putatively responsible for the transduction of sensory stimuli—
are relatively automatic functional processes in contrast to higher-level processes, such as those
involved in belief-formation. That the cognitive system should be identified with a single human
subject is, as Fodor (1986) argues, a metaphysical position justified by the methodology of the
various sciences, with psychology being the relevant science in the given context.
The debate over modularity has focused on the question of whether high-level cognitive
processes can also be characterized in terms of functional modules. Most advocates of “massive
modularity,” such as Carruthers (2006), are invested in evolutionary psychology. One advantage
of this general approach is that the principle of natural selection offers an empirical answer,
albeit a contentious one, as to why the individual organism should be identified as the basic unit
of the cognitive system.112 I turn now to Daniel Dennett, who has elaborated in detail the nature
of the functionalist subject and the problem of individuation from the perspective of evolutionary
theory.
Dennett has seen through and embraced what for many, including many functionalists,
are unwelcome implications regarding the fundamental nature of the cognitive subject. While
Dennett (1976) addresses the issue in terms of personhood, I will limit my discussion to
Dennett’s (1981, 2001) discussion of cognitive subjectivity. Dennett (1981) draws upon the
brain-in-a-vat trope in order to illustrate how functionalism undermines some of the most basic
112

Fodor has been highly critical of Darwinian-informed functionalism, which includes EM. Fodor (2001)
attacks the massive modularity thesis, while Fodor and Palmarini (2011) challenge the principle of natural
selection, the very foundation of Darwinian-inspired functionalism and much else.
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intuitions concerning the identity of the thinking subject—specifically, that the subject is a
spatially delimited entity and that an individual mind is unique. In the thought experiment,
Dennett’s brain is envatted so that he can control his body as it/he retrieves a radioactive
warhead. As the scenario becomes more extreme, Dennett comes to find that the technicians
have created a functionally identical duplicate of his original brain, which he can switch to and
from seamlessly. Tellingly, in reflecting on the thought experiment, Dennett does not consider
the duplication of a mind implausible so much as the idea that, for any extended period of time,
two minds could be kept in sync by being fed the same set of inputs (323). The issue, as Dennett
sees it, is that any slight difference in the timing between the inputs would quickly compound
into large computational differences due to the nature of massively parallel computing processes.
Hence, the overall moral of the story is that functionalism implies that thinking subjectivity itself
is multiply realizable.
For those averse to brain-in-a-vat scenarios, Dennett (2001) takes a more empiricallyinformed approach to the same question. At issue in this article is the source of creativity;
Dennett takes two computer programs—IBM’s Deep Blue chess program and David Cope’s EMI
musical composition program—as a bellwether for how artificial intelligence is going to
thoroughly undermine the mystification of creative genius. Dennett sees all creativity, and by
extension intelligence, as the exploration of a vastly large design space. Learning is simply the
acquisition of ways for more efficiently exploring the design space, which in the case of chess
consists of memorizing patterns that have been culled from previously played games (16). One
of the most important heuristics, on this view, is the very concept of self, which Dennett
characterizes as a placeholder for the “largely unknown and unknowable microprocesses as well
as the history that set them up” (25). That is to say, there is no self, though it is a useful and, at
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this point, perhaps indispensable convention for predicting and explaining the various
“microprocesses” at work. Part of Dennett’s point echoes though does not explicitly
acknowledge EM: Dennett believes that the boundaries of authorship should be extended (23).
The connection is more than incidental—Clark (2003) names Dennett as one of the two biggest
influences on EM—but Clark resists Dennett’s complete deflation of the cognitive subject, as is
clear in Clark’s (2010) concluding remarks.
After characterizing EM’s cognitive subject as a motley assemblage, Clark (2010) raises
the question of whether the extended mind debate undermines the very notion of mind. Might the
ultimate lesson be that the “idea of the mental is terminally unstable” and that we ought to
“eliminate the mind” (63). But rather than taking the Dennettian route of simply accepting that
the cognitive self is a useful convention for understanding a tightly interrelated nexus of
functional processes, Clark posits EM as the beginning of a new science of the mind that can
better illustrate the “biotechnological openness of the very ideas of mind and reason” (64). That
is, the mind and the individual self do exist—as opposed to just being useful heuristics—only
they are a biotechnological hybrid.
Given the resistance to Dennett’s account by functionalists such as Fodor, I begin the
next section by considering Sprevak’s (2009) critique of EM. Sprevak uses the most basic tenets
of functionalism to undermine Clark’s restricted conception of cognitive extension. Sprevak’s
critique pierces through Clark’s rhetorical framing of EM and thereby helps to draw out some of
the position’s more elusive aspects.

5.2

Uncovering the Adaptationist and Manipulationist Core of the Extended Mind

Mark Sprevak (2009) corroborates Dennett’s picture of the vanishing subject, showing how the
basic tenets of functionalism entails at the very least a similar picture. The first step of Sprevak’s
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argument is to establish that any worthwhile variety of functionalism is committed to extended
cognition. A number of EM’s critics have endorsed Clark’s parity principle yet insist that it is a
contingent historical fact that there have been no observed extended processes that satisfy the
standard (e.g., Adams and Aizawa 2008, Rupert 2004). The objection raises the previously
discussed issue of the coarse-ness of functional analysis: these critics are adopting a very finegrained, “short-armed” analysis. One of Clark’s responses, which Sprevak endorses, is that the
critics use so fine-grained an analysis that it undermines functionalism’s ability to account for
radically alternate forms of intelligence, such as possible Martians or artificial intelligence
(Sprevak 2009, 508). Maintaining these intuitions, which are pivotal to functionalism’s appeal,
requires a coarse enough standard that would also include extended cognitive processes.
Having established that functionalism entails extended cognition, Sprevak turns to
Clark’s restricted conception of extension. As noted previously, Clark supplements the parity
principle with three criteria: reliability, accessibility, and trustworthiness. Turning Clark’s own
point against himself, Sprevak (2009) notes that any grain coarse enough to would include a
possible Martian intelligence entails an unrestricted parity principle, as a Martian’s native
intelligence might fail on any or all of the supplemental standards (514-15). Furthermore, there
are cognitive processes physically internal to humans that already fail the criteria (516). Hence,
functionalism does entail extended cognition, but a more radical notion of extension than Clark’s
preferred version.
Sprevak understands why Clark wants to resist radical cognitive extension: radical
extension is so inclusive that mentality loses its meaningfulness, the same issue that Clark (2010)
raises when he asks whether the extended mind debate has eliminated the mind. Acknowledging
Sprevak’s critique, Clark (2011) even concedes that there is little hope of an empirical resolution
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to this question. Since the issue applies equally to EM and the aforementioned critics, Clark
brackets the issue and simply encourages the reader to continue attending to the tight coupling
dynamics between cognitive subject and world in the hopes that the question will be resolved at
some future point. While I am sympathetic to Sprevak’s assessment of EM, I think that there are
alternative accounts of functions—specifically Ruth Millikan’s etiological account of proper
functions—that mitigate his concerns. After articulating Millikan’s position and how it addresses
radical extension, I will then examine the extent to which the etiological account of functions
buttresses EM.
Millikan’s (1984, 1989, 2002) account of proper functions concerns the normativity of
purposes. Millikan claims that the normativity of all functions depend on a device’s history as
opposed to its present dispositions. In the case of biological devices, the history is an
evolutionary one: a biological device’s proper function is the product of natural selection, having
aided ancestors’ survival at some point in the organism’s evolutionary past (Millikan 1984, 28).
One of the primary insights of the concept, according to Millikan, is a naturalistic framework
that accounts for cognitive norms; indeed, Millikan (1993) argues that all cognitive norms are
biological norms ultimately rooted in natural selection. While there are a number of theories that
offer compelling empirical accounts of cognition, Millikan (1993, 3) notes that these accounts
have difficulty handling defective cases, often altogether excluding them from the category of
cognition. By contrast, Millikan differentiates between successful and dysfunctional cognitive
acts based on which are selected traits. Importantly, not every instance must be directly
explained in terms an evolutionary history, as there are “relational proper functions,” which
derive from “direct” proper functions but, unlike the latter, do not correspond to an innate
controlling mechanism (Millikan 1984, 47; 2002, 125). Millikan’s biofunctions thus encompass
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adaptive behavior in addition to directly selected traits. With this conceptual apparatus in hand,
let us revisit the issue of radical extension.
To illustrate the unpalatable consequences of radical extension, Sprevak (2009) uses the
example of a book. When I hold a book, radical extension entails that all of its contents are a
constitutive part of my mind; radical extension is simply the unadulterated application of the
parity principle. Suspending for the moment the question of whether the etiological account is
compatible with EM, Millikan’s position offers a promising even if limited response,
differentiating between adaptive and non-adaptive coupling relations. A coupling relation, on
Millikan’s view, possesses a normative function only if it has changed the conditions under
which natural selection has operated on humans. From this perspective, the agent-book relation
is historically too recent for it to satisfy Millikan’s standard. The Millikanian-EM response thus
deflects Sprevak’s example of radical extension, denying that the agent-book relation possesses a
proper function.
Importantly, even though the standard for cognitive extension is considerably more
difficult to satisfy, Millikan’s position does not rule out all cases. Richard Wrangham’s (2009)
cooking hypothesis, for instance, suggests a suite of extended cognitive skills that possess proper
functions. Wrangham is concerned with the emergence of social structures necessary for
cooking—given the many interdependent skills involved and the need to pass them along to new
generations—and the dramatic impact that cooking subsequently had on hominid anatomy.113
Although humans’ intestines do not thereby possess a cognitive function, there are a number of
epistemic skills involved in cooking that do, skills that are extended in the sense of both social
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expected given the relative proportions of other primates. The selective advantage of the gut shrinkage consists
in homo sapiens’ greater mobility.
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structures and physical artifacts. In addition to the proper cooking of food itself and the proper
tool use implied therein, there are right and wrong ways to create and maintain fires, store and
transport food, and so on. For the Millikanian, the proper function in each case is whatever
contributes to nutritional gains, dysfunction whatever detracts. Millikan’s concept of proper
functions thus blocks radical extension, without blocking forms that have reshaped an organism
on an evolutionary timescale.
Let us take stock of how Millikan’s position measures up to EM and whether it preserves
the general appeal of functionalist theories of mind. Beginning with the latter issue, Millikan can
easily account for salient differences in standards for extension between humans and Martians.
Such differences need only be explicable in terms of the differing evolutionary histories of
humans and Martians. It may of course be epistemically difficult to provide the respective
histories but this does not impeach the plausibility of their relevant differences. The case of
artificial intelligence is more complicated: for Millikan, AI would only possess derived functions
until enough time had passed for the process of natural selection to effectively “reshape” it.
Hence, Millikan’s concept of biofunctions preserves the Martian intuition, avoids undermining
the case of AI, while simultaneously defanging the issue of radical extension. Millikan’s
etiological account does this by constraining the multiple realizability thesis, at least insofar as
cognition is understood to entail the normative significance of epistemic error.
Taking up the issue of how EM and etiological biofunctions compare, the most glaring
difference concerns the emphasis that Millikan places on the historical dimension of cognition.
The scant attention given to history within EM begins with the introductory article, where Clark
and Chalmers’s (1998) contrast their “active externalism” to Putnam’s (1975) and Burge’s
(1979) passive meaning externalism. For Putnam and Burge, distal historical causes determine
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the semantic content of an individual’s mental states. Referencing Dennett’s (1991) distinction
between cognitive vehicles and contents, Clark (2008b, 76) later builds upon the contrast with
meaning externalism, clarifying that EM is a hypothesis strictly concerned with cognitive
vehicles as opposed to semantic content. Yet Millikan’s concept of biofunctions suggests that the
historical dimension of cognition is not limited to passive meaning externalism, as evolutionary
history on her account grounds all cognitive norms. If a refinement in cognitive vehicles results
in the corresponding individuals possessing more true beliefs, as EM emphasizes, then the
change is adaptive and would thus constitute a derived proper function. Such details are absent
from but not inconsistent with Millikan’s framework. And, as illustrated by the response to
Sprevak, the historical dimension can serve a crucial role for EM, treating radical forms of
cognitive extension as defective cases.
Furthermore, as with Millikan’s account of functions, the principle of natural selection is
integral to EM. Its role was glimpsed in the Clark and Sterelny exchange (§5.1): their broadly
Hobbesian depiction of human community stems from an adaptationist and egoist interpretation
of evolution. Nor is Clark’s response to Sterelny an off-the-cuff remark; the adaptationist view is
sprinkled throughout Clark’s writings. In his 1991 book Microcognition, for instance, Clark
presents the “007 Principle” as a thumbnail of cognitive evolution. Strongly foreshadowing EM,
the principle states that in general creatures will not store or process information using internal
media when they can more efficiently use the environment (64). In other words, organisms tend
to know only as much as they need to. Similarly, Clark (2008b, 13) presents the “Principle of
Ecological Assembly” in which the “canny” cognitive subject “tends to recruit, on the spot,
whatever problem-solving resources are available with a minimum amount of effort.”
Throughout Clark’s writings, the environment (including other people) only appear as resources
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to be exploited; hence, the Hobbesian view of human community. Likewise, Clark’s
understanding of evolution is adaptationist in the sense that it treats the principle of natural
selection as the only epistemically consequential aspect of evolution, as entailed by claiming that
increased efficiency is the general evolutionary trend of cognition.
Given the central role of natural selection to EM’s general framework, incorporating
Millikan’s account can be seen as a clarification of Clark’s position as much as a substantive
revision. The upshot of the synthesis is, of course, that it enables Clark to address Sprevak’s
(2009) radical extension objection. But, as evidenced by the preceding paragraph, it comes at the
cost of positing a manipulationist core underpinning the cognitive subject. Importantly, Clark has
resisted explicitly endorsing an essential core, even in places characterizing the cognitive subject
as if there were no core. Clark (2001), for instance, embraces neural constructivism in order to
account for the distinctive character of human rationality. Clark writes, “it is a mistake to posit a
biologically fixed ‘human nature’ with a simple ‘wrap-around’ of tools and culture. For the tools
and culture are indeed as much determiners of our nature as products of it” (138). Although the
passage explicitly denies a fixed human nature, Clark’s point is that most particular cognitive
skills are not hardwired in at birth.114 The passage continues, “we humans are natural-born
cyborgs, factory tweaked and primed so as to participate in cognitive and computational
architectures whose bounds far exceed those of skin and skull” (138). As evidenced by the
design language—“factory tweaked and primed”—even when Clark is emphasizing neural
plasticity, he retains the manipulationist presupposition. This dovetails with Clark’s preferred
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neural constructivist story in which the substantive aspects of plasticity occur in the newer parts
of the brain.115
EM represents perhaps the most abstract and thinnest version of the core view. Rather
than a particular cognitive skill, the fixed and innate core consists of a primordial and multiply
realizable drive to survive, from which more particular intentions derive and thereby the
acquisition of particular skills. EM’s core is adaptationist in the sense that it appeals to the
principle of natural selection as its historical origin and sole evolutionary mechanism, while
manipulationism more precisely designates particular manifestations of adaptationism—the
subject-object relationship of tool exploitation—within EM’s synchronic analyses. The
significance of the adaptationist and manipulationist core can be seen by revisiting the issue of
perceptual salience discussed in §3.4. For Clark (2008a), understanding sensory stimulation in
the brute mechanistic terms of “pressing the flesh” is unproblematic precisely because the
adaptationist drive to survive and its experiential derivatives ensure that the cognitive subject is
not overwhelmed or even paralyzed by raw sensory input. Clark, of course, stresses an
individual’s development of extended processes for filtering information but this only pushes the
issue of salience back one step: what initially motivated or mattered to the organism that spurred
the development of the extended process?
The manipulationist viewpoint is not unique to EM but is rather a largely unargued
presupposition within cognitive science and social epistemology. The Sterelny-Clark exchange is
representative in this regard of how conflicting theories often battle over which framework
provides the most compelling manipulationist or resource-utility account. Another instance is
Clark’s exchange with John Haugeland concerning the issue of social normativity (Clark 2002,
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Haugeland 2002). Advocating a position similar to Steiner and Stewart’s structural normativism
(§3.5), Haugeland criticizes Clark’s cognitive incrementalism, arguing that humans’ concern for
the norms of truth and goodness marks a divide from other animals (30).116 Despite thus
asserting that social relations between people are qualitatively different, Haugeland’s case rests
on avowedly manipulationist considerations. Contrasting social norms to Richard Dawkins’s
notion of a meme, Haugeland writes:
A signal advantage of conformism-enforced norms is that the structures of a community
can rely on the fact that almost all its members will abide by almost all its norms. … So
norms, unlike memes, can sustain an elaborate, interdependent social structure, with all of
the obvious advantages that it makes possible. (32)
The qualitative difference between norm-governed human communities and other types of
relationships, according to Haugeland, is not that the latter is only reducible to manipulationist
considerations but, on the contrary, that the former (social norms) possess greater instrumental
value. While Haugeland’s account suffers from the same issues as Steiner and Stewart’s
structural normativity—namely, the two-horned dilemma of vacuity or extreme implausibility—
Clark’s adaptationist core is a more elusive target. After all, it could be the case that other people
are only epistemically significant as tools to be exploited. Hence, the reason I chose EM as
exemplar of the core view and the manipulationist presupposition is because it offers perhaps
their most compelling defense, one that ultimately pushes the former to its breaking point. In the
next section, I examine a group of theorists that push EM past its breaking point, appropriating it
for analyses of social cognition that surpass Clark’s own version.
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It is important to note that Haugeland’s conception of norms differs greatly from Millikan’s etiological
account. Like Steiner and Stewart, Millikan would consider Haugeland’s account an instance of “meaning
rationalism,” which her etiological account serves as an alternative to.
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5.3

Socializing EM: Insights, Advances, and Some Intractable Difficulties

In their introductory article, Clark and Chalmers (1998) acknowledge the in-principle possibility
of social extension but consider it only a peripheral phenomenon. In a cursory paragraph near the
article’s end, Clark and Chalmers list an “unusually interdependent couple” and various
contractual relationships—such as having a secretary or an accountant—as possible instances of
social extension (17). Among the vast literature that EM has engendered, a number of theorists
have challenged this narrow view of social epistemic relationships. In the present section, I begin
with two separate but similar critiques of EM: both Shaun Gallagher and John Sutton argue that
EM entails a much richer account of social interaction than that proffered by Clark and Chalmers.
While Gallagher and Sutton both offer valuable insights, I argue their positions remain too
closely tied to EM, as evidenced by Sutton leaving the door open for what he calls “third wave”
EM. In closing the section, I compare the second and third waves of EM, noting some of the
remaining difficulties confronting Gallagher and Sutton’s accounts, which I tackle later in the
chapter. To begin, I consider Gallagher’s “overextension” of EM.
Over a series of articles, Gallagher presents the concept of a mental institution, drawing
heavily on EM’s parity principle (Gallagher and Crisafi 2009, Gallagher 2011, 2013). In a
recurring example concerning the legal system, Gallagher has the reader consider three different
problem-solving scenarios: (1) a person named Alexis formulates a decision after having been
given a set of facts and a collection of evidence, (2) in addition to the facts and evidence, experts
give Alexis three questions and a set of possible answers that she may choose from; (3) in
addition to the preceding, the experts instruct Alexis to follow a set of pre-established rules for
how to answer the questions (2009, 47; 2011, 114; 2013, 6). Despite the drastically different
decision processes, Gallagher estimates the cognitive effort to be roughly equal for each case. As
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Alexis works less, the labor is accomplished elsewhere: in the second case, by Alexis and the
experts; in the third, by Alexis, the experts, and also the people who created the rules. Shorn of
its supplemental criteria (§5.1), the parity principle suggests that the legal system should be
considered part of an extended cognitive process. The legal system is thus a mental institution,
other examples including museums and universities.
The primary obstacle to a properly socialized EM, from Gallagher’s perspective, are the
criteria of reliability, access, and trust, though Gallagher also believes that the parity principle
needs to be constrained. As an alternative to Clark’s criteria, Gallagher (2013) proposes a
Lockean notion of ownership. Based on this standard, cognitive extension is a matter of how
much work an individual has invested in a system and whether the individual is engaged in “the
right way” (9). Hence, while no one “owns” a legal system, individuals are a part of the mental
institution directly proportional to the extent of their participation in it, with experienced
professionals (in this case, lawyers and judges) being at the extreme end of involvement. One of
Gallagher’s key points is that there are a number of cognitive skills that legal professionals have
mastered that ought to be understood in the context of the legal system and may even be useless
and meaningless outside of it. In a later section, I return to Gallagher’s conception of cognitive
ownership in order to delineate and assess different varieties of enactivism.
Despite being the primary basis of the mental institution concept, Gallagher (2013) does
have some reservations about the parity principle itself. Gallagher notes, for instance, that the
principle retains a Cartesian element by basing the standard for cognition on whether a process
could occur within the head (5). Gallagher’s thoughts on EM, in fact, have become progressively
more critical, to the point that his use of the parity principle in developing the concept of mental
institutions appears in retrospect to be more an immanent critique of EM than a positive
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argument. Later, I return to Gallagher’s development of an enactive account of intentionality; but,
for the moment, I want to focus on Clark’s response to the claim that the parity principle is
Cartesian. To this specific criticism, Clark has clarified that the parity principle was not intended
to establish causal identity but rather to “engage our rough sense of what might belong to the
domain of the cognitive” (Kiverstein and Clark 2009. See also Clark 2007, Clark 2010). John
Sutton (2010) masterfully traces this dialectic, designating Clark’s use of the parity principle as
“first wave” EM and contrasting it to a “second wave.”
The definitive principle of the second wave, as Sutton defines it, is the complementarity
principle. In his analyses of extended coupling processes, Clark has drawn attention to the very
different but complementary roles that external and neural resources can serve; Clark notes that
in such cases the brain need not “waste its time replicating such capacities” (Clark 1997, 220;
Sutton 2010, 205). The external resources in these cases are important precisely because of the
different causal roles they serve, roles that may never have been neurally feasible. While parity
and complementarity are not inconsistent, Sutton argues that the two waves of EM are in tension.
Pushing back against Clark’s clarification, Sutton (2010) observes the general effect that the
parity principle has on analyses of cognition: “when certain criteria are met, parity suggests, we
shouldn't care if exograms rather than engrams are involved in the production of intelligent
behavior” (198). The abstract perspective of the parity principle thus tends to “flatten” out the
differences between internal and external cognitive resources. Even in light of this criticism, like
Gallagher, Sutton is more charitable to EM than he ought to be given that his proposal for a
historical cognitive science is at odds with the functionalist framework of EM, especially Clark’s
adaptationist version.
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To highlight the tension between EM and Sutton’s historical cognitive science, despite
Sutton’s mostly conciliatory stance, I turn now to Sutton’s own memory arts case study. The
memory arts process of memorization involves constructing an elaborate visual memory of an
artificial structure—whether an architectural structure like a palace or a symbolic structure like
an alphabet—then filling the structure with memories. Because the artificial structure provides
discrete locations, locations with no intrinsic relation to the semantic content of the memories,
the memories are stable and can be recalled at will (Sutton 2010, 208-11). While this mnemonic
practice was found in antiquity and continues into the present day, Sutton is concerned with its
prevalence in medieval Europe, the specifics of which problematize EM.
The medieval practice of ars memoria does not fit within Clark’s adaptationism. As noted
above, Clark recognizes that there are significant forms of complementarity—as opposed to
merely causal isomorphism—between internal and external epistemic resources, but he
understands complementarity strictly in terms of resource maximization. By contrast, in the most
literal terms, ars memoria is radically inefficient, as it involves the laborious internalization of a
text rather than resting content with it being offloaded onto the environment. Clark could stick to
his functionalist guns, claiming either that there is an overall gain in cognitive ability or that the
practice’s popularity was an aberration that eventually died off due to inefficiency. But such a
saving move is fanciful when compared to Sutton’s own explanation.
As quoted in the chapter introduction, Sutton (2010) argues the mind should not be
understood in isolation from culture. With regard to the present example, the memory arts gained
prominence in medieval Europe due to a confluence of religious, technological, and scientific
factors. The religious context laid great emphasis on maintaining the integrity of Scripture. Due
to technological limitations texts were scarce, and contemporary science attributed humans’
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fallible memory to animal spirits. Within this historical context, building memory palaces of
Scripture was a pressing moral endeavor, not a means for maximizing cognitive resources. Yet
Sutton thinks of his historical cognitive science as deepening EM’s most basic insight, not as a
contradictory framework.
Sutton does not directly address EM’s functionalist framework, focusing instead on
specific examples of extended coupling processes. Pushing EM further than Clark, Sutton (2010)
argues that the pervasiveness of extended processes suggests that the brain is essentially a “leaky
associative engine” (205). The brain is so leaky that it needs socialization in order to mold the
brain’s plasticity into useful cognitive skills, the socialization in the memory arts example
corresponding to the aforementioned religious, technological, and cultural factors. In this manner,
Sutton minimizes the tension between his picture of the encultured mind and EM. It would seem
all that is missing from EM is attention to how outer media reciprocally shape inner biological
mechanisms.117 It thus appears as though Sutton’s conception of enculturation strengthens EM,
filling in more of its picture of the cognitive subject.
In order to counter Sutton’s conciliatory stance, I now return to my claim in the previous
section that a viable functionalist theory of mind entails a manipulationist core. This core is
antithetical to treating the social as anything other than a contingent means for objective
epistemic ends. This is nowhere more evident than in places where Clark concedes that he has
not given as much attention to social factors as they deserve. Clark (2011), for instance,
discusses Edward Hutchins’s (2008) characterization of cultural practices as distributed cognitive
systems. Clark admits that for humans most cases of ecological assembly involve “long, hardwon, chains of cultural innovation and transmission” but Clark goes on to claim that EM
117

As noted in the previous section, Clark (2001) endorses neural constructivism, though, as I argued there, his
appeal to constructivism still presupposes an innate and fixed manipulationist core.
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concerns cognitive processes operating in the “here-and-now” (459). Similar to his dismissal of
Putnam and Burge’s semantic externalism (§5.1), Clark believes that EM targets a different
timescale than cultural practices. By treating synchronic and diachronic factors as isolable in this
way, he severely limits the possible role of social factors. Likewise, Clark can bracket Sutton’s
historical cognitive science, treating it as peripheral to his vision of a science of the mind. But
while Clark rightly notes the role of multiple timescales, he neglects the intersections and
interactions between them, which are pivotal for understanding what the manipulationist
presupposition fails to capture. In the chapter’s closing section, I link the notion of
complementarity and cognitive ownership to Di Paolo’s enactivist account of agency (§3.1),
arguing that epistemic agency inherently involves diachronic and first-personal dimensions.
Without an enactivist account of agency, both Gallagher and Sutton’s appropriations of EM
remain prisoner to EM’s functionalist framework. The instability of Gallagher and Sutton’s
positions and the robustness of the functionalist framework is evidenced by what Sutton (2010)
refers to as “third wave” EM.
After having presented second wave complementarity, Sutton leaves the door open for a
third wave of EM. Sutton characterizes this possible third wave as “a deterritorialized cognitive
science which deals with the propagation of deformed and reformatted representations and which
dissolves individuals into peculiar loci of coordination and coalescence among multiple
structured media” (Sutton 2010, 213). In short, rather than positing a very leaky cognitive subject,
the third wave flips the perspective, treating the cognitive subject as nothing more than a locus of
propagating representations. Mason Cash and Michael Kirchhoff both adopt the third wave
proposal, arguing that it provides a richer framework for addressing the cultural and ethical
dimensions of cognitive processes (Cash 2013, Kirchhoff 2012, 2013).
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Cash’s (2013) main thesis consists of an account of responsibility, which he offers as an
alternative to Gallagher’s aforementioned notion of cognitive ownership. Drawing upon Daniel
Dennett’s (2003) account of intentionality, Cash argues that “a socially and physically
distributed cognitive process counts as mine if it is appropriate to hold me responsible—to blame
me or praise me, punish me or credit me—for the ideas or actions produced by this process”
(Cash 2013, 62). A cognitive process, on Cash’s account, counts as an individual process based
on how people hold each other responsible, a process tied to communal norms. Like Dennett,
Cash believes that this approach renders superfluous investigations into the “true nature of
agency” (68). The immediate problem, however, with Cash’s proposal is that it is founded on an
erroneous critique of Gallagher’s notion of Lockean ownership.
Gallagher’s (2013) conception of cognitive ownership represents, for Cash, the limitation
of second wave EM. As noted above, Gallagher’s conception of cognitive ownership measures
cognitive extension in terms of an individual’s active involvement, stressing how the individual
and her environment reciprocally shape each other. The issue, as Cash sees it, is that a
reciprocally transformative relationship does not explain why a process is “owned” by a
particular individual when the process is distributed over a network of institutions, practices, and
other agents. Cash argues that the idea of ownership is fundamentally flawed, as it begins with
individuals and works its way outwards. Cash’s model of responsibility, by contrast, suggests
beginning with social norms of accountability and then treating individuals as the product of
these norms and associated social practices. In terms of the general third wave EM template,
social norms of accountability are the deterritorialized processes that produce the individual loci.
There are two interrelated issues with Cash’s (2013) critique of cognitive ownership.
First, Cash conflates Gallagher’s understanding of cognitive ownership with the generic sense of
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ownership as an exclusive property relationship. Gallagher’s notion of ownership, however, is
phenomenological, as evidenced by how he distinguishes it from the first-personal feeling of
agency (Gallagher 2005a, Chs. 2 and 8). In this context, both ownership and agency refer to a
first-order pre-reflective awareness (174). In normal cases of willed action, the experience of
ownership and agency coincide, whereas with involuntary movement, an individual “owns” the
movement but does not feel responsible for initiating it (Gallagher 2005a, 56).118 On this
phenomenological rendering, ownership refers to the feeling of own-ness. In the context of EM,
Gallagher’s concept of Lockean ownership thus does not entail an exclusive sense of property
ownership but instead the first-personal experience of being heavily involved in a particular
cognitive process. The second issue with Cash’s critique is another perspective on the first: Cash
equates the primitive significance of the first-personal perspective with a restrictive or substantial
notion of individuality. As argued in §3.4, the first-personal perspective—when understood in
terms of the enactivist conception of intrinsic normativity—addresses the issue of perceptual
salience without creating a spurious gap between individual and environment (Weber and Varela
2002, Di Paolo 2005). Having addressed Cash’s critique, I turn now to Michael Kirchhoff’s
account of third wave EM, which includes a more extensive critique of second wave
complementarity.
Kirchhoff’s most distinctive contribution to the third wave EM proposal is his emphasis
on the diachronic dimension of epistemic agency. Employing Dynamical Systems Theory,
Kirchhoff (2013, 20) notes that “all cognitive processes unfold in time continuous dynamical
systems.” Transactive memory systems, in which two or more individuals articulate a shared
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The significance of the distinction between the feeling of ownership and agency is apparent in various
pathological cases, such as schizophrenia. A schizophrenic, Gallagher (2005a) argues, initiates an action, is
aware through sensory feedback of having performed the act—thereby giving them a sense of ownership—yet
still lacks the feeling of agency (178).
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memory, is a particular example of such a process, given that interrupting it undermines the
creation of a shared memory (35). Yet the widespread use of synchronic analyses of cognitive
systems has obscured the significance of temporal continuity, a problematic tendency that
Kirchhoff attributes in part to the influence of analytic metaphysics (6). Clark (1997), for
instance, stresses continuous reciprocal causation, in which the outputs of a cognitive process are
fed back into the cognitive system as an input. But, as illustrated above, Clark lumps such
processes under the grossly oversimplified category of the “here and now,” contrasting them to
such distal historical chains as cultural practices and the evolutionary past. Clark’s contrast is
predicated on treating all inputs to a cognitive system as discrete causes, whose distinct efficacy
is isolable from larger processes such as continuous reciprocal causation. In opposition to Clark,
Kirchhoff’s claim that cognitive processes are continuous dynamical systems denotes that the
processes cannot be broken up into discrete points.
Kirchhoff (2012) shows how the diachronic character of epistemic agency entails that
enculturation is integral to cognitive processes. Using the examples of mathematical reasoning
and phoneme perception as exemplars, Kirchhoff (2012) concludes:
Certain neural transformations take the form of a re-shaping or reformatting process,
where diachronic development in socio-cultural practices significantly transforms a subset of the brain’s cortical representations from primarily non-linguistic to linguistic. (300)
Comparing Kirchhoff’s position to Clark is again helpful: as noted in §5.2, Clark endorses neural
constructivism but in a restricted sense. The added perspective afforded by Kirchhoff’s emphasis
on diachronicity is that Clark severs temporally extended processes of neural transformation into
discrete causal points, as if the points were only coincidentally related to each other. It is this
spurious division that enables Clark to treat culture as if it were only relevant as an indirect,
distal causal entity. Kirchhoff’s larger aim in the 2012 article is to argue for third wave EM.
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Kirchhoff believes that first and even second wave EM fail to account for the
enculturation of cognitive subjects. The issue, as Kirchhoff presents it, hinges on his contrast
between the “Fixed Properties View” and the “Dynamic Properties View” (288). Within the
context of EM, Kirchhoff identifies two manifestations of the fixed properties view. The first
corresponds to what I have called the core view: a theory allows that individuals’ cognitive
architectures are extended and also that their cognitive abilities are thereby enhanced but denies
that an individuals’ representational capacities are transformed during ontogeny (293). The
second type of fixed property view concerns “cognitive assembly,” in which the individual is
held as the primary assembler or driver of cognitive processes. Kirchhoff adopts this notion of
“cognitive assembly” from Clark’s aforementioned deflection of Hutchins (2008): that is,
cognitive assembly occurs in the here-and-now and is primarily driven by the brain.
Kirchhoff offers an extended critique of the complementarity principle but tellingly
focuses on Clark’s use of the term (Kirchhoff 2012, 289). As noted above, Clark unduly narrows
the complementarity principle, interpreting it strictly in terms of resource maximization. Sutton’s
conception, by contrast, emphatically embraces the role of socialization in shaping a cognitive
subject’s goals and most basic biological mechanisms. Kirchhoff leans upon the second version
of the fixed properties view—in which the individual is the primary driver of cognition—in order
to lump together Sutton and Clark’s respective conceptions of complementarity. When Kirchhoff
does directly address Sutton, he interprets Sutton’s complementarity principle as if it were
reducible to Merlin Donald’s (1991) distinction between engrams and exograms; Kirchhoff
writes, “building on Donald’s theory of engrams … and exograms … as a signature mark of
complementarity, Sutton points out that exograms are often discrete, modality and task
independent, and much more durable than engrams” (292). Yet Sutton explicitly rejects treating
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Donald’s distinction as denoting a fixed barrier:
It's important to resist a tendency within second-wave EM to treat the inside and the
outside as distinct realms with fixed properties. … External representational systems need
not be permanent, of unlimited capacity, translatable across media, or endlessly
reformattable as Donald's typology suggests. (Sutton 2010, 206)
Rather than adopting Donald’s engram-exogram distinction, Sutton employs it as a starting point,
using the memory arts example to illustrate how an engram can possess characteristics associated
with exograms.
In fairness to Kirchhoff’s critique, there are problematic aspects of Sutton’s account of
complementarity. In §5.6, I address how Sutton (2014) wrongly leaves open the possibility of
primitive representational content. Additionally, in personal correspondence with Kirchhoff,
Sutton appears to endorse an overly synchronic view of constitution (Kirchhoff 2013, 22). But
even with regard to the latter issue, it is clear that Sutton’s account should not be equated with a
strictly synchronic view of constitution. Evelyn Tribble and John Sutton (2012, 589) write, “the
analysis of the mind must be fundamentally historical in character, because changing cultural
artefacts, norms, and institutions are not external supplements or cues to cognition, but partly
constitute it.” Tribble and Sutton jointly insist that viewing the epistemic agent as a discrete time
slice is a meaningless abstraction. At the very least, this recognition of diachronicity undermines
equating Sutton’s conception of complementarity to the second sense of the “Fixed Properties
View”: Clark’s notion of cognitive assembly, which Kirchhoff uses to explicate the second kind
of fixed properties view, hinges upon a clean division between “here-and-now” cognitive activity
and historical causes. Kirchhoff’s sweeping critique of complementarity is indicative of
underlying issues with his third-wave EM program.
In the following two sections, I examine two frameworks that Kirchhoff links his account
to. When attached to Hutto’s Radical Enactivism and Menary’s Cognitive Integrationism,
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Kirchhoff’s emphasis on diachronicity becomes a fully-fledged model of the cognitive subject.
The connections offer two valuable insights: first, Kirchhoff’s (2012) adoption of the third-wave
EM is a misnomer and, second, epistemic agency should not be reduced to a strictly retrospective
dimension. Regarding the first, unlike Cash (2013), Kirchhoff never draws upon functionalism as
an explanatory resource. Kirchhoff thus either uses the “third wave EM” label in a loose
rhetorical sense or wrongly presumes that the functionalism of EM is limited to Clark’s preferred
individualistic version. With that said, there are important similarities between Kirchhoff’s
diachronic subject and pure functionalism. Indeed, Kirchhoff’s (2012) endorsement of a
decentralized agent could be read as an argument for an unconstrained functionalism against
Clark’s individualistic rendering of EM. This similarity will be clarified in connection with the
second insight—namely, the strictly retrospective account of agency entailed by Kirchhoff’s
diachronic model. While Kirchhoff arguably overcomes the core view, he fails to overcome the
manipulationist presupposition. Accordingly, as I detail in the next two sections, the resulting
account of the cognitive subject is similarly flawed. The first-personal agent is missing, crowded
out by pre-determined ends and objective communal norms.

5.4

Hutto’s Radical Enactivism: Eliminating Basic Mental Content But at What Cost?

Kirchhoff positions his diachronic cognitive subject within Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin’s
Radical Enactive Cognition hypothesis (REC) and Richard Menary’s Cognitive Integrationism
(CI). In the next two sections, I unpack both frameworks, which have largely converged into a
single formidable interpretation of enactivism despite differing priorities and terminology. I
begin with Hutto and Myin’s (2013) REC since it addresses a lower level of analysis, offering an
account of embodied directedness that does not presuppose mental representations. My
explication of REC consists of two parts: first, identify Hutto and Myin’s polemical target and,
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second, present their account of basic cognition. At the end of the section, I raise a preliminary
issue with REC but postpone my full critique of its manipulationism until after having presented
Menary’s CI.
Even within the enactivist branch of 4E (i.e., embodied, embedded, extended, and
enactive cognitive theories), there has been a proliferation of differing interpretations. While in
Ch. 3, I noted two main strands of enactivism—the Varela-inspired phenomenological strand and
Noë’s sensorimotor contingency strand—Hutto and Myin (2013) critique both. The Varela strand,
they argue, falls prey to what they consider cognitivist terminology, such as “sense-making” (35).
Similarly, although Hutto and Myin consider the sensorimotor contingency theory less
problematic, they still take issue with Noë’s use of such terms as “practical” and “mediating”
knowledge in the context of basic perception (26). The underlying issue for both strands,
according to Hutto and Myin, concerns the thesis that Cognition necessarily Involves Content
(CIC); they claim that 4E theories in general have not been able to fully reject the thesis.
In an attempt to shift the rhetorical landscape within the philosophy of mind, Hutto and
Myin (2013, Ch. 4) present “The Hard Problem of Content” as the field’s most pressing issue. In
this context, the Cognition necessarily Involves Content (CIC) label serves as a tool for targeting
more subtle forms of representationalism than traditional cognitivist models. In opposition to this
framing of the philosophy of mind, Wheeler (2014) argues that the nature of mental
representation is a separate issue from the extent of cognition, noting that the content-vehicle
distinction enables different pairings of internalist and externalist positions regarding mental
representation. To this, Hutto, Kirchhoff, and Myin (2014) argue that REC undermines the
content-vehicle distinction, invoking REC’s account of basic cognition as an alternative. This
exchange highlights the general argumentative pattern of REC: its positive account of basic
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cognition follows directly from critiques of the thesis that Cognition necessarily Involves
Cognition. I turn now to the account of basic cognition that drives REC, aiming to show how it
obscures the form of enactivism that I espoused in Ch. 3.
One of the most extensive explications of the basic cognition entailed by REC comes
when Hutto (2006) addresses a group of critics, offering a number of clarifications and
amplifications often missing from his more polemically-oriented work. Hutto, for instance,
articulates his indebtedness to Millikan’s (1984, 1993, 1995) account of representations.
Specifically, Hutto (2006b, 83) draws upon Millikan’s notion of tracking sameness through
differences. On this view, tracking occurs through placing a “Strawsonian dot” for each distinct
substance to be identified, with each sensory modality identifying the dot in its own
characteristic way (84). Drawing upon Dretske (1981), Hutto understands Millikan’s notion of
tracking as an organism being “informationally sensitive to natural signs” (84). Hutto (2006a,
140) uses the connection to Dretske to drain Millikan’s dots of content: he writes, “the only
legitimate notion that can be derived from ‘information theory’ is that of covariance relations—
not referential or truth relations.” Hutto thus treats the dots as purely indexical signs rather than
possessing Millikan’s (1995) notion of primitive “pushmi-pullyu” representational content.
Whereas content implies its own conditions of satisfaction, Hutto’s indexicals do not. The
difference corresponds in turn to Hutto’s (2006d) distinction between propositional attitudes and
intentional attitudes, in which the latter are “propositional attitudes extensionally rather than
intensionally construed” (189; original emphasis). Hutto believes that conditions of
satisfaction—intensionality—require much more than indexicals; they require, on his view,
languages that can focus a creature’s attention on propositions. Although he does not have an
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extensive account of language’s origin, Hutto sketches what he believes are precursor social
mechanisms.
Hutto’s sketch of social cognition is founded on the broader concept of Action
Coordination Routines. Action Coordination Routines apply to all types of worldly engagements,
denoting instances in which routines develop between organisms’ informational sensitivity and
certain indexical signs (Hutto 2006c, 161). Hutto thinks there are an enormous variety of such
routines, including simple and complex behavioral patterns, but all share the basic format of
being “pre-scripted” (161). Given their automated nature, the coordination routines operate like
functional modules, as discussed by Fodor and Carruthers, except without informational content.
Turning to the issue of social cognition, Hutto argues there are coordination routines specialized
for “basic social responding” (165). That is to say, agents become informationally sensitive to
other people’s expressions, with common expressions prompting the creation of corresponding
automated responses. While far from foolproof, Hutto argues that these socially tuned responses
foster “embodied expectations” that serve as “reliable enough guides to ‘other minds,’ at least in
historically normal conditions” (166). Hence according to Hutto, there’s nothing qualitatively
different—at their most basic level—between the coordination routines related to social
interaction and those related to other types of worldly engagements. The special character of
social interaction does not appear until the emergence of symbol systems, such as human
languages.
Although REC does not have a detailed story regarding language’s phylogenetic origin,
Hutto and Myin (2013) offer an ontogenetic account of general symbol use. Their account
piggybacks Sutton’s second wave complementarity interpretation of EM, with one major
revision. While adopting the idea that external symbols transform and augment cognition, they
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make the additional claim that any decoupled symbol use is derivative in “both a logical and
developmental sense” due the fact that “coupled activities are the ultimate basis of the decoupled
ones” (153). What Hutto and Myin effectively endorse is a reverse parity principle, wherein
outside processes become internalized. The reverse parity model explains the rather striking
characterization of agency near the beginning of the book: “mentality-constituting interactions
are grounded in, shaped by, and explained by nothing more, or other, than the history of an
organism’s previous interactions” (8). Hutto and Myin thus argue that all mental aspects of
epistemic agency should be explicated in strictly retrospective terms, as if mentality were just the
sedimentation of an agent’s previous interactions. The retrospective orientation holds, of course,
below the level of mentality since the mechanisms that enable the acquisition of symbol systems
are understood to be, following the lead of Millikan, the product of natural selection. Having thus
explicated REC with an emphasis on its account of basic cognition, I turn now to some
preliminary issues, beginning with a concern that Hutto himself alludes to.
Identifying the proper functions of basic cognitive mechanisms is only possible in
principle. Following Millikan, Hutto (2006a) grounds the function of such mechanisms in natural
selection, but notes the inherent difficulty of actually identifying a function:
In principle, to decide this [a cognitive mechanism’s proper function] we would have to
determine whether or not the current conditions matched those which actually advantaged
the organism’s ancestors when the response systems were first selected. My bet is that in
most cases there would be no such match. (146)
Hutto sees himself as only raising an epistemic issue for third-personal observers, but it
highlights an inherent flaw with strictly retrospective accounts of epistemic agency. Granted, the
mismatch between present and past circumstances does not by itself impeach Hutto’s
retrospective account, as evidence for mismatch cases can be found in the existence of
dysfunctional mechanisms. While Millikan rightly considers this explanation of dysfunction a
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significant advance over most cognitive theories, it still marginalizes the epistemic significance
of error by treating it primarily as a structural mismatch between evolved history and present
circumstances. The variety of enactivism that I advanced in Ch. 3, by contrast, stresses the
productivity of error, error being integral to learning.
The productivity of error is tied to the prospective orientation of Bickhard’s interactional
model of representation (§3.2). Hutto fails to recognize the model’s insight, as evidenced by his
discussion of covariance relations. Despite rightly limiting information theory’s importance to
covariance relations, Hutto wrongly infers that representational content must be absent from an
organism’s basic cognitive capacities. What Hutto fails to recognize is that an organism acts as
its own point of reference: the covariance relation corresponds to Bickhard’s notion of
differential contact. The only information that perceptual differentiators contain about the
environment is that it caused a given final state within an organism to be reached, with the
internal state thereby implicitly defining the organism’s environment (§3.2). Using one’s internal
states as a reference point would be problematic if the primary purpose of representations were
to capture a mind-independent aspect of the world. But representations’ primary purpose is
instead to refine an organism’s interactive anticipations, which is an inherently salient task. As
discussed in Ch. 3, accounting for perceptual salience is the chief merit of Bickhard’s
interactivism, but I will postpone returning to this issue until next section, since the issue is
exemplified by Menary’s appeal to communal norms.
In closing my discussion of REC, it is worth questioning Hutto’s “radical” enactivist
label. REC leaves a great deal of the traditional cognitivist picture intact, simply anchoring
traditional symbolic capacities in primitive contentless cognitive mechanisms and extended
coupling activities. Bickhard’s interactivist model, by contrast, avoids positing a major leap from
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primitive to symbolic capacities, with the latter on Bickhard’s view simply consisting of an
organism’s abstraction from its own anticipations. Despite being a new level of abstraction,
learning still occurs through the same basic process of differential contact and implicit definition.
With regard to language, for instance, Bickhard and Hutto thus subscribe to fundamentally
different pictures. For Bickhard, human language is notable for its high level of abstraction,
though it still does not refer to a mind-independent aspect of reality. Hutto, by contrast,
subscribes to the classic picture of symbolic languages as possessing referential and truth
relations, thereby ultimately committing REC—albeit at a secondary level—to a much more
substantive notion of content than the variety of enactivism that I am defending.

5.5

Enculturation via Cognitive Practices: Menary’s Erasure of Epistemic Agency

Using Menary’s (2007, 2009, 2012) Cognitive Integrationism (CI) as a focal point, I argue in the
present section that a strictly retrospective account of the cognitive subject annihilates any
meaningful notion of first-personal agency. The critique applies to REC as well, especially given
the two frameworks’ affinities. Despite some notable differences, REC ultimately dovetails with
CI. Their biggest difference concerns their respective starting points: while REC is polemicallyoriented and geared towards low-level cognitive mechanisms, Menary builds CI on the concept
of cognitive practices.
The primary purpose of the cognitive practice concept is to differentiate between
different types of extension. More specifically, Menary wants to differentiate between
Enculturated Cognition and mere Artifact Extension: in the former an epistemic agent
participates in a cognitive practice as opposed to merely “outsourcing” or “offloading” an
epistemic task on another person or thing (Menary 2012, 148). Enculturated cognition implies
that the agent exhibits a certain cognitive character, whereas artifact extension does not. For an
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activity to be counted as part of an agent’s cognitive character requires that it is “part of the core
set of processing routines that directly lead to completing a task” (151). The activity has to be
integrated into the agent’s core set of cognitive processes. According to Menary, the core set of
cognitive processes are those specifically responsible for “reliable” belief formation (152).
Menary’s manipulation thesis more precisely clarifies the distinction between enculturated
cognition and artifact extension.
The manipulation thesis links the concepts of cognitive practice and character to
communal norms. Menary (2010a, 563) writes, “we create, maintain and manipulate cognitive
niches. … Cognitive manipulations are bodily engagements with the niche that are regulated by
norms.” The defining feature of cognitive practices—enculturation—is thus learning how to
skillfully manipulate artifacts in accord with norms, as opposed to identifying practices with the
artifacts themselves. Menary (2012, 161) uses the example of an airport security officer using a
baggage scanner: “The ability to manipulate the tool is part of my cognitive character; it is an
ability that I have to maintain by diligence. The processes inside the tool are not part of my
cognitive character … they are not abilities of mine.” While a baggage scanner produces an
image irrespective of its user’s abilities, security personnel need to be trained in order to read the
images properly and must maintain the skill through practice. Hence, on this view, the acquired
skill is part of the security officer’s cognitive character whereas the CT scanner is not. The
manipulation thesis highlights the integral role of norms within CI: norms are precisely what
differentiate cognitive practices from inert physical artifacts. Furthermore, the communal nature
of norms highlights an important affinity between CI and REC.
As with REC, the CI framework models cognitive development in terms of outside
processes becoming internalized. Using one of his favorite examples of a cognitive practice,
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Menary (2012, 152) describes learning a written language as follows: “the inside is transformed
to be more like the outside (as a kind of reverse parity principle).” As in Hutto’s picture,
decoupled “internal” skills—in this case, skills related to writing—derive from previous coupled
interactions with external artifacts. In relation to a cognitive practice, an individual’s epistemic
skills are thus meant to be tied to communal norms. To bolster the link between internal skills
and communal norms, Menary and Kirchhoff (2013) draw upon Hubert Dreyfus’s model of
expertise.
Menary and Kirchhoff (2013) argue that communal norms are most apparent for novices
but their visibility recedes with performative fluency. The norms shift from being explicit and
context-free to being entirely implicit and embodied. Even though embodied expertise cannot be
articulated in terms of explicit rules, Dreyfus believes it is a form of “practical objective
knowledge” (§2.2). Among the issues I raised in Ch. 2 against Dreyfus’s account, most
troublesome is how “objective” embodied knowledge dramatically narrows the epistemic
significance of social interaction: other people are at best an opportunity for implicitly copying a
piece of objective knowledge. While the extent to which CI is committed to Dreyfus’s flawed
model of coaching is debatable, his notion of objective embodied knowledge is a useful point of
entry for assessing the unwelcome ramifications that the cognitive practice concept has on firstpersonal agency.
Similar to Dreyfus’s notion of objective practical knowledge, Menary understands
cognitive practices in terms of stable patterns. The stability of cognitive practices explains how
communal norms, whether they are explicit rules or implicit embodied knowledge, are impressed
upon individuals. This portrayal of cognitive practices rests in part on Roepstorff et al.’s (2010)
work in cognitive anthropology, as cited in Menary and Kirchhoff (2013). Roepstorff et al.
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(2010) use the concept of patterned practices to supplant the more homogeneous notion of
culture common within neuroscientific studies:
Everyday life is continuously ordered into more and less stable patterns that are specific
to particular types of situations. … A patterned practice approach assumes that regular,
patterned activities shape the human mind and body through embodiment and
internalization. Vice versa, enacting practices shape and re-shape norms, processes,
institutions, and forms of sociality. (1051-52)
Roepstorff et al. thus show that characterizing practices as stable patterns does not entail that
practices are static inert entities. Even though, on this view, an activity that falls outside of a
given pattern is an aberration with regard to the corresponding practice, the authors note that an
agent can reshape the practice. Such a reshaping, however, presupposes that the practice first got
“under the skin” of the agent (1052). Despite thus pointing to a significant role for individuals,
picturing practices as stable patterns impressed onto individuals ultimately undermines firstpersonal agency, as evidenced by how this picture manifests itself in particular examples of
cognitive practices.
Three examples of cognitive practices from Menary and Kirchhoff’s writings are useful
illustrations of the approach’s ramifications for first-personal agency. First is Menary’s (2012)
previously discussed example of written language, whose allusion to a reverse parity principle
links CI to REC. Reverse parity corresponds to the notion of practices getting “under the skin” in
Roepstorff et al. (2010), an image that Menary and Kirchhoff (2013) reiterate in examining
mathematical reasoning. In the case of mathematical reasoning, the second example, Menary and
Kirchhoff substantiate the notion of reverse parity by appealing to Dehaene’s (2005) neuronal
recycling hypothesis, wherein cultural inventions “invade” evolutionarily older brain circuits and
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change their functions.119 The rhetoric of “invasion” is apropos—indeed, symptomatic—of the
agent’s stature vis-à-vis cognitive practices.
As a third and final example, Kirchhoff (2012) considers culturally attuned phoneme
perception, a case also discussed by Roepstorff et al. (2010). While the norms of a written
language can be explicated in terms of rules, phoneme perception is important since it serves as
evidence for the more contentious notion of objective implicit embodied norms. In a study
performed by Näätänen et al. (1997, 434), speakers of Estonian and Finnish languages were
found to have significantly higher sensitivity to non-prototypical vowel sounds when the sound
was paired with a vowel from their native language. As interpreted by Kirchhoff (2012, 298),
“patterns of practices at the socio-cultural level reshape the patterning of cortical connectivity
and activity.” The point of using the term “practice” is to suggest that language possesses a
stability—in this example, a specific pattern of phonemes—that transcends its particular
manifestations. The process’s stability corresponds to its causal efficacy: it is the practice “at the
socio-cultural level” that changes an individual’s neural structure, a process that only
incidentally—on this view—occurs through exchanges with particular language speakers. At this
point, given that enculturated imprinting encompasses both explicit rules and embodied skills, it
is worth asking whether anything is left of the first-personal agent.
It is helpful to consider the relationship between agents and cognitive practices in terms
of temporal directionality. As noted in the previous section, Hutto and Myin (2013) present a
strictly retrospective account of mental thought. By claiming that all mental thought is not only
“grounded in” but also “explained by” an organism’s past interactions (8), Hutto and Myin
119

Dehaene’s neuronal recycling hypothesis is an alternative to Quartz and Sejnowski’s (1997) neural
constructivism. In contrast to the latter’s plasticity, Dahaene believes that cultural inventions are constrained
by having to repurpose fairly rigid neuronal structures. Yet Menary and Kirchhoff are not particularly
concerned with the mechanisms of internalization so long as the broader picture of the outside becoming
internalized is retained, whether via structural or functional transformations.
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marginalize if not totally eliminate the spontaneity of first-personal agency. This issue is not
obviated by the fact that the passage addresses mental thought as opposed to basic cognition:
spontaneity is not going to be found in basic cognition’s “pre-scripted” Action Coordination
Routines either, since the evolutionarily and developmentally selected routines are even more
impersonal and automated. Given that the retrospective construal of the agent follows from the
reverse parity principle, Hutto and Myin’s characterization applies to Menary’s CI as well. For
both frameworks, the epistemic agent is sculpted by its history of communal norm-guided
interactions. The variety of enactivism that I advanced in Ch. 3, by contrast, treats agency in
prospective terms. The perceptual salience issue that it addressed manifests itself in the present
context in terms of an individuation problem.
On a retrospective account, it is unclear how to individuate cognitive practices and
epistemic agents. Seen from another angle, it is unclear how to individuate the salient aspects of
an agent’s interactive history with regard to a particular action. To address the problem by
referring to statistical regularities only highlights the complete absence of first-personal agency,
as the practice’s patterns are doing all of the explanatory work. As an alternative to retrospective
accounts, I turn now to my “team helper” example from Ch. 4. In the example, I understand
social identities in terms of Granic’s notion of behavioral attractors (§3.3, §4.4). As a behavioral
attractor, a social identity is not a causal force underpinning or driving an agent’s actions but
rather corresponds to what an agent recognizes as interactive opportunities.
My specific illustration of a social identity concerned social comparison pressures within
epistemic communities. The social comparison pressure involved instances in which an agent
remained reticent when a team member voices a point at variance with her own findings (§4.3).
Learning of and subsequently being able to recognize the behavioral pattern can empower the
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agent, enabling her to frame her actions as being a “team helper” searching for a “hidden profile”
as opposed to a “trouble maker” attacking a team member. In this case, the significance of the
behavioral pattern consists precisely in overcoming or mitigating it. The retrospective account
has its own way of explaining such cases, but, as argued in the next section, it relies on an
manipulationist presupposition that narrows the epistemic import of social interaction. For the
present moment, I only want to stress that it is the prospective orientation of the first-personal
agent that determines what particular aspects of her interactive history appear as relevant. While
an agent’s interactive history constrains its range of interactive opportunities, it is the agent’s
prospective directedness that determines in a given situation which interactions actually appear
as opportunities. The inchoateness of an agent’s interactive history thus appears as a virtue—
instead of a problematic indeterminacy—since it enables the agent to exploit its history in more
novel ways.
In the present section, I have raised a general concern with retrospective accounts of
agency. Even though Menary and Hutto rightly emphasize the social dimensions of cognitive
development, their retrospective accounts reify the patterns of cognitive practices and norms into
causally efficacious entities. As a result, the cognitive subject is annihilated, as similarly
witnessed with regard to functionalism. Furthermore, like functionalism, Menary and Hutto fall
prey to a manipulationist presupposition, which is needed in order to glue together what appear
to otherwise be historically contingent processes. As an alternative, in the chapter’s closing
section, I present a complementarity-based interpretation of enactivism.

5.6

The Encultured Mind: An Enactive Account of Complementarity

Sutton’s complementarity principle holds an argumentative advantage over Hutto and Menary’s
retrospective accounts. Complementarity is not saddled with the strong reverse parity claim and
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thus has a lower explanatory burden. Yet complementarity does not claim that the historical
dimension is irrelevant—far from it. The difference, as I detail in the present section, hinges
upon moving beyond manipulationism. After formulating Hutto and Menary’s manipulationist
response to the team helper example from last section, I present an enactivist interpretation of the
complementarity principle, drawing upon Gallagher and Miyahara’s (2012) enactive account of
intentionality and Di Paolo’s (2009, 2010) more general account of agency. In this context,
complementarity is understood in terms of reflective equilibrium. To begin, I want to consider
from a broader perspective Hutto and Menary’s models of the cognitive subject in order to
highlight its manipulationism.
Hutto and Menary’s account of the cognitive subject consists of two general layers: basic
cognitive mechanisms and public representational systems. Exemplified by Hutto’s notion of
Action Coordination Routines, the former fulfill pre-determined ends as ultimately set by natural
selection. Public representational systems provide novel means for accomplishing those basic
ends. In terms of the team helper example, the more basic layer can be seen as a leverage point
for counteracting social comparison pressures. The agent desires accomplishing a certain task,
the desire is undergirded by more basic ones, the most basic ones ultimately bottom out in
matters of survival (e.g., earning a paycheck to feed oneself). Hence, upon learning of the social
comparison pattern, the agent is driven by one of the more basic ends to counteract the pattern
rather than being enchained by it. The notion of the basic layer consisting of “pre-scripted” ends
is one of the clearest forms of the manipulationist presupposition in cognitive science and social
epistemology. Similar to Clark’s neural constructivism (§5.2), Menary’s discussion of cognitive
transformation is limited to finding novel ways to accomplish pre-established ends. But, as I first
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argued in Ch. 3, the creation and transformation of epistemic aims is one of the most vital
dimensions of social interaction.
To expand on the idea of generating epistemic ends through social interaction—first
discussed in relation to participatory sense-making (§3.3)—I turn now to Gallagher and
Miyahara’s (2012) enactive account of intentionality. To illustrate the difference between the
enactive and cognitivist perspectives, they invite the reader to imagine the following scenario:
you are driving a car along a road when you notice a person on the edge of the street looking
back and forth; you slow down or ready yourself to do so. In considering the scenario, Gallagher
and Miyahara argue that rather than forming a belief that the person might cross the road, which
subsequently led you to brake, the placing of your foot on the break pedal accounts for all of
your intentionality towards the pedestrian. Now if there were another person in the car who
asked why you had slowed down, then—in responding that you think the person might cross—
you would have formed a representation of the pedestrian. That is to say, reflecting on one’s
actions, as prompted on some occasions by another individual’s query, is not simply the
articulation of latent intentions. While the point is most pertinent for challenging cognitivist
theories, it also cuts against strictly retrospective accounts of agency.
The epistemic agent is not strictly a product of its past interactions. In the driving
scenario, the social interaction generates a new intention in part because of the inchoateness of
what Gallagher and Miyahara call “operative intentionality”: in the first scenario, the driver only
possesses an embodied directedness towards the pedestrian, while in the second—by simply
being prompted to reflect on the braking action—there is also a representation of the pedestrian.
Likewise in the team helper case: the behavioral pattern corresponding to social comparison
pressures is pliable, which explains why simply reflecting upon and recognizing the pattern can
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have a meaningful impact. The inchoateness of embodied directedness is a corollary to the
indeterminacy of an agent’s interactive history. In this way, Gallagher and Miyahara’s account of
enactive intentionality offers another perspective on why the indeterminacy of one’s interactive
history is an epistemic virtue: it is a inchoate resource to be exploited rather than a mass of
patterns that have been impressed onto the agent.
Di Paolo (2009, 2010) offers a more general perspective on the complementary
relationship between the agent and its interactive history. Di Paolo’s goal in the two essays is to
clarify why cognition is not reducible to autopoietic conservation. In Di Paolo (2009), this
involves conceptualizing how the sense-making activities of an organism can radically transform
its metabolic substrate. Part of this conceptual groundwork consists in using the notion of
operational closure as an alternative way of determining whether something is a constituent part
of a living system: a process counts as part of a living system based on whether it is conditioned
by another process of the system, rather than whether it is on the inside or outside of a physical
boundary (Di Paolo 2009, 16). Conceived in this way, it is possible to recognize cases in which
an animal’s behavior fundamentally reshapes the network of processes that constitute the living
system and thereby becomes itself a constituent process.
Di Paolo (2010) offers the water boatman insect (corixidae) as a concrete example of
how agency can transform an organism’s metabolic substrate. By trapping air bubbles on the
hairs of its abdomen, the water boatman is able to live most of its life underwater, where it feeds
mostly on algae (63). The insect’s preference for eating underwater plants leads it to live in
conditions more precarious than necessary for its survival and reproduction, a development that
does not cohere with a strictly autopoietic viewpoint. Agency opens up previously non-viable
domains and with it greater precariousness (66). By illustrating how agency intervenes in its
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metabolic substrate, Di Paolo explains how cognition is intimately related with though not
strictly an extension of autopoietic self-maintenance. Agency is not simply a means of
accomplishing pre-established ends but rather is capable—at the most fundamental level of its
own being—of creating new ends. Di Paolo (2010, 66) describes the reversal as a shift from a
“life-support of agency” (i.e., the organism acts to satisfy its autopoietic ends) to an “agency of
life-support” (i.e., the actions of an organism transforms its metabolic ends). Hence, while Di
Paolo stresses the importance of an organism’s interactive history, the agent is irreducible to it.
Having used two enactivist accounts to highlight the pliability of an epistemic agent’s
embodied directedness and its interactive history, I will now link them to the notion of
complementarity. The complementarity principle helps to clarify the ontological implications of
my general interpretation of enactivism—that is, my synthesis of Di Paolo, Gallagher, and
Bickhard’s respective works in Chs. 3 – 5. My understanding of complementarity cuts slightly
against Sutton (2014), since he leaves open the possibility of primitive representational content.
From this angle, Sutton treats the relationship of complementarity as holding between inner
representations and extended processes of engaging the world. On my usage, complementarity
refers to the relationship of differential contact between agent and environment. There is no
internalization of outer content, whether at a basic cognitive or symbolic level. Founded upon
differential contact with one’s environment, representational content is instead endogenously
produced by an agent, the content indexed to its own internal states.
My reading of complementarity finds common cause with and deepens the significance
of the most noteworthy innovation in twentieth century ethical and political philosophy: the
method of reflective equilibrium. For Rawls (1999) and Goodman (1983), reflective equilibrium
is a deliberative method crucial to negotiating conflicting demands, whether concerning
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induction or the political interests of disparate groups of people. Goodman’s (1983) original aim
was to shift away from the old problem of attempting to justify the act of induction to the new
problem of better understanding how acts of induction are actually legitimated. The shift is based
on how Goodman believes we already assess inductive inferences: we balance our endorsement
of general inferential rules with our assent to specific inductions (121). A rule may be revised,
for instance, if it is found to block a prediction we want to preserve upon reflection and vice
versa.
The enactivist version of the complementarity principle goes further by suggesting why
the old problem of induction is intractable. If mental content is intrinsically indexed to the
internal states of individual epistemic agents—as opposed to referring to objective mindindependent features of the world—then there is a basic reason why our epistemic methods lack
an objective foundation. For this reason, complementarity suggests that our practices of
justification, as described by Goodman (1983), is not a contingent or temporary limitation of our
cognitive abilities.
This rendering of complementarity also buttresses reflective equilibrium’s dramatic
social implications, beginning with Rawls’s application of reflective equilibrium to matters of
political justice. By the end of his career, it became increasingly apparent to Rawls that a general
convergence on a shared equilibrium amongst disparate groups of people was implausible
(Daniels 2013). In this context, Rawls’s desire to bracket appeals to moral truths is supported by
enactivist epistemology rather than requiring a special exception for ethical matters. With regard
to Kusch’s social epistemology (§1.7, §2.5, §4.4), the complementarity principle challenges his
division between natural, artificial, and social kinds. Despite a number of crucial insights,
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especially his critique of testimony theories, Kusch’s social epistemology projects too large of a
role for language. To recap, social kinds are the products of collective stipulation via language.
In Ch. 1, I noted that the distinction between artificial and social kinds does not hold up
to scrutiny, since a typewriter would cease to exist just as much as money would if all humans
disappeared. In both cases, all that would be left would be token traces: rectangular cubes of
metal, circular discs of metal, and so on. Enactivist complementarity takes this critique further,
challenging the distinction between natural and social kinds, which Kusch (2002b) adopted from
Barnes (1983). Enactivism undermines the underlying picture of words being pinned onto events
or material entities. Much of Kusch’s advances over other testimony theories stems from
emphasizing the performative dimension of language. But the notion of collective stipulation—
the centerpiece of Kusch’s account—entails an overly stable picture of the relationship between
language and world.
There are more social dimensions of knowledge than acts of collective stipulation. As
first presented in Ch. 4, I used the notion of a “team helper” as an example of a social identity in
order to move away from the overly stable categories implied by Kusch’s privileging of language.
The performative nature of language is important not because of the distinctive nature of
language but rather because language operates on a more fundamental embodied directedness.
Enculturation thus begins at a level prior to symbol systems, one of its most basic roles being the
generation of epistemic aims. Enculturation’s influence on inchoate embodied directedness is
obscured if one anchors the social dimension to language, as in Kusch, or to the underlying
manipulationist presupposition, as in the case of Hutto, Menary, and functionalist theories of
mind.
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For many types of epistemic analysis, the manipulationist presupposition is a useful
heuristic. Yet for a wide array of theoretical frameworks, as detailed in the present chapter,
manipulationism is an indispensable presupposition, necessary for gluing together what would
otherwise be a coincidence of processes. From this perspective, the epistemic agent turns into a
veritable Frankenstein, its only epistemically consequential features being those sculpted by
natural selection and its cultural intermediaries. In presenting the encultured mind, as understood
in terms of my enactive complementarity principle, I have sought to illustrate how profoundly
shaped we are by our historical, social, and developmental circumstances, influences that
because they intersect and interact cannot be fully isolated from each other. This profound
influence, as I have warned, should not however be equated with agency. The cognitive subject,
ever presumptuous, enacts its history in the process of creating a new one.
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Conclusion: Epistemic Enquiry, Encultured Enquirers, and their Future

6.1 From the Problem of Justification to Enculturation: How Much Has Changed?
In the preceding chapters, I have traced the movement in social epistemology from the abstract
problem of justification to the epistemic dimensions of embodied skills and enculturation. In Ch.
1, I harnessed the testimony literature—especially Goldman’s (1978) epistemics project—to
problematize the traditional picture of knowledge, wherein propositional beliefs are the most
fundamental epistemic unit. Tellingly, one of the most compelling presentations of the testimony
view—Kusch’s (2002a) communitarian epistemology—is centered on language’s performative
dimensions rather than its denotative properties. The insights of Kusch’s communitarian
epistemology, I argued, are best understood by abandoning the testimony framework in favor of
one that grounds cognition in an agent’s embodied interaction with its environment. Viewed
from this perspective, the testimony literature is a Trojan horse for justified true belief accounts
of knowledge rather than, as Schmitt (1994) suggests, a litmus test for refining them.
Moving to an embodied account of knowledge opens up new avenues of enquiry for
social theory. There are, however, a wide range of competing frameworks for conceptualizing
the embodied nature of knowledge, as evidenced by range of theories canvassed in Chs. 2 – 5.
Synthesizing the works of Di Paolo (2005, 2009, 2010), Bickhard (1996, 2002), Gallagher
(2005a, 2013), and Sutton (2010), I have defended an enactivist framework in which the futureoriented epistemic agent is in reflective equilibrium with her environment. For human epistemic
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agents, some of the most important environments are the many overlapping social contexts that
the agent is thrown into and subsequently participates within: that is, the embodied human
epistemic agent is intrinsically encultured.
In this concluding chapter, I offer a more general comparison of my interpretation of
enactivism to some of the competing frameworks. In particular, I address theorists who take the
naturalization of cognition seriously—especially those that recognize the primitive epistemic
significance of embodied skills—but regard enactivism with skepticism under the belief that
adopting it would involve radical changes while only promising nebulous advances. Clarifying
the methodological ramifications of enactivism for social theory mitigates some of these
concerns. In the second half of the chapter, I focus on what I consider to be the most distinctive
implications of the enactive framework—namely, the novel perspectives it affords with regard to
ethics. I articulate an important ethical implication of my account and argue that it is, in more
general terms, a fruitful framework for tackling many pressing ethical dilemmas.
To return to my skeptical interlocutor, two of the most basic objections that can be
leveled against my account is that it does not offer any crucial empirical evidence in its favor and,
furthermore, that its emphasis on the first-personal and encultured aspects of cognition would
hinder a number of contemporary research projects. To expand upon the latter issue, if the
emphasis on the first-personal dimension of cognition entails that each agent is unique, then it
would seem to cut against some of the most interesting results in neuroscience—such as the
findings concerning culturally specific phoneme perception and mathematical reasoning that
were discussed in Ch. 5. That is, if each individual is unique, then we should not expect to find
any meaningful identity across cognitive subjects. In raising the question how similar or different
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cognitive subjects are, the objection alludes to an important aspect of the relationship between
enquiry and enquirer.
The results of enquiry cannot be separated from the research interests or goals that
motivate its enquirers. This point does not entail a voluntarist constructivism: just because a
researcher may desire a particular result does not mean that she will find it. Instead, with regard
to the particular issue of comparing cognitive subjects, the point is that whether one finds
identity or difference across subjects depends massively on the level of grain the researcher
chooses. At one end of the spectrum are social epistemologists, who track population-level
patterns of epistemic communities. One of their main tasks is to identify mechanisms that would
otherwise be invisible or transparent if considered in terms of particular subjects. But a shared
pattern—while significant—does not prove that it is a self-contained, causally efficacious
phenomenon. The same lesson holds, at the other end of the spectrum, in appeals to fMRI scans
of individual brains: similarity of neural patterns does not establish that what has been identified
is the causally efficacious foundation of a particular epistemic skill. It is important to
acknowledge that judgments of identity across cognitive agents necessitate setting aside what are
considered negligible differences.
There are ineliminable differences amongst agents. These differences might appear to be
idle or negligible when viewed at a very high level of generality or, at the other extreme, in terms
of single isolated events. Who cares, for instance, if they are slight differences in neural
excitation patterns so long as the similarities appear to correspond to a salient epistemic trait. Or,
when viewed in terms of a single isolated event, who cares if there are slight differences in how
two agents accomplish a certain task, so long as the task is accomplished. To draw upon an
example from the end of Ch. 4, who cares if one person has an exact item-by-item printout for
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grocery shopping and calls it a “load list,” whereas another person only has a few items scribbled
on a piece of scrap paper. In the end, as this dismissal would have it, each comes home with stuff
to eat. But such apparently mundane differences are not always as fleeting and trivial as they
initially seem. Sometimes they reflect salient differences in the agents’ interactive histories,
reflect the differing epistemic ventures that each has participated in and that have transformed
the agent in signature ways. Such cases underpin the methodological proposal made in Ch. 4.
As proposed at the end of Ch. 4, one general methodological shift that would benefit
cognitive science and social epistemology is to move away from toy examples in favor of
focusing on cutting-edge epistemic pursuits. Using toy examples to establish the basic
mechanisms underpinning more complex cases presupposes the core view—that is, that there are
underlying mechanisms common to both cases. But it is the complex cases—participation in
innovative epistemic enterprises—that transform agents, as evidenced by the pervasive
differences that appear in how people accomplish mundane epistemic tasks. The methodological
shift does not entail that we should stop analyzing the activities of everyday epistemic agents in
favor of, to use one of the case studies from Ch. 4, physics research laboratories. The decisive
issue, instead, is that epistemic analyses should avoid searching for the lowest common
denominator across agents: whether examining the discovery of the top Quark or the compilation
of a shopping list, epistemic analyses should be mindful of the differing histories of the agents
involved, and how the differences can subtly manifest themselves with respect to a given task.
Accordingly, the general methodological shift that I am calling for casts into doubt “one-factor
explanations” of social phenomena, as touched on in Ch. 1. The sweeping enormity of one-factor
explanations depends heavily on positing the existence of some fundamental cognitive
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foundation—whether a neural core or a set of communal norms. The enactivist framework, by
contrast, involves multiple levels of analysis.
In addition to the first-personal and population-level perspectives, there is an institutional
level—what Shaun Gallagher and Anthony Crisafi (2009) call “mental institutions.” As
evidenced by my conception of social identity (Ch. 4), I think that institutions should be
understood in terms of opaque coordination mechanisms rather than as a codified set of norms or
a collection of physical artifacts. The latter two conceptions reify institutions, turning them into
pseudo-agents. The proviso follows in the spirit of Turner’s critique of Searle and normativism
(Ch. 2): epistemically productive social interaction does not presuppose a playbook, a codified
set of rules, or any other kind of formal organization (institutionalized or otherwise). Formalized
institutions might be necessary for certain kinds of tasks—e.g., modern scientific research
(Kitcher 1990)—but not for epistemically productive social coordination per se. And, following
Bickhard’s (2002) levels of knowing model, I understand the formal modes of social
collaboration as a more abstract and refined but still opaque mode of coordination.
Understanding the codified rules of social institutions in terms of opaque coordination
mechanisms links social institutions to more ephemeral though nonetheless formative epistemic
pursuits. From hobbies and other recreational interests pursued through clubs to even more
transitory interactions—such as helping a friend or family member with schoolwork or how to
use a new phone—there are many gradations in how formalized a social interaction is.
Accordingly, for social theory, there are many different possible levels of analysis. The more
ephemeral forms of social collaboration are not reflections of formal institutions; on the contrary,
it is the institutions that reflect the more ephemeral forms of interaction. Even in the institutional
contexts in which there is a codified set of rules that structure interaction, how the rules are
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understood and applied is shaped by each individual’s unique interactive history, of which
institutional training is only a part. It is the particular agents and their particular engagements
that make improvised use of the rules and tools of institutions. Hence, even though my
framework calls for analyzing a plurality of levels, the first-personal perspective plays a
distinctive role.
Having presented enquiry as consisting of multiple levels in order to afford more nuanced
comparisons of cognitive subjects, I have come full circle with regard to the objection it was
meant to address. To wit, the objection states that stressing the first-personal perspective and
uniqueness of particular agents would hinder many contemporary research projects. At this point,
it is worth noting that the first-personal perspective and the attendant model of enquiry do not
undercut what has been one of the most important perspectives for social epistemology and
cognitive science. That is, by denying manipulationism—the view that people’s epistemic
significance is of strictly instrumental value—it might appear as though my enactivist framework
undercuts the ability to examine agents’ behavior in terms of instrumental benefits, which is an
indispensable level of abstraction for cognitive science and social epistemology.
The enactivist framework does not dismiss the importance of instrumental analyses.
Instead, it entails that instrumentality should not be treated as the sole fundamental or isolable
factor in epistemic analyses. The danger with manipulationism—the dead-end, self-sealing
argumentative strategy—is to take cost-benefit analyses and resource maximization as the
ultimate aim of all epistemic activity, regardless of evidence to the contrary. Such an
argumentative strategy—as considered, for instance, with regard to ars memoria case study in
Ch. 5—is analogous to Ptolemaic astronomers, adding epicycle upon epicycle in order to save
the phenomena. Having thus already presented this critique, I turn my attention to the role that
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instrumental analyses still play within my framework. Instead of blocking such analyses, my
interpretation of enactivism entails that they should be treated as heuristic devices. The
difference between manipulationism and heuristic instrumental analyses is that the former
squeezes every aberrant activity into one of two results. On the manipulationist view, an activity
that does not fit a cost-benefit/resource maximization model is either dismissed as non-epistemic
cruft (e.g., an irrational agent) or is an indication of an undiscovered instrumental benefit that
necessitates tweaking a cost-benefit model.
Treating instrumental analyses as heuristic devices opens up a much greater range of
possible outcomes. Take, for instance, Fehr and Gächter’s (2002) concept of altruistic
punishment. In one of the more novel game theoretic studies, Fehr and Gächter found that
participants were willing to pay to punish free riders, despite knowing there would be no future
interactions with the person (137).120 And even though the groups were shuffled after each
punishment, the free riders’ contributions increased after having been punished.121 Hence, the
punishment is altruistic since the punisher incurs a cost without deriving a material benefit,
though it benefits the participants that subsequently interact with the free rider.
Altruistic punishment is an anomaly with respect to the three most prominent
evolutionary explanations of human cooperation. Kin selection does not apply since the group
members are unrelated, direct reciprocity does not apply since the group reshuffling prevents a
quid pro quo incentive, and costly signaling (i.e., reputation building) is impossible given the
120

In Fehr and Gächter’s (2002) “public goods” experiment, the participants—grouped into fours—had to
decide how much money to invest. Investing money came at a personal cost but benefited the other three group
members. It was thus in each participant’s maximal self-interest to invest nothing, but if no one invested any
money, then no one would benefit from the fixed return on investment. The identity of participants were kept
anonymous and the groups were shuffled after each investment decision in order to ensure there were no
subsidiary benefits for punishing the free rider (137).
121
The experiment involved punishment and no-punishment conditions. The average contribution was higher
in all sessions of the punishment condition. Furthermore, average contributions increased with each subsequent
round of the punishment condition (137).
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condition of anonymity. Falling outside of these three theories, Fehr and Gächter argue that
strong negative emotions were the proximate mechanism that explained people’s willingness to
punish free riders despite the steep cost (139).122
On a manipulationist view—given its adaptationist underpinnings—it is necessary to
present a selection history to explain altruistic punishment. One could argue, for instance, the
function of negative emotions in social contexts is to incline agents to punish free riders since it
results in greater cooperation, which nets an overall benefit (i.e., a “public good”). There are two
basic issues with positing such a selection history that I want to address. First, there is a
mismatch between an organism’s present environment and that of its ancestors. I raised this issue
in Ch. 5 with regard to Hutto’s conception of radical enactive cognition. Specifically—having
adopted Millikan’s account of functions—Hutto (2006a, 146; Ch. 5) concedes that it is
practically impossible to identify the proper functions of basic cognitive mechanisms due to the
likely mismatch between present and past environments. The mismatch raises the worry—which
applies equally to the three aforementioned evolutionary explanations of social cooperation—as
to whether the selected mechanism could still play a useful role in contemporary social contexts.
The second issue concerns the high degree of stability implied by a mechanism
possessing a selection history. This stability is illustrated by Hutto’s (2006c, 161; Ch. 5) concept
of Action Coordination Routines and Fodor’s (1983a) more well-known concept of functional
modules: in both cases, the mechanism is highly automated or, as Hutto puts it, “pre-scripted.”
With regard to altruistic punishment, the manipulationist sketch suggests that negative-emotionsin-a-social-context have been selected to serve the specific function of inclining an agent to
122

Fehr and Gächter’s claim that negative emotions were the proximate mechanism rests on two salient
punishment patterns: the highest contributors also paid the most to punish others and, second, the greater the
deviance from the group norm, the bigger the punishment (139). Surveys of the participants substantiated the
patterns: both the punishers reported anger and the free riders reported that they expected to be the object of
anger.
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punish a free rider, which in turn induces greater communal cooperation. As discussed in Ch. 5
in the context of strictly retrospective accounts of epistemic agency, the danger of positing such
highly automated and casually efficacious mechanisms is the risk of erasing any meaningful
notion of first-personal agency. It is not the agents doing the work but instead their selection
history; as a result, agency is weighed down and non-spontaneous. Given these and other issues,
there are incentives for approaching the origins of human cooperation without relying on the
principle of natural selection.
My enactive encultured framework enables an alternative approach to altruistic
punishment and human cooperation more generally, an approach centered on the concept of
participatory sense-making (Ch. 3). Viewing human cooperation in terms of coordination
mechanisms shifts the focus away from selection histories and towards the particular agents and
dynamics of interaction. This is because coordination mechanisms endogenously emerge when
agents interact. On this alternative approach, it is possible to reconstruct the three
aforementioned theories of cooperation in terms of coordination mechanisms.
As an example of reconstructing a selectionist account of cooperation, consider the case
of selfish reciprocity. Rather than linking selfish reciprocity to natural selection, it is possible to
look for context specific features that attract mutual exploitation. In Fehr and Gächter’s
experiment, for instance, the express goal of the experimental setting—acquire as much money
as possible via joint investment—attracts mutual exploitation. It was only another aspect of the
experimental setting that blocked the possibility of selfish reciprocity—namely, the shuffling of
groups. Shifting the focus to the particular agents and interactive context takes the pressure off of
reducing a particular mechanism to a specific function, a suspect methodology exemplified in
one-factor explanations.
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The above manipulationist sketch of altruistic punishment illustrates well the inherent
difficulties of ascribing specific functions to a mechanism. Reconstructing the negative emotions
as a coordination mechanism leaves open improvisatory space for the agents: when agents act on
the negative emotions by punishing the free rider, the negative emotions thereby serve the
function of inducing punishment in contrast to always possessing the specific function
irrespective of the agents’ actions. This distinction highlights the study’s results concerning the
dramatic difference between the punishment and no-punishment conditions: presumably, the
negative emotions are present in both, but the increase in cooperation only comes when the
individuals can act on the emotions. Alternatively, if the emotions differ in each context—a
plausible scenario—then this would strengthen the enactivist point, signaling a qualitative
difference attributable to the change in interactive context.
By treating particular agents and interactive contexts each as a primitive datum rather
than as manifestations of a more fundamental and discrete mechanism, the concept of
coordination mechanisms does not crowd out or weigh down the role of first-personal agents.
Furthermore, the concept affords a high level of generality—one can talk about a particular
coordination dynamic arising in a wide range of interactive contexts—while avoiding the
excessively abstract level of one-factor explanations.
This more context-specific approach to the levels of epistemic analysis dovetails with
treating instrumentality as a heuristic level of analysis. While the value of the instrumental level
of analysis is evidenced by its role in revealing phenomena such as altruistic punishment, it is not
the definitive context-independent standard of epistemic analyses. If a social interaction fails to
net a perceptible instrumental benefit—whether at the individual or higher level—it should not
be automatically relegated to non-epistemic cruft. The aims of epistemic agents vary across

258

contexts, as should the ends of epistemic enquiry. While I have thus responded to the second
objection regarding the types of analyses my framework permits, the reframing and broadening
of perspective noted in relation to altruistic punishment might appear as an idle consideration in
light of the first objection—namely, that the enactivist framework does not offer any decisive
empirical evidence in its favor but rather only the nebulous promise of broader perspectives.
I am doubtful of there being a single crucial piece of evidence, an empirical result, to
decide between my enactive account and the competing theories. It should be noted, however,
that this not uncommon in scientific enquiry. While there will likely be no shortage of
neurocognitive reductionist and eliminativist studies, the enactivism that I have advanced
promises to incorporate the worthwhile insights of such accounts and present them within a more
comprehensive framework. As evidenced by the range of theories that my account has drawn
upon, what I have defended is less a single theory of the cognitive subject-environment relation
and more an interdisciplinary framework for overcoming manipulationism in its many guises.
With that said, the closest thing to a crucial piece of evidence for the enactive view concerns its
ethical implications. That is, the broader perspectives of the enactive framework open up new
and extremely important dimensions of ethical enquiry.

6.2 The Information Age and Not-Just-Information Problems
By undermining the division between knowledge and its application, the encultured enactive
view entails that epistemology is intrinsically linked to ethics. Once the distinction is undermined,
manipulationism becomes ethically problematic. People are not—even from a strictly epistemic
viewpoint—resources to be exploited, yet the belief that they are informs knowledge policy and
social organizations. Recall, for instance, Fodor’s no-nonsense take on epistemology: “What
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philosophers call ‘linguistic deference’ is actually the use of experts as instruments. …
Epistemology … is mostly about money; e.g., about what I’m prepared to pay to insure that one
or another of my beliefs is true” (Fodor 1995, 36-37; Ch. 3). Fodor wants to dismiss the
significance of epistemology by treating it as merely a practical exigency. While Fodor’s point is
largely rhetorical, the economic incentives to promulgate manipulationism are very real: in the
information age, there is no need to pay an arborist to find out whether a tree is an elm. Likewise,
never mind paying a tutor or seeking help from a friend—there is a more convenient, oftentimes
cheaper, and much vaster store of information found in Google searches, digital assistants, and
IBM’s Watson. The information age can provide us with a practically infinite number of beliefs,
which, for the purposes of argument, I will even assume are largely true. (Or at least not
noticeably more untrue than the claims made by an average person on an average day.) The
information age would—from the viewpoint of Fodor’s thumbnail of epistemology—appear to
be an epistemic utopia. But the enactive encultured account of the cognitive subject suggests
otherwise.
Two questions my encultured account is specially suited to address are: first, how do our
acquired epistemic skills impact our treatment of and relationship to other people? And, second,
how do our beliefs about the nature of knowledge impact our treatment of and relationship to
other people? Beginning with the latter question: notice that although it might seem too abstract
a question for it to be of major ethical importance, the trust in internet search engines, digital
assistants, and the like depends on at least an implicit belief that there is nothing of consequence
lost when acquiring information from these sources as compared to another person. But the
information age comes with special dangers, such as the ease with which one can become lost in
a personal informational bubble. It is all too easy to go to sources that entertain us and confirm
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our views, especially when the search engine has a record of all our previous queries. In addition
to confirmation bias, our access to the sources is controlled by what promises to be increasingly
few corporate gatekeepers, with effects such as “googlearchy”123 often invisible to end users.
To escape our information bubbles, even if only temporarily, we need encounters with
alterity—with the Other. We need such encounters in order to jar us, to open us up to new
perspectives and new meanings, to change the way we live. What I have mind builds on Iris
Marion Young’s (1990) vision of heterogeneous public discourse. The enactive framework links
Young’s notion of discourse to less articulate but no less epistemically significant forms of
interaction, enabling more heterogeneous forms of communication. It is up to us to, following
Young’s vision, to come to know someone else and, in the process, become ourselves a different
person.
The enactive encultured framework, to be sure, is not the first theory to draw attention to
the epistemic dimensions of ethics. Miranda Fricker’s (2007) concept of epistemic injustice, as
touched on in Ch. 1, is in this regard one of the most important works in social epistemology.
Fricker offers an additional perspective on racial and sexist prejudices. Her most extensive
analysis concerns testimonial injustice, in which people subject to a racial or sexist stereotype
suffer from a “credibility deficit” (17). While valuable, Fricker’s conception of testimonial
injustice only scratches the surface of what social epistemology and cognitive science have to
offer ethics. Furthermore, testimonial injustice fails to address the novel forms of oppression
made possible by the coupling of manipulationism and the information age; in fact, the Internet
could be presented as something of a remedy for testimonial injustice, since it enables people to

123

The term “googlearchy” was coined by Hindman et al. (2003) in their assessment of how the Internet had
impacted access to political information. The authors found that a few successful sites received a
disproportionate amount of traffic.
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share their testimony behind avatars. Taken to a greater extreme: if knowledge is nothing but
information, then why bother with our bodies, or even with other people. Because she endorses a
traditional picture of knowledge in which beliefs are the most fundamental unit, Fricker’s
conception of epistemic injustice fails to recognize the distinctive ethical dangers posed by the
information age.
Recognizing the ethical dangers of the information age depends, in part, on considering
the first question above—namely, how our acquired epistemic skills can impact how we treat
other people. The prodigious and numerous beneficial achievements of the information age have
an intoxicating potential, as we seek to apply the same methods to new domains. But many of the
biggest problems that we face—including public health and environmental crises—depend on
more than the frictionless dissemination of information and cheap technological solutions. These
problems are instances, I argue, of not-just-information problems, which I take to be a subset of
what Garrett Hardin (1968) famously called “no technical solution” problems. Towards this end,
I offer two cases: Atul Gawande’s (2013) discussion of public health initiatives in India and
Maria Konnikova’s (2015) discussion of clean water technologies.
Noting the various successes and failures of public health campaigns against cholera and
infant mortality, Gawande (2013) challenges the conventional wisdom of the information age.
The key to success in such efforts, he argues, is a “sandals on the ground” approach, sending
massive numbers of people out into areas such as Bangladesh and India in order to directly
engage people in small groups. One of the leading causes of infant mortality, for instance, is
hypothermia; Gawande laments the wish for a technological panacea, such as cheap incubators,
noting that “kangaroo care” in which a mother swaddles her infant directly to her body is
sufficient for combatting the vast majority of cases. Furthermore, despite previous awareness of
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the medical protocols, Gawande details the sustained mentoring efforts that are necessary in
order to implement kangaroo care, higher standards of hygiene, and other crucial reforms in rural
hospitals.
More than providing information, Gawande likens the mentoring efforts of the public
health campaign in India to the change in social identity witnessed within American and
European medicine in the nineteenth century. Specifically, Gawande notes doctors’ resistance to
hand sanitation: Joseph Lister had published his antiseptic method in a prominent medical
journal in 1867, but sanitation procedures did not take hold until the turn of the twentieth century.
The decisive change was initiated by German doctors, Gawande argues, when they stopped
associating medical practice with battlefield surgeons, associating it instead with laboratory
scientists. The dissemination of information and technological advances were beneficial in both
cases but presupposed social mentoring, mentoring that creates new social identities and the
range of behavioral changes implied therein.
The environmental issue of access to potable world is another case in which social
mentoring must play an integral role. The technology exists for converting human waste to
drinkable water, yet implementing the technology has been met with near universal resistance
from people on all continents. This resistance holds despite the fact that people are informed that
the water from the “Omniprocessor,” as noted by Konnikova (2015), is more pure than unfiltered
tap water. As part of an ongoing effort to change people’s attitudes, Bill Gates has shot a
promotional video in which he drinks water that had five minutes previously been human waste.
The case of the Omniprocessor thus serves as an important illustration that it is not just the
poorest and least educated peoples for whom pure information is not enough, for whom
mentoring is essential for informing the way we live.
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Other people are a never-ending and interminable source of surprises, a source of
wonderment and frustration, a potential for liberation and oppression. Other people are a source
of superstitions and prejudices—including racial, gender, and cultural prejudices; but other
people also help us overcome them. The Other can jar us into recognizing an inarticulate bigotry,
such as when George Yancy (2008) describes, as a black man, walking across a street to the
sound of car doors locking and walking into an elevator as white women clutch their purses more
closely. Others, we hope, can jar us into overcoming our distaste for Omniprocessor water,
forcing us to consider what sorts of radical lifestyle changes the future demands of us. It is not
enough to hear statistics concerning the scarcity of water or even hearing of widespread
droughts; it takes watching one of the richest people in the world drink water that has been
distilled from shit to appreciate just how serious and immediate the problem is.
It should come as no surprise that the wonderment and frustration caused by others is in
no small part due to their indispensable epistemic roles. But such an obvious fact is easily
occluded given the history—both recent and distant—of how knowledge and the cognitive
subject have been understood and given the impressive—perhaps intoxicating—
accomplishments of the information age. Given this background, understanding the integral
epistemic roles of other people—recognizing that social interaction is more than a practical
exigency for acquiring information or some inarticulable skill—is a hard fought achievement.
Even when considered from a strictly epistemic viewpoint, other people are more than just tools
or resources to be exploited, manipulated, and managed. It is difficult to pay more than lip
service to this fact, but, as suggested by the Gawande and Gates cases, addressing some of our
biggest problems, problems that threaten our very future, depend on it.
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